United States v. Bell

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 20, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 05-6208
v. (D.C. Nos. 99-CV-00348 and
CR-96-84-T)
HAROLD EUGENE BELL, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Harold Eugene Bell, a prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal from the district court’s denial of his “Motion
for Reconsideration and Clarification,” which sought reconsideration of an earlier
motion to have his initial § 2255 motion reopened. 1 The earlier motion (filed in
2005) sought reopening on the basis that the district court re-characterized certain
pleadings (filed in 1999) and did not advise Mr. Bell of the need to raise every
available constitutional claim so as to avoid the restrictions associated with
second or successive § 2255 motions. R. Doc. 239. The district court construed
1
Mr. Bell also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
the motion for reconsideration as arising under Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and
denied it.
Briefly, by way of background, Mr. Bell was convicted in 1997 of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine powder and cocaine base (i.e., crack), and
sentenced to life imprisonment. This court affirmed that conviction in United
States v. Bell, 154 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1998). Next, Mr. Bell filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal and/or a new trial on February 22, 1999. The district court
construed the motion as a request for habeas relief under § 2255, and denied it
because Mr. Bell failed to present any newly discovered evidence. Mr. Bell
sought a COA in order to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2255 motion.
In an unpublished opinion, we determined that the district court did not err in
treating the motion as one requesting relief under § 2255, and subsequently
denied Mr. Bell’s request for a COA. United States v. Bell, 1999 WL 713320 at
*1 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 1999) (unpublished).
We agree with the district court that the present motion to reconsider may
be characterized as a Rule 60(b) motion. In the § 2254 context, the Supreme
Court recently held that a Rule 60(b) motion should not be construed as a second
or successive habeas petition where it does not add a new claim for relief or
challenge the district court’s resolution of prior claims on the merits. Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2648 (2005). Where a motion challenges a perceived
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“defect in the integrity of the proceedings” under § 2254, a Rule 60(b) motion is
appropriate. The reasoning of Gonzalez v. Crosby has been extended to § 2255
motions which implicate similar concerns of successiveness. United States v.
Scott, 414 F.3d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 2005).
With liberal construction, Mr. Bell may be said to be challenging the
mechanics of the disposition of his prior motion. Mr. Bell needs a COA to
proceed. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2650 n.7. Where the district court dismisses a
petition on procedural grounds, a COA requires the inmate to demonstrate that it
is reasonably debatable whether (1) the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right, and (2) the district court’s procedural ruling is correct.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
The district court’s resolution is not debatable at all. Given an abuse of
discretion standard of review, no reasonable jurist could conclude that the district
court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion, which in and of
itself was successive of the initial motion to reopen. Moreover, we had approved
of the district court’s handling of the matter as a § 2255 motion previously. Bell,
1999 WL 713320 at *1.
We DENY IFP, DENY a COA, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
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Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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