United States v. McCleary

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 25, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-6316
v. (D.C. No. CR-04-48-R)
ROBERT McCLEARY, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without
oral argument.
In October 2000, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned
of a bank fraud scheme involving Defendant and a number of other alleged co-
conspirators. The conspiracy involved a check kiting operation where worthless
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
checks were deposited into newly opened accounts for the purpose of artificially
inflating account balances. Defendant was charged in a three-count indictment
for bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1). Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Defendant pled guilty to one count in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining
counts.
At sentencing, the presentence report recommended that the district court
apply a two-level sentencing enhancement under § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) because Defendant allegedly
participated in more than minimal planning of the conspiracy. The presentence
report recommended an additional three-point sentencing enhancement under §
3B1.1(b) of the Guidelines for Defendant’s alleged leadership role in the
conspiracy. Defendant objected to the district court’s application of §
2F1.1(b)(2)(A) and § 3B1.1(b) arguing that the enhancement violated his Sixth
Amendment rights as articulated in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Rec., Vol. 1, at 1-5. The district court overruled Defendant’s objection and
sentenced Defendant to twelve months’ incarceration–the low end of the
Guidelines range. Anticipating that, in the wake of Blakely, the Guidelines might
be declared unconstitutional, the district court indicated that it would impose the
same twelve-month sentence were it not bound by the Guidelines. Supp. Rec.,
Vol. 1, Sent. Tr. at 25.
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On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence violated his constitutional
rights as recently articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker,
__U.S.__, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court announced that
types of errors can occur when a defendant is sentenced pursuant to the then-
mandatory Guidelines: constitutional error and non-constitutional error. United
States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731-32 (10th Cir. 2005). Constitutional
error occurs when a judge makes a finding of fact (other than a fact of prior
conviction) that increases a defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum authorized
by either a guilty plea or the jury’s verdict. Id. at 731. Non-constitutional error
is present in most pre-Booker cases and results from the district court’s mandatory
application of the Guidelines. Booker,__U.S.__, 125 S. Ct at 764. (severing 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)).
Here, Defendant claims that the district court committed constitutional
error when it found facts, beyond the terms of the plea agreement, that related to
sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines. Because Defendant made a
Blakely objection to the district court at sentencing, he preserved his Booker
argument for this appeal. See United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140,
1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that a Blakely objection is sufficient to preserve
a challenge of Booker error). We apply a harmless error standard of review to
cases involving constitutional error. Id.-3-
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) outlines the harmless error
standard, providing that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” The Supreme Court has directed
courts of appeals to remand cases for resentencing when the district court has
misapplied the Guidelines unless the court of appeals concludes that the district
court’s selection of the sentence was not affected by the error, i.e., that the error
was harmless. United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 875 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citing Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). The government
must also demonstrate that the error did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights.
Williams, 503 U.S. at 203. In cases of constitutional error, like the instant case,
the “beneficiary of the error”–the government in this case–must prove that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
In Labastida-Segura, we held that a sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines range demonstrates that the error is not harmless and warrants an
automatic remand for resentencing. 396 F.3d at 1143. The district court’s
twelve-month sentence under the then-mandatory Guidelines regime, at the low
end of the Guidelines range, is, therefore, not harmless. But that does not end our
inquiry because the district court in this case provided an alternate sentence.
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In United States v. Serrano-Dominiguez, 1 we affirmed the district court’s
alternate sentence which was identical to the unconstitutional Guidelines sentence
that the district court had also imposed. 406 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005).
Defendant’s case is analogous to Serrano-Dominiguez. The district court here
stated unequivocally that it would impose the same sentence even if it were not
bound by the Guidelines. It therefore imposed identical alternative sentences–one
under the Guidelines and the other in case the Guidelines were held to be
unconstitutional. Supp. Rec., Vol. 1, Sent. Tr. at 25. Because of the district
court’s remarkable prescience, “we do not need to read any tea leaves to
determine what the district court would do on remand.” Serrano-Dominguez, 406
F.3d at 1223. A remand would be futile. See id. at 1224 (“[A] remand would
needlessly burden the district court and counsel with another sentencing
proceeding, which we know would produce the same result.”). 2 Additionally, the
alternative sentence imposed by the district court was well below the statutory
maximum of thirty years, and overall, we find it to be reasonable. See
1
While Serrano-Dominguez dealt with non-constitutional Booker error
instead of the type of constitutional Booker error at issue in this case, the effect
would be the same for either error; thus, the distinction is trivial.
2
We do not reach Defendant’s ex post facto clause argument since we are
not remanding the case. Aplt. Br. at 22 ( “[T]he district court on remand may
sentence anywhere below the applicable Guideline range, but not above that range
based on the remedy fashioned by Justice Breyer’s opinion.” (emphasis in
original)). Because we affirm the district court’s sentence on other grounds, we
will not address this argument.
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Booker,__U.S.__, 125 S. Ct. at 766-67.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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