Clipperton v. Allstate Insurance

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 6, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
LARRY CLIPPERTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 04-6113
v. (D.C. No. CV-02-1750-T)
(W.D. Okla.)
ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , ANDERSON , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Larry Clipperton appeals from the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the issuer of his homeowner’s insurance policy, Allstate
Insurance Company. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
On June 4, 2000, Mr. Clipperton’s home was damaged by a natural gas
explosion. An adjuster hired by Allstate inspected Mr. Clipperton’s home and
provided an estimate of how much it would cost to repair the home’s sheetrock
damage. The adjuster also recommended that Allstate retain an engineer to
inspect the home for structural damage. Between August 2000 and December
2000, the parties obtained divergent structural-damage estimates. In May 2001,
Allstate issued a check to Mr. Clipperton for the undisputed amount of sheetrock
damage. More than sixteen months elapsed, and in November 2002, Mr.
Clipperton filed this lawsuit in Oklahoma state court for breach of contract.
Allstate removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship and
filed a motion for summary judgment.
The district court held Mr. Clipperton’s case time-barred and granted
Allstate’s summary judgment motion, ruling (1) Allstate’s failure to raise in its
answer the insurance policy’s one-year limitation period did not result in a waiver
of that defense because Mr. Clipperton was unable to demonstrate that the belated
assertion unfairly surprised or prejudiced him; (2) the one-year limitation period
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began to run on the date that Mr. Clipperton’s home was damaged; and (3) the
coverage invoked by the damage to Mr. Clipperton’s home was a property
insurance loss, and as such, the one-year limitation period did not offend Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3617. On appeal, Mr. Clipperton argues that the district court
erred by finding his case time-barred and challenges each of the district court’s
rulings.
Diversity actions, such as this, are governed by the substantive law of the
forum state, but we follow federal law “in determining the propriety of the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.” Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co. , 256 F.3d 1013,
1016 (10th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we review de novo the district court’s grant
of summary judgment, applying the same standard as that court under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). See Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse
Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999).
Mr. Clipperton first asserts that his breach-of-contract claim is not time-
barred because he was prejudiced by Allstate’s failure to either deny his claim or
raise in its answer the one-year limitation period. But we cannot ascertain
whether Mr. Clipperton argued in the district court that he was prejudiced by
Allstate’s failure to deny his claim. 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2) (“For each issue
raised on appeal, all briefs must cite the precise reference in the record where the
issue was raised and ruled on.”). We therefore decline to consider this argument.
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State Ins. Fund v. Ace Transp. Inc. , 195 F.3d 561, 564 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999); 10th
Cir. R. 10.3(B); see also Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894, 896
(10th Cir. 1992) (observing general rule that appellate court will not consider an
issue not passed upon by district court). 1
And, although Mr. Clipperton identifies
as an issue on appeal that he was prejudiced by Allstate’s failure to assert in its
answer the one-year limitation period, he waived this issue by failing to support it
in his appellate brief. Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa , 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th
Cir. 1990); see generally Aplt. Br. at 10-14 (only addressing prejudice resulting
from Allstate’s failure to deny claim).
Mr. Clipperton next argues that the limitation period does not begin to run
until Allstate denies his claim. In support of this proposition, Mr. Clipperton
cites the same two non-binding cases he relied upon in the district court, Peloso v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. , 267 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1970), and Nicholson v.
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 517 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Ga. 1981). We
are not persuaded by Mr. Clipperton’s argument. He has not identified, and we
have not found, any Oklahoma authority to support his minority position. See,
e.g. , Peloso , 267 A.2d at 500 (acknowledging that the majority of courts hold that
1
Mr. Clipperton’s counsel also disregarded Tenth Circuit Rules 10.3(D)(2)
and 30.1(A)(1), and is reminded that these rules “are not empty gestures,”
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Accurate Autobody, Inc. , 340 F.3d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir.
2003).
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the limitation period should be calculated from the date of the casualty insured
against, not from the date that the insurer denies an insured’s claim).
Moreover, an unambiguous insurance policy must be enforced according to
its express terms, “giving the policy’s language its plain and ordinary meaning.”
S. Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. , 393 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2004)
(applying Oklahoma law); see also Dalton v. LeBlanc , 350 F.2d 95, 97 (10th Cir.
1965) (applying Oklahoma law) (explaining that the “insured is chargeable with
knowledge of the terms of his insurance policy” and bound by the terms’ legal
effect). Mr. Clipperton did not allege that the insurance policy is ambiguous.
The policy expressly states, “Any suit or action must be brought within one year
after the inception of loss or damage,” Aplt. App. at 4, ¶ 12. Giving the
foregoing language its plain and ordinary meaning, we agree with the district
court that the one-year limitation period began to run on the date that
Mr. Clipperton’s home was damaged. We likewise agree with the district court
that Insurance Co. of North America v. Board of Education , 196 F.2d 901 (10th
Cir. 1952), does not compel a different result. The record does not demonstrate
that Allstate, unlike the insurer in Insurance Co. of North America v. Board of
Education , engaged in dilatory tactics or extended the parties’ negotiations
beyond the expiration of the limitation period. Rather, the parties in this case
ended their negotiations in May 2001, one month before the expiration of the
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applicable limitation period; and then, Mr. Clipperton waited until November
2002 to file suit.
Mr. Clipperton also contends that the one-year limitation period violates
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3617. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs, the
record, and Oklahoma law, we agree with the district court that the one-year
limitation period does not run afoul of § 3617.
Finally, Mr. Clipperton asserts, without regard to 10th Cir. R. 27.1(C), that
it may be appropriate to certify certain questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
“Whether to certify a question of state law to the state supreme court is within the
discretion of the federal court.” Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc. , 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th
Cir. 1988). Here, we decline to exercise that discretion.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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