United States v. Rios-Zamora

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 9, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 04-3186
v. (D. Kansas)
JESUS RIOS-ZAMORA, (D.C. No. 03-CR-20152-GTV)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, McKAY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2003, Jesus Rios-Zamora was charged with one count of
being found illegally in the United States after having been deported, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Mr. Rios-Zamora moved to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and
the attendant transfer of certain immigration-related responsibilities from the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of T ENTH C IR . R. 36.3.
Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003 created
an overbreadth or vagueness defect in the indictment. The district court denied
the motion.
Mr. Rios-Zamora then entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea
agreement that preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss
the indictment, but waived any rights to appeal a sentence within the guideline
range determined by the court. The district court sentenced Mr. Rios-Zamora to
77 months of imprisonment, to be followed by a two-year term of supervised
release.
Mr. Rios-Zamora (1) appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss the
indictment, and (2) contends that, in the wake of United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2005), the district court erred when it sentenced him under a mandatory
sentencing scheme. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the
district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. In addition, we
hold that Mr. Rios-Zamora cannot bring a Booker challenge because his plea
agreement knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Challenges to the Indictment
Mr. Rios-Zamora contends that the indictment (1) charged him with an
additional element offense that is not in the statute (the failure to obtain the
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advance consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security for readmission to the
United States); (2) failed to satisfy the Notice Clause of the Sixth Amendment and
the Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and is therefore unconstitutionally
vague, and (3) charged him with conduct that he was incapable of committing.
“Generally, we review the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment for an abuse of discretion. However, when the dismissal involves
issues of statutory interpretation, or when the sufficiency of a charge is
challenged, we review the district court’s decision de novo.” United States v.
Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1248-49 (10th Cir.2000).
The indictment read as follows:
On or about September 16, 2003, in the District of Kansas, JESUS
RIOS-ZAMORA, the defendant herein, an alien, that is, a person who
is not a citizen or national of the United States, was knowingly and
unlawfully found in the United States without obtaining advance
consent from the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security for readmission to the United States after having been
convicted of an aggravated felony and having been deported from the
United States on or about August 5, 2002, in violation of Title 8 United
States Code, Section 1326(a) and (b)(2), with reference to Title 6
United States Code, Sections 202(3), 202(4), 557.
Rec. vol. I, doc. 13, at 1 (emphasis added).
1. The indictment sufficiently charged the offense
Section 1326(a) provides:
[A]ny alien who–
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(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United
States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the
United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous
territory, the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's
reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously
denied admission and removed, unless such alien shall establish that he
was not required to obtain such advance consent under this chapter or
any prior Act,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (emphasis added).
Mr. Rios-Zamora contends that the indictment is fatally flawed because it
charges an element not contained in § 1326, that is, Mr. Rios-Zamora must have
“obtain[ed] advance consent from the . . . Secretary of Homeland Security for
readmission to the United States.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 13, at 1.
“On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased to
exist as an agency within the Department of Justice, and its enforcement functions
were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.” United States v.
Sandoval, 390 F.3d 1294, 1296 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004). See Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 1 The government responds
1
At oral argument, the panel asked the government to trace the statutory
and regulatory provisions that preceded the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security. In its supplemental authority, the government explains that,
prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Attorney
(continued...)
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that the statutory reference to the Attorney General that currently remains in the
text of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 was addressed by a proviso in the Homeland Security Act
deeming such references to refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security:
With respect to any function transferred by or under this chapter
(including under a reorganization plan that becomes effective under
section 542 of this title) and exercised on or after the effective date of
this chapter, reference in any other Federal law to any department,
commission, or agency or any officer or office the functions of which
are so transferred shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary, other
official, or component of the Department to which such function is so
transferred.
6 U.S.C. § 557 (emphasis added).
We agree with the government and the district court that the indictment
sufficiently charges an offense under § 1326. To the extent the indictment
includes an additional allegation, that is, the advance consent from both the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, such language might
1
(...continued)
General’s statutory authority to consent to a previously removed alien’s
reapplying for admission was found in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii),
(a)(9)(C)(ii). The Attorney General’s more general authority in immigration
matters was addressed in 8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(1) (2000).
Regulations governing the procedure for obtaining consent to reapply for
admission after removal are set out in 8 C.F.R. § 212.2. Regulations delegating
the authority of the Attorney General to enforce the Immigration and Nationality
Act and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of
aliens to the INS Commissioner, and regulations further delegating authority to
INS regional and district directors, were set out in 8 C.F.R §§ 2.1, 100.2(a) & (d),
103.1(g) (2001). In addition, 6 U.S.C. § 271(b) transfers adjudications previously
made by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to the Director of
the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration.
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be mere surplusage that need not be proven. See United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d
436, 439 (10th Cir. 1988) (“When the language of the indictment goes beyond
alleging the elements of the offense, it is mere surplusage and such surplusage
need not be proved.”). With the transfer of authority under § 557, as of March 1,
2003, the title “Attorney General” is synonymous with the Secretary of Homeland
Security. Under the Homeland Security Act, only advance consent from the
Secretary of Homeland Security is required, and the government concedes as
much. Finally, the record establishes that Mr. Rios-Zamora did not seek
permission (1) either from the Attorney General from the date of his deportation
until March 1, 2003, or (2) from the Secretary of Homeland Security after March
1, 2003. Mr. Rios-Zamora’s challenge thus fails.
2. Section 1325 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Rios-
Zamora
In a similar vein, Mr. Rios-Zamora contends that § 1326 is
unconstitutionally vague because of the absence of a reference to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, therefore not providing fair notice of the need for such
advance consent.
[T]he fair warning requirement embodied in the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the [government] from holding an
individual “criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, [617] (1954). This prohibition against excessive vagueness
does not, however, invalidate every statute which a reviewing court
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believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes
will have some inherent vagueness, for “in most English words and
phrases there lurk uncertainties.” Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S.
282, [286] (1945).
United States v. Herrera, 584 F.3d 1137, 1149 (2d Cir. 1978) (some citations
omitted).
Although we agree with Mr. Rios-Zamora that § 1326 and § 557 fail to
cross-reference each other, it is of no consequence here. Had Mr. Rios-Zamora
sought advance consent from the Attorney General pursuant to §1326 to the
Attorney General, and the Attorney General neglected to refer the application to
the Secretary of Homeland Security, he might present a persuasive argument.
However, as we have noted, Mr. Rios-Zamora failed to seek advance consent
from either the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. Thus,
we conclude that the statute made it sufficiently clear that he was barred from
returning to the United States without permission. See e.g., United States. v.
Vanness, 342 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 2003) (declining to reach determination
of whether unreasonable noise ordinance was unconstitutional). Section 1326 is
not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Rios-Zamora.
3. Mr. Rios-Zamora was legally capable of performing the act with which
he was charged
In his final challenge to the indictment, Mr. Rios-Zamora contends that he
is alleged to have illegally re-entered the United States in June 2003. At that
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time, the Attorney General was no longer responsible for consenting to
applications for permission to enter the United States. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(3), (4).
Thus, he argues that an application to the Attorney General during June 2003
would have been futile and of no legal effect. According to Mr. Rios-Zamora,
because he cannot violate the law if he fails to perform an act that he is legally
incapable of performing, the indictment cannot be upheld.
Mr. Rios-Zamora’s argument is flawed for several reasons. First, the
indictment did not charge him with illegal reentry in June 2003. Rather, the
indictment alleged that Mr. Rios-Zamora was found unlawfully in the United
States on September 16, 2003, after having been deported on August 5, 2002.
Second, as the government points out, Mr. Rios-Zamora could have obtained
permission to reenter (1) from the Attorney General from the date of his
deportation until the transfer of authority on March 1, 2003, or (2) from the
Secretary of Homeland Security beginning on March 1, 2003. See Aple’s Br. at
17. Mr. Rios-Zamora was not charged with an act that he was incapable of
performing.
B. Mr. Rios-Zamora’s Plea Agreement Waived His Right to Maintain a
Challenge to his Sentence
Mr. Rios-Zamora also contends that we should remand his case for
resentencing in light of Booker because the district court erred in applying the
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guidelines in a mandatory fashion. However, in his plea agreement, Mr. Rios-
Zamora “knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] any right to appeal or collaterally
attach any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction and sentence,
with the exception that he [could] appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the
indictment.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 30, at 5 (emphasis omitted). Mr. Rios-Zamora also
“knowingly waive[d] any right to appeal a sentence imposed which is within the
guideline range determined appropriate by the court,” unless the United States
exercises its right to appeal the sentence. Id.In his reply brief, Mr. Rios-Zamora acknowledges that our holding in
United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005), “appears to dispose of
[his] claim regarding Booker.” Reply Br. at 5-6. In Green, we noted that “a
defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is not otherwise unlawful based on the
subsequent issuance of Booker.” 405 F.3d at 1191. Mr. Rios-Zamora nonetheless
raises this claim in the event that the en banc court reconsider its holding in
Green.
We appreciate Mr. Rios-Zamora’s candor, and agree that his pre-Booker
plea agreement was knowing and intelligent. Further, our enforcement of Mr.
Rios-Zamora’s waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice because the (1)
sentence was within the recommended guideline range, (2) the district court did
not rely on an impermissible factor at sentencing, and (3) the sentence was not
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otherwise unlawful. Thus he is unable to raise this Booker challenge because our
holding in Green precludes his claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss the indictment, and we ENFORCE Mr. Rios-Zamora’s waiver of his right
to appeal his sentence, thus dismissing that part of the appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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