Estate of Kenneth Mi v. United States

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 7, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ESTATE OF KEN NETH M ICH AEL
TR EN TA D U E; C AR ME N A G UILAR
TRENTAD UE; W ILM A LO U TRENTA DU E;
ESTATE OF JESSE JAM ES TRENTADU E;
DO NN A TRENTA DU E SWEENEY ; LEE
FREDERICK TREN TA DUE; and JESSE
CA RL TREN TAD UE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA;
D EPA RTM EN T O F JU STIC E; FEDERAL
B UREA U O F PR ISO N S; and FEDERAL
B UREA U O F IN V ESTIG A TIO N,
Nos. 05-6406
Defendants-Appellants. & 06-6011
_____________________________________ (D.C. No. CIV 97-849-L)
(W . Dist. Okla.)
ESTATE OF KEN NETH M ICH AEL
TRENTAD UE,
Plaintiff,
CARM EN AGUILAR TRENTADUE; W ILM A
LO U TREN TA DUE; ESTA TE O F JESSE
JA M ES TR EN TA D U E; D O N N A
TRENTADUE SW EENEY; LEE FREDERICK
TRENTADUE; and JESSE CARL
TRENTAD UE,
Plaintiffs - Cross-Appellants,
v.
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA;
D EPA RTM EN T O F JU STIC E; FEDERAL
B UREA U O F PR ISO N S; and FEDERAL
B UREA U O F IN V ESTIG A TIO N,
Defendants - Cross-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HA RTZ, SE YM OU R, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
The United States appeals the district court’s decision on remand finding
that family members (the Family) of Kenneth Trentadue suffered severe
emotional distress and reinstating an award of $1.1 million in damages under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Family cross-appeals the district court’s denial of their request to move for
dismissal of a collateral claim without prejudice. W e remand to the district court
for further findings as to the fourth prong of the test for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and we affirm the district court’s denial of the Family’s
M otion for Dismissal W ithout Prejudice of Jesse C. Trentadue’s Severed Claim of
Emotional Distress Based Upon the United States’ Efforts to Indict Him.
This litigation originates as a result of the unfortunate death of Kenneth
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Trentadue while in federal custody in Oklahoma. The parties and the district
court are fully aware of the factual predicate of this case, see Estate of Trentadue
ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (Trentadue I). In
short, relatives of M r. Trentadue brought a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under the FTCA. The district court evaluated the claim
pursuant to Oklahoma state tort law. To prove intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Oklahoma, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress;
and (4) the emotional distress was severe.” Id. at 855-56. The district court
found M r. Trentadue’s wife, mother, father, sister, and brothers satisfied all four
requirements and aw arded damages to each family member. 1
The government appealed to this court, contending the Family failed to
satisfy any of the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. W e
concluded the family members “proved the first, second, and third elements of the
tort of emotional distress, intentional or reckless conduct, outrageousness, and
causation.” Id. at 857. “H owever, because the district court did not make explicit
findings as to the severity of each individual plaintiff’s emotional distress,” we
were unable to determine whether the fourth element w as met. Id. at 857-8.
1
The district court awarded Mr. Trentadue’s wife $250,000, his mother,
sister, and two brothers $200,000 each, and his father’s estate $50,000.
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Accordingly, we “vacate[d] the FTCA judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
remand[ed] for additional findings on whether the emotional distress suffered by
each plaintiff was severe under Oklahoma law.” Id.On remand, the district court summarily found the fourth prong had been
met and reinstated the damage awards. Specifically, the court concluded
[u]nder Oklahoma law . . . the emotional distress suffered by each
plaintiff was severe. Based upon the evidence presented at trial,
including the testimony of the plaintiffs, the court finds that each
plaintiff satisfied the fourth element of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress which requires proof that the
plaintiff’s emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it. In making this finding, the court has
also considered the intensity and duration of the distress suffered by
plaintiffs . . . [and] the extreme and outrageous character of the
defendant’s conduct [as] important evidence that the distress existed.
App., Vol. III at 754-55. The government appeals this remand order, asserting the
district court failed to follow our mandate to make “explicit findings as to the
severity of each individual plaintiff’s emotional distress.” Trentadue I, 397 F.3d
at 857-58. Further, they assert that, as a matter of law , the family members
cannot m eet the severity element of intentional infliction under Oklahoma law.
Our “mandate consists of our instructions to the district court at the
conclusion of the opinion, and the entire opinion that preceded those
instructions.” Proctor & Gamble Co., v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.
2003). In reviewing the district court’s application of our mandate, “we consider
whether the court abused the limited discretion that our mandate left to it.” Id. at
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1125. “To decide w hether the district court violated the mandate, it is necessary
to examine the mandate and then look at what the district court did.” Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 969 (10th Cir. 1991).
In Trentadue I, we clearly mandated the district court to provide greater
evidentiary support for its conclusion that each individual plaintiff’s distress was
severe under Oklahoma law . W e sought an expanded discussion of the severity
prong because we were “unable to determine from the district court’s [first] order
whether the fourth element of the tort ha[d] been met.” Trentadue I, 397 F.3d at
858. This mandate was intended to elicit an individualized severity analysis for
the differently situated plaintiffs. See id. at 857-58 (“[B]ecause the district court
did not make explicit findings as to the severity of each individual plaintiff’s
emotional distress, we are unable to determine whether the fourth element of the
tort has been met.” (emphasis added)); id. at 858 (“remand[ing] for additional
findings on whether the emotional distress suffered by each plaintiff was severe
under O klahoma law ” (emphasis added)); id. at 867 (remanding “to the district
court for supplemental findings on whether, under O klahoma law, each plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress.” (emphasis added)). W e sought this additional
analysis because family members experienced the death and its aftermath from
different vantage points. For example, the decedent’s wife, mother, and sister
personally witnessed the unveiling of the unexpectedly bruised and lacerated body
of M r. Trentadue at the California funeral home, while other family members
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were orally informed of the body’s condition. See Trentadue I, 397 F.3d at 850.
It has always been the government’s position that this is a distinction with a
difference. Although all plaintiffs may have suffered “severe” distress in light of
the government’s actions, the family members were subjected to different stresses
and the severity of each plaintiff’s distress therefore requires individualized
evaluation. 2
On remand, the district court failed to make specific findings regarding the
severity of the emotional distress each family member suffered, and we are thus
in no better position to “determine from the district court’s order whether the
fourth element of the tort has been met,” than we were upon our first review. Id.
at 858. W e are still unable to evaluate adequately whether each family member
has satisfied the fourth prong. See United States v. Wagoner County Real Estate,
278 F.3d 1091, 1102 (10th Cir. 2002) (remanding for more specific findings).
For example, on remand, the district court stated in evaluating the fourth prong
that it considered “testimony of the plaintiffs,” app., vol. III at 754, and the
intensity and duration of the distress under the proper legal standard–proof that
each plaintiff’s emotional distress was so severe no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it. In doing so, however, the court did not identify these
2
The district court awarded individual compensation ranging from $50,000 to
$250,000. The nonuniform financial awards suggest the district court may have already
determined plaintiffs suffered harms of differing severity. See Trentadue I, 397 F.3d at851 n.2.
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witnesses, the persuasive content of their testimony, or the characteristics of the
distress that led it to conclude the fourth prong was met. W e therefore remand for
the court to make additional findings specific to each individual plaintiff to
support its conclusion that their emotional distress was severe under Oklahoma
law. Further specificity as to the nature and severity of the harm suffered by each
individual plaintiff will satisfy both our original remand and this present mandate
for additional findings.
W ith respect to the cross-appeal, the Family on remand sought leave to
dismiss without prejudice Jesse Trentadue’s collateral intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. The district court denied this request and the Family
cross-appeals.
In its amended complaint, the Family alleged that government officials
intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Jesse Trentadue by “knowingly
attempt[ing] to indict Jesse C. Trentadue for obstruction of justice and fraud in an
effort to silence him . . .” and to deter his investigation into his brother’s death.
App., vol. I at 255. At trial, the district court held that this issue “would be
totally collateral to this litigation,” and although it “certainly might be the subject
of litigation by M r. Jesse Trentadue against the government in some way, [it is]
not really part of this lawsuit.” App., vol. X at 3615. In Trentadue I, 397 F.3d at
866, we addressed the district court’s decision not to consider this intentional
infliction claim,
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reject[ing] plaintiffs’ argument that the district court erred in not
allow ing Jesse Trentadue to pursue his separate emotional distress
claim against the government along with plaintiffs’ other FTCA
claims. Plaintiffs made a series of conclusory allegations that the
DOJ w as attempting to “indict” Jesse Trentadue for tampering with
witnesses. The district court properly concluded that these
allegations were collateral to the issues before the court involving
Kenneth Trentadue’s death and declined to make additional findings.
M oreover, the plaintiffs’ allegations are primarily centered around
the conduct of the government’s trial counsel during discovery, and
are not evidence of misconduct by federal officials investigating
Trentadue’s death. W e see no abuse of discretion by the court in
limiting evidence on this issue.
On remand, M r. Trentadue requested the district court to “dismiss[] without
prejudice . . . Jesse C. Trentadue’s severed claim of emotional distress based upon
the U nited States’ efforts to indict him.” A pp., vol. II at 609. Instead, the court
concluded that its “pretrial rulings on the collateral nature of Jesse Trentadue’s
purported claim merged into the court’s final judgment in this matter and were
appealable by plaintiffs,” App., vol. III at 757, and that “the extensive record in
this case does not support plaintiffs’ contention that this claim was ‘severed’ to
be preserved for some part of a later trial in this proceeding,” id. at 756.
Furthermore, the court found “it would not be proper” in the context of our
limited remand to consider this separate claim. Id. at 758. Accordingly, the court
denied the Family’s request.
W e agree with the district court on this issue. As noted above, the district
court had previously stated that it did not consider Jesse Trentadue’s claim
alleging the government’s improper attempt to indict him to be part of this
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lawsuit. M r. Trentadue was clearly on notice before his first appeal that insofar
as the district court was concerned, he would have to file a separate lawsuit to
raise this “collateral” claim against the government. W e just as clearly affirmed
that determination in Trentadue I, 397 F.3d at 866. Consequently, there was
nothing regarding this claim left in this lawsuit for us to remand to the district
court.
As the Seventh Circuit has succinctly stated, on remand a district court
“may address only (1) the issues remanded, (2) issues arising for the first time on
remand, or (3) issues that were timely raised before the district and/or appellate
courts but which remain undecided.” United States v. M orris, 259 F.3d 894, 898
(7th Cir. 2001). The Family’s motion to dismiss was not a remanded issue and
did not arise out of the present remand. The district court therefore did not abuse
its discretion in denying the Family’s request to file a motion to dismiss on
remand. The Family had ample opportunity to seek dismissal of this issue from
the district court before the first appeal.
In sum, we R EM A N D for additional findings specific to each individual
plaintiff to support the district court’s conclusion that the emotional distress of
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each was severe under Oklahoma law, and we AFFIRM the court’s refusal to
consider further M r. Trentadue’s motion to dismiss his collateral claim.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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