United States v. Lee

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 19, 2006
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-3071
(D.C. Nos. 04-CV-3389-JTM and
UNDRA D. LEE, 93-CR-10043-JTM)
(D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Undra D. Lee appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
district court determined that Mr. Lee’s motion was untimely because it was filed
outside the one-year period of limitation contained in the Antiterrorism and
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1)-(4). Mr. Lee
does not dispute that his judgment of conviction became final in 1993. Because
his conviction became final before the effective date of AEDPA, Mr. Lee had
until April 24, 1997, to file for § 2255 relief. See Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d
1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting, in similar context of remedies available to
state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that the end of AEDPA’s statutory grace period
was April 24, 1997). Indeed, the district court was even more charitable, holding
that under § 2255(3) Mr. Lee arguably had until May 18, 1999, to file for § 2255
relief, which date was one year from the date that Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998), made Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150
(1995), retroactively applicable to cases on collateral appeal. 1 Thus, since
Mr. Lee did not file his § 2255 motion until October 14, 2004, “nearly eleven
years after the date of his conviction, eight years after Bailey, and some six years
after the decision in Bousley,” R., Doc. 39 at 2, the district court held the motion
untimely and denied relief. We previously granted Mr. Lee a certificate of
appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 and 2253(a), we affirm.
1
But see Dodd v. United States , __ U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 2482 (2005)
(holding that the date from which the limitation period begins to run under
§ 2255(3) is the date that the Court initially recognizes the right asserted in an
applicant’s § 2255 motion, not the date on which the right is made retroactively
applicable).
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On October 29, 1993, following the entry of a guilty plea, Mr. Lee was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release for
using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Mr. Lee did not take a direct appeal. In October 2004, he
filed the present § 2255 motion, asserting that his conviction should be vacated
because the Government did not demonstrate that he actively employed the
firearm at issue, as is required to sustain a conviction under § 924(c)(1). Bailey,
516 U.S. at 150. Instead, argued Mr. Lee, “the admitted facts indicate that the
gun merely lay inert under the bed mattress,” R., Doc. 38 at 8. Construing
Mr. Lee’s § 2255 motion liberally, see Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613
(10th Cir. 1998), the motion also alluded to actual innocence. See Miller v. Marr,
141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that actual innocence of a
defendant may be grounds for tolling AEDPA’s similar one-year statute of
limitations for state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)).
The district court found Mr. Lee’s § 2255 motion untimely under AEDPA’s
one-year period of limitation and denied relief without reaching the merits of his
claims. Mr. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that his plea was
not knowing and voluntary because he was misinformed by the district court as to
the essential elements of the crime charged. The district court denied Mr. Lee’s
motion for reconsideration.
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This court issued a certificate of appealibility to consider whether the
district court erred in denying Mr. Lee’s § 2255 motion on timeliness grounds
without examining whether he was entitled to equitable tolling pursuant to his
claims of actual innocence. 2 Because this issue requires us to address a question
of law, our review of the district court’s denial of § 2255 relief is de novo. See
Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 2000). “AEDPA’s one-year
statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling but only ‘in rare and
exceptional circumstances.’” Id. at 808 (quoting Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806,
811 (5th Cir. 1998)). Actual innocence, for example, constitutes a rare and
exceptional circumstance. See id. Notwithstanding, equitable tolling “is only
available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the
failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added).
Mr. Lee’s underlying challenge to his conviction is based on the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Bailey, which was issued on December 6, 1995. Mr. Lee,
2
Having reviewed Mr. Lee’s timely submission in response to our show
cause order, we conclude that when he filed the § 2255 motion he was in custody
under the conviction and sentence challenged in the motion. See United States v.
Hernandez , 94 F.3d 606, 613 (10th Cir. 1996) (observing that § 2255 relief is
available only to one who, when he files his § 2255 motion, is in custody under
the conviction and sentence he seeks to vacate, set aside, or correct).
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however, did not file his § 2255 motion until October 14, 2004. Thus, Mr. Lee
has not diligently pursued his Bailey claim, and he has provided no explanation
for his failure to do so. Further, in demonstrating that his failure to comply with
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was caused by extraordinary
circumstances beyond his control, Mr. Lee must not only prove actual innocence
as to the gun charge to which he pleaded guilty, he must also prove actual
innocence of the three drug counts for which he was indicted. See Bousley,
523 U.S. at 624 (“In cases where the Government has forgone more serious
charges in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner’s showing of actual innocence
must also extend to those charges.”). Mr. Lee makes no such showing.
We conclude that the district court properly denied Mr. Lee’s § 2255
motion as untimely, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Mr. Lee’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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