United States v. Soule

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS October 10, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 07-8001
v. (D.C. No. 06-CR-166-W FD)
(D . W yo.)
RO BERT SOU LE,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Robert H. Soule appeals his sentence of 130 months’ imprisonment
imposed following his guilty plea for possession of child pornography in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Soule’s counsel moves for leave to
withdraw in a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Because we conclude that each of the arguments raised by Soule’s counsel in her
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Anders brief is frivolous, we AFFIRM Soule’s sentence, DISM ISS his appeal,
and G R A N T counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I
Soule’s troubles in this case began on M ay 20, 2006, when members of his
family contacted the Laramie Police Department to report that they had
discovered what appeared to be child pornography amongst Soule’s possessions at
his mother’s home. After attempting to interview Soule about his fam ily’s
discovery, officers applied for and obtained a search warrant for Soule’s mother’s
residence as well as for two storage units leased by Soule. Officers executed the
search warrant on M ay 25 and 26, 2006, and found approximately seventy 3.5-
inch floppy computer disks, ammunition for several types of firearms, and
numerous pornographic photographs. The officers later turned over the computer
disks to members of the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, who
determined that the disks contained approximately 210 digital images depicting
children engaged in explicit sexual activity. Some of the children depicted in the
images were prepubescent, and at least six images allegedly depicted children
engaged in sadomasochistic conduct.
On July 19, 2006, a federal grand jury indicted Soule on two counts,
charging: (1) unlawful possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); and (2) knowing possession of images of child
pornography that affected interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Soule initially pleaded not guilty to both counts at
his arraignment, but later entered into a written plea agreement with the
government, in which he agreed to plead guilty to the count alleging possession of
child pornography in exchange for the government’s dismissal at sentencing of
the other count. The district court held a hearing on the plea agreement on
September 22, 2006, and accepted the revised plea.
Soule was sentenced on December 8, 2006. His Presentence Report
(“PSR”) noted an adjusted total offense level of 26 and a criminal history
category of V. Taken together with the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence
required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), 1 these sentencing considerations provided
for a potential range of 120 to 137 months’ imprisonment. In response to the
PSR , Soule advanced three main objections: (1) the mandatory minimum
sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) constitutes a per se cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment; (2) the PSR
overrepresented his criminal history and a departure from the Guidelines was thus
warranted under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b); and (3) under the factors listed in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court should impose a sentence below the Guidelines, or, in
the alternative, sentence Soule to no more than the mandatory minimum. The
district court rejected each of these arguments and imposed a sentence of 130
1
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), a person with a prior conviction for
possession of child pornography, like Soule, must be “imprisoned for not less
than 10 years nor more than 20 years.”
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months’ imprisonment, with fifteen years of supervised release. This timely
appeal followed.
II
If an attorney conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous, counsel may “so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel must submit a brief
to both the appellate court and the client, pointing to anything in the record that
would potentially present an appealable issue. The client may then choose to
offer any arguments to the court. If, upon complete examination of the record,
the court determines that the appeal is in fact frivolous, it may grant the request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id. In the present case, acting pursuant to
Anders, counsel provided Soule with a copy of the appellate brief; Soule has
declined the opportunity to file a pro se brief. Counsel’s Anders brief raises four
potentially appealable issues, each of w hich we determine to be frivolous.
First, counsel’s brief argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying Soule’s motion for a downward departure based on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b).
W e generally have no jurisdiction to review a district court’s discretionary
decision to deny a defendant’s motion for downward departure. United States v.
Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007). Indeed, we may only review a
denial of a defendant’s motion for departure if the denial was based on the district
court’s erroneous belief that it w as without authority to grant the departure. Id.-4-
As the transcript from Soule’s sentencing hearing makes clear, the district court
used its discretion to deny the motion for downward departure and did not
erroneously rely on the belief that it was without authority to grant the requested
departure. W e are thus w ithout jurisdiction to review its denial.
Second, counsel’s Anders brief raises what is essentially a reasonableness
argument under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Counsel
specifically asserts that the district court erred in denying Soule’s request for a
variance from the G uidelines pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Post-Booker, we
review a sentence for reasonableness. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050,
1053 (10th Cir. 2006). In conducting this analysis, we review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United
States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 906 (10th Cir. 2005). W e also apply a
presumption that a sentence falling within a properly calculated Guidelines range
is reasonable. 2 Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054.
Soule did not object to the district court’s application of the Guidelines or
to the court’s calculation of the relevant sentencing range based on Soule’s
adjusted offense level and prior criminal record. In addition, our review of the
transcript from the sentencing hearing reveals that the district court properly
2
Our circuit’s use of an appellate presumption of reasonableness for those
sentences falling within a properly calculated Guidelines range was recently
upheld by the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-68
(2007).
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considered Soule’s objections to the proposed sentence, as w ell as the factors
articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Soule has done nothing to overcome the
presumption that his 130-month sentence is reasonable, and we therefore conclude
that, under the circumstances presented, Soule’s sentence is reasonable. See
Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
Third, counsel’s brief posits that the statutory minimum sentence of 120
months for Soule’s conviction amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Specifically, Soule’s counsel asserts that it is per se cruel and unusual for
Congress to impose a mandatory minimum sentence under any statute. Because
this issue presents a purely legal question, we review the district court’s denial of
this objection de novo. See United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 750 (10th
Cir. 2006).
“The Eighth Amendment . . . contains a narrow proportionality principle
that applies to noncapital sentences.” Ew ing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003)
(quotations omitted). It does not, however, “require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence.” Id. at 23 (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court
has “drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and
see[s] no basis for extending it further.” Harmelin v. M ichigan, 501 U.S. 957,
996 (1991); see also id. at 995 (recognizing that “[t]here can be no serious
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contention . . . that a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual becomes
so simply because it is mandatory.”). Given the w eight of Supreme Court
precedent on this issue, and the fact that the Guidelines recommend a sentencing
range of 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment in this case, even without
consideration of the applicable mandatory minimum, we decline to hold that the
120-month mandatory minimum sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2)
violates the Eight Amendment’s proscription against inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment, per se or otherwise.
Finally, counsel argues that Soule’s guilty plea was invalid. W e have often
recognized that a defendant’s plea must be given voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. See, e.g., United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.
1998). To ensure these basic requirements are met, a district court must inform a
defendant of the nature of the charges to which he pleads, the rights he waives by
pleading guilty, and the possible penalties that will be imposed if he is adjudged
by the court to be guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The district court must also
question the defendant to ensure that he gives the plea voluntarily and not as a
result of “force, threats, or promises.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). Our review of
the record before us leads us to conclude that the district court scrupulously
complied with the requirements of Rule 11 and that Soule’s plea was entered
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
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Because Soule fails to present us w ith any meritorious grounds for appeal,
we AFFIRM Soule’s sentence, DISM ISS his appeal, and GRANT counsel’s
m otion to w ithdraw .
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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