Nickola v. Storage Technology Corp.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 29, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JANICE MARIE NICKOLA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1403
(D.C. No. 02-M-1605 (MJW))
STORAGE TECHNOLOGY (D. Colo.)
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Janice Marie Nickola, proceeding pro se here as in the district
court, appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of her
former employer Storage Technology Corp. (StorageTek) on her claims brought
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213(ADA). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Ms. Nickola has filed a motion to supplement the record, which StorageTek
opposes. We grant the motion to supplement.
I. Background
Ms. Nickola was employed in the manufacturing division of StorageTek.
Due to an October 2000 injury to her right hand and wrist, she was placed on light
duty and then transferred to the Transitional Duty Department, where she worked
until her employment with StorageTek ended. Ms. Nickola informed her
employer that she would not return to any manufacturing position, and she sought
another type of job within the company. She was looking for a big promotion
from her manufacturing job, R. Vol. I, Doc. 65, Ex. A, at 278, and she applied for
positions such as director of corporate alliances, business process consultant, and
strategic planning analyst, even though by her own admission, she was not
qualified for them. Id. Doc. 65, Ex. A, at 284; Exs. L & M. Although she was
qualified for secretarial work, she did not apply for those jobs because she
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preferred a position more suited to her personality and career goals. 1
Id. Vol. I,
Doc. 65, Ex. A, at 207; id. Vol. II, Doc. 84, Ex. 35, at 5. Ms. Nickola declined an
opportunity for a position as a business analyst. Id. at 170-71.
The medical evidence pertaining to Ms. Nickola’s hand and wrist injury
consisted of the treatment notes of the on-site physician, Randy Reims, M.D., the
second opinion of another physician, Dr. Fry, that Ms. Nickola required additional
treatment, and the determination of the workers’ compensation board that
Ms. Nickola’s injury resulted in an eighteen percent permanent partial disability.
Dr. Reims’s notes indicated that the only activities Ms. Nickola should limit were
lifting, carrying, and removing staples with her right hand. On February 23,
2001, Dr. Reims released her to work without restriction, with the understanding
that she had decided not to return to her former job in the manufacturing division.
Ms. Nickola, who had not found another position with StorageTek, then left its
employ. The parties dispute whether she resigned or was discharged, but the
circumstances of her termination are irrelevant, as explained below.
1
Ms. Nickola testified at her deposition that she did not want a secretarial
position. Citing Franks v. Nimmo , 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986), she
asserts that her deposition testimony is not binding. Ms. Nickola’s situation is
unlike that in Franks because Ms. Nickola’s deposition testimony does not
conflict with her later affidavit. Both the testimony and the affidavit explain that
she did not want a secretarial position. Cf. id. (holding that plaintiff’s affidavit,
that conflicted with his earlier sworn testimony, should be disregarded on
summary judgment as raising a sham fact issue).
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After exhausting her administrative remedies, Ms. Nickola brought this
action alleging that she was a qualified individual with a disability, as defined in
the ADA, and that StorageTek discriminated against her on the basis of her
disability. She asserted that her impairment substantially limited her ability to
perform the major life activity of “working.” The district court granted summary
judgment to StorageTek and denied Ms. Nickola’s post-judgment motion.
Ms. Nickola appeals the rulings against her on her ADA claims. 2
II. Summary Judgment Standards
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Lanman v. Johnson County, 393 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment will be
granted to defendant if plaintiff “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322. “Thus, to
2
Ms. Nickola has abandoned on appeal her claims based on other legal
theories, including those for defamation, a federal contractor’s duty concerning
affirmative action, and violation of Title VII. She does not appeal the order
denying her post-judgment motion.
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survive summary judgment the plaintiff has the burden to put forth sufficient
evidence to warrant a verdict as a matter of law; a scintilla of evidence will not
suffice.” Lanman, 393 F.3d at 1154-55. Ms. Nickola is representing herself on
appeal so her pleadings will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
III. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA requires StorageTek to provide “reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [StorageTek] can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its]
business.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A “qualified individual with a disability”
is a person “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires.” Id.§ 12111(8). In this context, “disability” means that an individual has “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(2).
Ms. Nickola asserts that she is a qualified individual with a disability who
has a physical impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of
working. She also alleges that StorageTek discriminated against her on the basis
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of her actual disablity and because it regarded her as disabled. We determine that
she has waived any claim based on a record of her impairment because she did not
raise it in her opening brief on appeal. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon , 31
F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
Ms. Nickola bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case. See
MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver , 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding in summary-judgment context, “plaintiff initially must raise a genuine
issue of material fact on each element of the prima facie case”). To do so, she
must demonstrate that (1) she is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) she
is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she was
discriminated against due to her disability. Aldrich v. Boeing Co. , 146 F.3d 1265,
1269 (10th Cir. 1998). We conclude that Ms. Nickola has not established the first
criterion – that she is disabled as defined by the ADA – and, therefore, the other
criteria are irrelevant, including the issue of whether she resigned or was fired.
(A) Actually Disabled
Under § 12102(2)(A), a plaintiff must establish that “an impairment
substantially limits at least one major life activity.” Doebele v. Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co. , 342 F.3d 1117, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003). “‘Substantially’ in the phrase
‘substantially limits’ suggests ‘considerable’ or ‘ to a large degree.’” Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams , 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002). A claimant is not
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disabled for ADA purposes merely by having an impairment. Id. at 195. A
claimant must also “demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life activity.”
Id.Ms. Nickola asserts that her wrist injury prevents her from performing the
essential functions of her former manufacturing job pertaining to pushing tubing
onto a plastic elbow joint and pounding the parts into position. To establish that
this injury is disabling, she relies on the notes from Dr. Reims and Dr. Fry and the
determination from the workers’ compensation board that she sustained an
eighteen percent permanent partial disability. She concedes, however, that her
wrist impairment does not limit other activities and that she does not consider
herself to be disabled. R. Vol. I, Doc. 65, Ex. A, at 329-30; id. Ex. EE, at 1. The
doctors’ reports and workers’ compensation determination, without evidence of
substantial limitations caused by the impairment, are insufficient to establish
disability status under the ADA. Cf. Toyota Motor , 534 U.S. at 198 (holding
evidence of medical diagnosis of an impairment is insufficient, standing alone, to
prove disability status in performing manual tasks). We hold that Ms. Nickola’s
showing that she cannot perform the specific manual tasks required for her former
manufacturing position is insufficient to demonstrate genuine fact issues as to
whether she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
Therefore, because she cannot make out the first element of a prima facie case,
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Ms. Nickola’s ADA “actually disabled” claim must fail, and the entry of summary
judgment in StorageTek’s favor was correct.
(B) Regarded as Disabled
Ms. Nickola next asserts that she is entitled to protection under the ADA
because StorageTek regarded her as disabled. There are two ways an individual
may qualify under the “regarded as” section, § 12102(2)(C): (1) the employer
“mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities,” or (2) the employer “mistakenly believes
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). To
withstand summary judgment under this rule, Ms. Nickola must come forward
with triable evidence showing that StorageTek regarded her as substantially
limited in her identified major life activity of working. Rakity v. Dillon
Companies, Inc., 302 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2002). “[I]n order to establish a
disability under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the ADA with respect to the major life
activity of working, an individual must show that the employer regarded him or
her as being substantially limited in performing either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes.” Steele v. Thiokol Corp. , 241 F.3d 1248, 1256
(10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
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Ms. Nickola argues that StorageTek regarded her as disabled because it did
not offer her a job after she was medically released and because it could not find
a position in the entire organization for her. She claims that since StorageTek
was aware of her on-the-job injury that prevented her from returning to her
manufacturing position, its failure to find her a different job demonstrates that it
regarded her as disabled under the ADA. See R. Supp. Vol. IA, at 14.
Ms. Nickola’s argument is disingenuous. First, StorageTek invited and
assisted her to apply for other jobs within the company, which indicated that it did
not regard her as substantially limited in her ability to work. See McGeshick v.
Principi , 357 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating employer’s invitation to
plaintiff to apply for jobs indicated that employer “did not perceive [plaintiff] as
substantially limited in his ability to perform major life activities”). Moreover,
Ms. Nickola concedes that StorageTek provided her an opportunity for a position
as a business analyst, but she declined it. StorageTek’s job opportunity “clearly
shows [Ms. Nickola] was not perceived as unable to perform an entire class or
broad range of jobs.” Lanman, 393 F.3d at 1158 (reviewing employer’s continued
willingness to employ plaintiff); see also Rakity, 302 F.3d at 1164 (holding
employer’s continuing willingness to employ plaintiff in his current position
amounted to undisputed evidence that it did not regard him as substantially
limited in his ability to work); cf. Doebele, 342 F.3d at 1134 (holding fact-finder
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could infer that supervisors believed plaintiff was precluded from broad range of
jobs by their refusal to consider position for plaintiff that would implement her
doctor’s requested accommodations at a time company was hiring 200-300 people
a week). Accordingly, we hold that Ms. Nickola has failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact on her claim that StorageTek regarded her as
disabled. Consequently, summary judgment in favor of StorageTek on this claim
was appropriate.
IV. Conclusion
Ms. Nickola’s motion to supplement the record is granted. The judgment of
the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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