United States v. Perez

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 16, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 06-2289
v. (D.C. No. CR-92-236 JC)
(D . N.M .)
M AR IO PEREZ,
Defendant–Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Appellant M ario Perez appeals his sentence following revocation of
supervised release on the ground that the district court was unreasonable in
imposing this sentence consecutive to, rather than concurrent with, his sentence
for a new drug conviction. W e have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and A FFIR M .
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
In 1992, Perez, a Cuban national and deportable alien, was convicted of
federal charges related to a drug distribution conspiracy in the District of New
M exico (“the N ew M exico case”). He was sentenced to 87 months’
imprisonment, concurrently with a 120-month sentence on related state charges,
followed by three years’ supervised release. After serving his term of
imprisonment, Perez was released into the custody of the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and detained for nearly two years. 1 Perez’s
period of supervised release began to run as soon as he was transferred to ICE
custody.
Approximately one year after his release from ICE custody and with only
five weeks of supervised release remaining, Perez was arrested for participating
in a cocaine sale. H e pled guilty to charges of possession with intent to distribute
in the Central District of California (“the California case”) and was sentenced to
108 months’ imprisonment.
Because this new conviction violated the conditions of Perez’s supervised
release in the New M exico case, his parole officer filed a Violation Report
1
Because Cuba does not accept repatriations from the United States, Perez
was detainable for a reasonable period of time pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 689 (2001). The reasons for Perez’s long detention are not clear from
the record and are not at issue in this case.
-2-
calculating an advisory sentencing range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment
pursuant to § 7B1.1, .3, & .4(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines. The New M exico
district court held a revocation hearing on September 20, 2006, and imposed an
additional 18-month sentence, to run consecutively with the 108-month sentence
in the California case. Perez appeals the consecutive nature of this revocation
sentence, but not its length or method of calculation, as procedurally and
substantively unreasonable.
II
W e review sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness,
United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006), and apply a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences, United States v.
Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006). W hen imposing a sentence upon
revocation of supervised release, procedural reasonableness requires that a
sentencing judge consider the sentencing factors specified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e). 2 Furthermore, the district court must “state in open court the reasons
2
Section 3583(e) incorporates several of the sentencing factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), specifically:
the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and
characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to
afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care or other correctional treatment in the m ost effective manner;
pertinent guidelines; pertinent policy statements; the need to avoid
unwanted sentence disparities; and the need to provide restitution.
(continued...)
-3-
for its imposition of a particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); see also United
States v. Rose, 185 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying § 3553(c) to
the imposition of consecutive sentences upon revocation of supervised release
under § 3583(e)(3)). This explanation need not be “lengthy” where the sentence
imposed is consistent with the Guidelines. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
2468 (2007). Rather, a judge must simply satisfy us “that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Id.W e apply an even more deferential standard of review where a defendant
fails to contemporaneously object to the sentencing court’s procedure, including
its consideration of the appropriate sentencing factors. In such cases, we review
only for plain error. United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir.
2007). Because Perez did not object at sentencing, we will remand for
resentencing only if “there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects
substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1178. W e have recently refused to find
plain error in the imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence even where a district
judge mentioned only the G uidelines and addressed neither the defendant’s
2
(...continued)
United States v. Contreras-M artinez, 409 F.3d 1236, 1242 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005).
-4-
nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence, nor the factors in § 3553(a). See
United States v. Cereceres-Zavala, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 W L 2421755, at *5 (10th
Cir. Aug. 28, 2007).
Perez challenges on appeal the sentencing judge’s failure to explicitly
reference the § 3553(a) factors during his revocation hearing. At the hearing,
Perez admitted violating the conditions of his supervised release, and his counsel
asked the judge to consider Perez’s cooperation against other defendants in the
California case in determining his sentence, adding that his violation came just
five weeks before the end of his term of supervised release. Perez himself
requested a concurrent sentence. The court rejected this request, stating:
The Court determines that under Section 7B1.1 of the sentencing
guidelines, which are not binding on me, that the crime for which the
defendant admitted is classified as a Grade A violation. The criminal
history category is III. A Grade A violation and a criminal history
category of III establishes a revocation imprisonment range of 18 to
24 months. The Court finds that the sentencing guidelines are
advisory.
The defendant, M ario Perez, is comm itted to the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons for a term of 18 months. Said term shall run
consecutively to the term of imprisonment in . . . the Central District
of California.
The Guidelines provide that “[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the
revocation of probation or supervised release shall be ordered to be served
consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving.”
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). Thus, the district court was w ithin the Guidelines in
-5-
imposing consecutive terms, and Perez’s sentence is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054. To rebut this
presumption, Perez argues that the district court’s failure to allude to the
§ 3553(a) factors or directly address his arguments for a variance renders his
sentence procedurally unreasonable.
In light of our recent holding in Cereceres-Zavala, however, it was not
plain error for the sentencing court not to address Perez’s arguments in detail.
See Cereceres-Zavala, 2007 W L 2421755, at *5 (“Circumstances may well make
clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that
the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other
congressional mandates) in the typical case.” (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468)).
In that case, we found a sentence to be reasonable in circumstances identical to
those at hand, except that the defendant therein had raised his arguments in more
detail and in writing. Id. at *1. Considering the weakness of Perez’s arguments
for a variance (see supra) and the sentencing court’s explicit recognition that the
Guidelines are not binding on it, we hold that the context here makes clear that
the sentencing judge applied his independent judgment and chose to rely on the
reasoning behind the Guidelines. 3 Thus, Perez’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
3
W e recognize that there may be tension between Cereceres-Zavala and
past decisions holding that the district judge must “somehow indicate that he or
she did not rest on the guidelines alone.” E.g., United States v. Jarrillo-Luna, 478
F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446
(continued...)
-6-
III
Perez also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. W e
have not yet articulated a standard of review for consecutive sentences imposed
upon revocation of release after U nited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
However, because we find that Perez’s sentence was reasonable, and it is clear
that we do not examine a district court’s chosen sentence for anything more
demanding than reasonableness, see Rodriguez-Quintanilla, 442 F.3d 1254, 1257
(10th Cir. 2006), 4 we need not consider the applicability of some even more
deferential standard of review.
Perez challenges the reasonableness of the consecutive nature of his
revocation sentence in light of: (1) the length of his sentence in the California
case; (2) the time he spent in ICE detention; and (3) his cooperation with the
3
(...continued)
F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006)). Given the substantial similarity between
Cereceres-Zavala and this case, however, w e are bound by its holding.
4
Rodriquez-Quintanilla explains the confusion surrounding the effect of
Booker on our review of consecutively-imposed revocation sentences. See id. at
1256-58. W e note that since Rodriguez-Quintanilla was decided, we have held
that our sliding scale of “reasonableness” review is the same as the “abuse of
discretion” standard described in Rita. See United States v. Garcia-Lara, ___
F.3d ___, 2007 W L 2380991 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007).
-7-
government in the California case. 5 None of these factors rendered the district
court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence unreasonable.
First, Perez does not argue that either the California sentence or the
revocation sentence was unreasonably long by itself, and each sentence was
calculated in accordance with the Guidelines. In the absence of some other factor
not taken into account by the Guidelines, the long total incarceration imposed the
two sentences does not make their consecutive imposition unreasonable.
Nor does the length of time Perez spent in immigration detention overcome
the presumed reasonableness of his revocation sentence. Perez asks us to find
that it was unreasonable for the sentencing judge not to make his revocation
sentence concurrent because he was recently deprived of his liberty for
nonpunitive reasons. 6 Although past immigration detention might be a
permissible fact for a sentencing judge to consider under § 3553(a)(2)(B)
(“adequate deterrence”), the court in this case was also free to exercise its
discretion to reject this factor. The fact that Perez committed a new crime so
soon after his release from ICE custody suggests that the judge was correct to
disregard the possibility of a deterrent effect.
5
Perez does not renew his argument at sentencing that the short time
remaining in his period of supervised release rendered the consecutive sentence
unreasonable.
6
Immigration detention is civil and nonpunitive. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 690.
-8-
Finally, although Perez apparently did not receive a departure in the
California case for “substantial assistance to authorities” under § 5K1.1 of the
Guidelines, it does not follow that it was unreasonable for the sentencing judge to
decline to take that cooperation into account in setting his revocation sentence.
Perez presented no evidence of this cooperation or its value to the sentencing
judge beyond the brief description offered by his counsel. In light of the Central
District of California’s failure to grant a departure from Perez’s sentence in the
case in which he alleges cooperation, it was reasonable for the N ew M exico court
to conclude that no departure from his revocation sentence was merited.
In short, none of the factors cited by Perez are sufficient to overcome the
presumption of substantive reasonableness that attaches to within-Guidelines
sentences imposed by the district courts.
IV
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
-9-