Giron v. Chaparro

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 24, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
__________________________ Clerk of Court
MAGDALENA GIRON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-2015
(D. N.M.)
SUSANA CHAPARRO, (D.Ct. No. CIV-04-670 BB/WDS)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Susana Chaparro, a state magistrate judge, appeals the district
court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against her
based on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. Exercising our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand.
The following facts are uncontested. Judge Chaparro is a magistrate judge
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions
of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
for the Doña Ana County court system in New Mexico. The parties generally
agree that under New Mexico law Judge Chaparro possesses the authority to issue
contempt citations or orders for disorderly behavior or breach of the peace
tending to interrupt or disturb a judicial proceeding in progress before a
magistrate or for disobedience of any lawful order or process of the court. See
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-3-9 (1978). The Appellee, Magdalena Giron, is a contract
employee with the Administrative Offices of the Courts of the State of New
Mexico, for the purpose of providing interpreting services to the courts in Doña
Ana County. On June 26, 2001, Judge Chaparro summoned Ms. Giron to her
courtroom, where Judge Chaparro was presiding before two assistant district
attorneys, a public defender, and a Spanish-speaking client. The reason for Ms.
Giron’s presence was to translate during the proceeding, which she failed to
perform due to a misunderstanding on her part.
The judge became upset with Ms. Giron’s failure to perform her contract
services, after which Ms. Giron said they needed to talk to the chief clerk of the
court and began to walk out of the courtroom. Despite the judge’s order for Ms.
Giron to return, she left the proceeding. The judge followed Ms. Giron to the
clerk’s office and again ordered Ms. Giron to return to the courtroom, but she
refused. Judge Chaparro then ordered Ms. Giron to leave the courthouse, but she
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refused. On the following day, two police officers arrested Mr. Giron at the
courthouse, based on a warrant stemming from a contempt of court order to show
cause issued by Judge Chaparro.
Ms. Giron brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation
of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, based in part on the judge
holding her in contempt. Specifically, she claimed the contempt order arose from
the judge’s personal animus against her because (1) she, rather than the judge’s
sister, received the interpreter services contract for the court, and (2) she
previously lodged grievances against the judge for what she described as a
campaign of harassment which began the day she started her contract. She also
contended the judge previously engaged in harassment, intimidation, and
interference against her in an effort to constructively discharge her from her
contract by making accusations in the presence of others that she falsified
vouchers, performed incompetently, and failed to provide sufficient interpreter
services to the court. She alleged that based on Judge Chaparro’s wrongful
actions and her fear of continued harassment and retaliation by her, she did not
bid to renew her contract. In response, Judge Chaparro brought a motion to
dismiss on grounds of (1) absolute judicial immunity for performing a judicial act
of issuing a contempt order, and (2) failure to state a cause of action because Ms.
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Giron failed to allege she was terminated from any position or lost other
employment opportunities because of any statements made by Judge Chaparro. 1
In considering Judge Chaparro’s motion to dismiss, the district court
determined the only question presented was the issue of absolute judicial
immunity under the facts alleged in Ms. Giron’s complaint. 2 The district court
denied the motion to dismiss, determining Judge Chaparro was not entitled to
absolute immunity as a matter of law because it was unclear whether the judge
acted as an employer attempting to impose her will over a court employee or in a
judicial capacity attempting to control the conduct of the proceeding in her
courtroom. Judge Chaparro appeals the order, claiming the district court
erroneously considered the “personal motives” of the judge “rather than looking
at the nature of the act itself” and determining whether it is a function
traditionally performed by a judge. Because the act of issuing a contempt citation
is exclusively judicial in nature, she suggests any alleged motive associated with
1
Ms. Giron incorrectly claims the only question presented to the district court in
Judge Chaparro’s motion to dismiss was absolute immunity.
2
We note the district court did not explicitly address the other issue raised by
Judge Chaparro in her motion to dismiss with respect to harassment and other related
charges Ms. Giron made in her complaint against her. Because the district court did not
address it, and Judge Chaparro did not raise or address that issue on appeal, we do not
consider it here. See Drake v. City of Ft. Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991);
Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 431, 444 (10th Cir. 1990).
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the act is irrelevant, even if motivated by malice, corruption, or other improper
intent.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a judge’s motion to dismiss
based on absolute judicial immunity. See Malik v. Arapahoe Co. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 1999) (relying on Kamplain v. Curry Co.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 159 F.3d 1248, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998)); Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d
1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1994). In reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion
to dismiss for absolute immunity, we accept the allegations of the complaint as
true. See Gagan, 35 F.3d at 1475. It is well-settled judges are generally “immune
from a suit for money damages,” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per
curiam), and such immunity applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
recover for alleged deprivation of civil rights. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554-55 (1967); Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000).
The doctrine of absolute immunity ensures judges and judicial officers perform
their duties vigorously and without fear of time-consuming, costly, “vindictive or
ill-founded damage suits brought on account of action taken in the exercise of
their official responsibilities.” See Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 341 (10th Cir.
1973) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Judges enjoy absolute judicial
immunity even if “flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors”
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Whitesel, 222 F.3d at 867 (quotation marks and citation omitted), and regardless
of a judge’s “motive or good faith,” Smith, 485 F.2d at 342 (citations omitted), or
whether “the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly,” Pierson, 386
U.S. at 554.
Two exceptions to judicial immunity exist. First, a judge is not immune
from liability for non-judicial acts, which are acts not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. Second, a judge is not immune from
actions, though judicial in nature, taken “in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. In determining the scope of a judge’s jurisdiction, it “must be
construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge,” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978), and merely acting in excess of authority
does not constitute an action in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356-
57 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, the parties generally rely on New Mexico Statutes Annotated
§ 35-3-9 (1978) for the proposition that Judge Chaparro has authority to issue
contempt citations, which states:
A magistrate has jurisdiction to punish for contempt only for
disorderly behavior or breach of the peace tending to interrupt or
disturb a judicial proceeding in progress before the magistrate or for
disobedience of any lawful order or process of his court. No person
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shall be punished for contempt of the magistrate court until given an
opportunity to be heard in his defense. Any person convicted under
this section may appeal to the district court in the same manner as in
other criminal actions in the magistrate court.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-3-9 (1978). The New Mexico Legislature also enacted the
following general contempt statute: “It shall be within the power of each and
every presiding officer of the several courts of this state, whether of record or not
of record, to preserve order and decorum, and for that purpose to punish
contempts by reprimand, arrest, fine or imprisonment ....” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-2(1978).
In addition, the rules of civil and criminal procedure for magistrate courts
promulgated by the New Mexico Supreme Court, and relied on by Judge Chaparro
in her motion to dismiss, state:
A. Jurisdiction. A magistrate has jurisdiction to punish for contempt
only for:
(1) disorderly behavior in the presence of the court or close enough
to the court that it obstructs the administration of justice;
(2) misconduct of court officers in official transactions; [and]
(3) disobedience or resistance to any lawful order, rule or process of the
court.
See N.M. R. Magis. Ct. RCP Rule 2-110(A)(1)-(3) and N.M. R. Magis. Ct. RCRP
Rule 6-111(A)(1)-(3). The same rules further state notice of contempt may be
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made orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the person in contempt,
and that a “direct contempt” may be punished summarily if the judge, by written
order, certifies to having seen or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
that it was committed in the presence of the court. See N.M. R. Magis. Ct. RCP
Rule 2-110(B) & (C) and N.M. R. Magis. Ct. RCRP Rule 6-111(B) & (C). Under
New Mexico case law, these rules take precedence over the legislature’s
enactment of § 35-3-9. See State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 243, 244-45 (N.M. Ct. App.
1987). Finally, in lieu of either legislation or rules on contempt, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has held “[t]he power to punish for contempt is inherent in the
courts,” Case v. State, 709 P.2d 670, 671 (N.M. 1985); State ex rel. Bliss v.
Greenwood, 315 P.2d 223, 227 (N.M. 1957), and “its exercise is the exercise of
the highest form of judicial power,” Bliss, 315 P.2d at 227.
Having reviewed the applicable law, we turn to Ms. Giron’s contentions in
support of the district court’s decision. She claims Judge Chaparro is not entitled
to absolute immunity because (1) her action was not a judicial act, but “an
offensive weapon to vindicate personal objectives”; (2) part of the event occurred
outside the courtroom in the clerk’s office; (3) no formal proceeding was in
progress in the courtroom, but rather it involved an informal administrative-type
matter over which the judge presided in open court; (4) she was not a litigant
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before the judge; and (5) the judge procedurally erred by failing to hold a hearing
to show cause prior to issuing the contempt order and sentence.
First, we begin with the question of whether the act of issuing a contempt
order is a judicial act. While a judge’s vindictive motives in issuing a contempt
order cannot be condoned, a judge’s act with respect to the issuance of a contempt
order nevertheless patently involves a judicial function which must be afforded
the defense of absolute immunity. To hold otherwise would have a chilling effect
on a judge’s judicial acts, leaving the judge readily subject to suit in the course of
performing such acts. See Smith, 485 F.2d at 340-41. While this circuit has not
specifically identified a contempt order as a judicial act, our reasoning follows
other circuit court decisions which have explicitly ruled contempt orders are
judicial acts subject to absolute immunity, 3 as well as New Mexico law holding
the judicial exercise of contempt power is an exercise of “the highest form of
3
See, e.g., Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (determining
“[t]here can be little doubt that holding an individual in contempt is an act normally
performed by a judge”); Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990)
(concluding a judge’s contempt order, even against a non-litigant, is clearly a judicial
act); Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating “[t]here is no
question” the judge’s acts, including contempt sentence, are “judicial acts”); Patten v.
Glaser, 771 F.2d 1178, 1179 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (affirming decision that judge
who issued contempt sentence performed function normally performed by a judge acting
in his judicial capacity and therefore, it constituted a judicial act); Dean v. Shirer, 547
F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1976) (determining judge who imposed a contempt sanction
performed a judicial act).
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judicial power,” Bliss, 315 P.2d at 227, and the Supreme Court's long-standing
announcement that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. See
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
Having held the act of issuing a contempt order constitutes a judicial act,
we also conclude the state magistrate judge in this case possessed jurisdiction for
the purpose of issuing a contempt order. In so doing, we reject Ms. Giron’s
specific contentions the judge lacked jurisdiction to cite her for contempt,
including her contention absolute immunity cannot apply here because it involved
an informal or administrative proceeding rather than a formal hearing before the
judge. We are not persuaded that a contempt order arising from events occurring
at a proceeding over which a judge presides before counsel in open court and
seeks the services of a court interpreter for a Spanish-speaking client is a
proceeding over which the judge allegedly lacks contempt power. Regardless of
the characterization by Ms. Giron, the circumstances suggest the informality of
the proceeding did not change the judicial nature of the act itself, and because the
judge generally possessed jurisdiction to impose contempt sanctions for disorderly
conduct or disobedience of her orders directed to individuals before her in her
judicial capacity, her action was not taken “in complete absence of all
jurisdiction.”
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Similarly, because Ms. Giron clearly disobeyed the judge’s verbal orders to
return to the courtroom and perform interpretive services, and her disobedience of
such orders obviously occurred “in the presence of the court” (vis-a-vis the judge)
or, alternatively, “close enough to the court that it obstruct[ed] the administration
of justice,” Judge Chaparro had jurisdiction to punish Ms. Giron’s disobedience
of her orders. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-3-9 (1978); N.M. R. Magis. Ct. RCP
Rule 2-110(A)(1) & (3). Thus, when the judge ordered Ms. Giron in court to
come back and act as an interpreter, and then in the clerk's office again ordered
her to return to the courtroom to perform her services, she possessed jurisdiction
in both situations to punish Ms. Giron’s refusal with contempt. See, e.g., Crooks,
913 F.2d at 701 (rejecting contention that power to sanction for contempt is valid
only when the contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court or the judge at chambers and, instead, determining the term “court” refers
“to the person of the judge, acting in his official capacity, wherever he may be”).
See, e.g., Dean, 547 F.2d at 231 (holding judge who issued contempt citation over
attorney who made statements outside courtroom immediately after trial and while
court was out of session retained subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal action).
We also reject Ms. Giron’s contention absolute immunity cannot apply
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because she was an employee of the court and not a litigant before the judge. The
fact Judge Chaparro held one of the court’s own contract employees in contempt
does not alter either the judicial nature of the act or her jurisdiction to generally
issue such contempt orders, and thus, the contempt order was not taken “in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” See Crooks, 913 F.2d at 699, and Crooks v.
Maynard, 820 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1987) (same case) (concluding a judge’s
decision to hold two court employees, who were not litigants, in contempt of
court is clearly a judicial act and one which a district court judge has sufficient
jurisdiction to render). Moreover, in this case, the New Mexico rules for
magistrates explicitly give judges jurisdiction to punish misconduct of court
officers in official transactions for contempt, and, arguably, Ms. Giron could be
considered a court officer involved in an official transaction at the time the judge
asked her to lend her interpretive services in court and when she repeatedly failed
to obey the judge’s order to return to the courtroom to provide those services. See
N.M. R. Magis. Ct. RCP Rule 2-110(A)(2).
Finally, while Ms. Giron argues the judge erred by failing to hold a
contempt hearing, we have previously held judges enjoy absolute judicial
immunity even if “flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”
Whitesel, 222 F.3d at 867 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the
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procedural error does not alter the nature of the act from being a judicial one over
which the judge had jurisdiction, and therefore, it was not taken “in complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Figueroa, 208 F.3d at 443 (holding order
of contempt sentence, without statutory opportunity for appeal, was in error but
nevertheless involved a judicial act subject to judicial immunity); O’Neil v. City
of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 368-70 (9th Cir. 1981) (order of contempt without
requisite supporting affidavit was granted in “excess of jurisdiction,” but
nonetheless the judge did not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction” and
therefore enjoyed judicial immunity). Moreover, in New Mexico, the applicable
rules for magistrate judges provide for a “direct contempt” which may be
punished summarily if the judge certifies to having seen or heard the conduct
constituting contempt committed in the presence of the court. N.M. R. Magis. Ct.
RCP Rule 2-110(C). Thus, no hearing on an order to show cause would be
necessary in such a circumstance. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948)
(limiting use of summary contempt to “charges of misconduct, in open court, in
the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the
essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually
observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent
demoralization of the court's authority before the public”).
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For these reasons, we conclude Judge Chaparro performed a judicial act
with the requisite jurisdictional authority to cite Ms. Giron with contempt,
regardless of any alleged personal motives or procedural errors. Accordingly, we
conclude Judge Chaparro is entitled to absolute judicial immunity and REVERSE
and REMAND this case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of the
Appellee, Judge Susana Chaparro, on her motion to dismiss, in accordance with
this decision.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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