United States v. Declerck

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 24, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 07-3136
v. (D . of Kan.)
G W Y N DELL B . D EC LER CK , (D.C. Nos. 02-CR-40072-RDR
and 07-CV-4028-RDR)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before H E N RY, T YM KOV IC H, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges. **
Gwyndell DeClerck is a federal prisoner serving a sentence of ten years and
five months for violating the Hobbs A ct (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and brandishing a
weapon during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
W e affirmed his convictions on direct appeal in United States v. DeClerck, 135 F.
App’x 167 (10th Cir. 2005). Proceeding pro se 1 , he now seeks a certificate of
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Because DeClerck is proceeding pro se, we review his pleadings and
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appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district
court denied all six of DeClerck’s claims and dismissed his motion. The district
court also denied DeClerck’s subsequent request for a COA. W e agree that
DeClerck is not entitled to relief under § 2255 and therefore DENY his request
for a C OA . 2
I. Background
In 2002, DeClerck and a co-defendant were indicted on four counts relating
to a robbery at a H ampton Inn in Lawrence, Kansas. DeClerck pleaded guilty to
tw o charges and the district court sentenced him to 125 months imprisonment.
The district court entered a final amended judgment on April 22, 2004. DeClerck
appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment on June 8, 2005. The
Supreme Court denied DeClerck’s petition for certioriari on February 21, 2006.
DeClerck filed his § 2255 motion with the district court on February 22,
2007. The district court concluded that all of DeClerck’s arguments lacked merit
1
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filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
2
DeClerck has filed a motion to proceed in form a pauperis (ifp). The
district court previously granted DeClerck’s request to proceed ifp in his criminal
case, a ruling it did not revisit for his § 2255 motion. DeClerck’s m otion to this
court, therefore, is unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).
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and denied the motion. DeClerck seeks a COA from this court on grounds that
the district court judge was biased and should have recused.
II. Standard of Review
To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); M iller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). This standard is satisfied by demonstrating that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). The denial of a motion to recuse is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Higganbotham v. Okla. ex rel. Okla.
Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003).
III. Discussion
In his appeal to this court, DeClerck purports to make three claims, which
in fact boil down to one. DeClerck alleges his Due Process rights were violated
because he was denied the benefit of having a detached and neutral judge evaluate
his § 2255 motion.
A. DeClerck’s D ue Process Claim
DeClerck has failed to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” W e reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, DeClerck
is procedurally barred from raising an issue on a motion to vacate that was raised
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and decided on direct appeal. Second, even if his argument were not barred, no
reasonable jurists could conclude “the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
DeClerck’s claim is procedurally barred, since it was already heard and
decided on direct appeal. “A n issue disposed of on direct appeal will generally
not be reconsidered on a collateral attack by a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. However, a motion under Section 2255 may be proper when there has
been an intervening change in the law of a circuit.” United States v. Nolan, 571
F.2d 528, 530 (10th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted); see also United States
v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989). DeClerck points to no change in
Tenth Circuit law and we find none. Nevertheless, DeClerck asserts here, as on
direct appeal, that the district court judge acted with “bias and prejudice” against
him at trial. He claims the judge made certain rulings and statements to
encourage him to plead guilty. Since these issues have already been decided, they
are procedurally barred.
Even if the claims were not barred, nothing in the record indicates the bias
and prejudice asserted by DeClerck. A district judge has the discretion to run a
trial in a manner that is fair and efficient to both sides. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
57(b) (“A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law ,
these rules, and the local rules of the district.”). Cf. United States v. Busby, 16 F.
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App’x 817, 826 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not
an absolute right and may not be insisted upon in a manner which will obstruct
orderly judicial procedure or interfere with a court’s exercise of it’s [sic] inherent
power to control procedure in the courtroom.”). After disagreements with more
than one court-appointed attorney, DeClerck represented himself. As w e noted in
DeClerck’s direct appeal, “The district court bent over backwards to
accommodate M r. DeClerck . . . . The court allowed him to make dozens of
baseless arguments and scheduled several hearings to assuage M r. DeClerck’s
concerns.” DeClerck, 135 F. App’x at 170. Although the district court referred
to DeClerck as “guilty” in open court, this w as not until after DeClerck and his
co-defendant had pleaded guilty and admitted to the factual basis of the charges
against them.
To the extent DeClerck challenges the constitutionality of allowing the
district court judge to rule upon his claim that the judge was biased, DeClerck
still fails to sufficiently allege “the denial of a constitutional right.” See United
States v. Bellam y, 411 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005). Judicial
disqualifications proceed under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455. Section 144
requires the party seeking recusal to file a timely and sufficient affidavit alleging
personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge before whom the matter is
pending. It is undisputed that was not done in this case.
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Section 455(a), on the other hand, is broader and requires a judge to
disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). This court has held, “A judge has a
continuing duty to recuse under § 455(a) if sufficient factual grounds exist to
cause a reasonable, objective person, knowing all the relevant facts, to question
the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1277 (10th
Cir. 2000). W hen reviewing a charge of bias lodged against a district court judge,
the Supreme Court has counseled,
[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality m otion
unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
m ake fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,
counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or
partiality challenge.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
For DeClerck to prevail in his appeal, he must make a substantial showing
of bias rising to the level of a constitutional violation. This was not done. See
Edmond v. Athlete’s Foot Group, 15 F. App’x 738, 740 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“W ithout more, the fact that a judge presided in a previous criminal matter
involving a party is not a valid ground for recusal [in a subsequent civil
matter].”); see also Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[A]dverse rulings against a litigant cannot in themselves form the appropriate
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grounds for disqualification.”); Hinm an v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir.
1987) (“A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly
tenuous speculation.”). DeClerck fails to allege with any particularity conduct
that w ould lead a reasonable jurist to question the district judge’s neutrality. He
musters only speculative or inconsequential allegations to support his claim.
In essence, DeClerck’s appeal challenges the constitutionality of the system
announced in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 itself. He complains that the judge who presided
over his criminal trial and sentenced him to 10 years in prison also heard his
§ 2255 motion. Yet this is required by law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶1 (“A
prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress . . .
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.” (emphasis added)). Cf. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
220–21 (1952) (“The very purpose of Section 2255 is to hold any required hearing
in the sentencing court because of the inconvenience of transporting court
officials and other necessary witnesses to the district of confinement.”). The
benefits to judicial efficiency which flow from this system are obvious. The
judge who sentenced the movant is in the best position to adjudicate the merits of
a subsequent motion to vacate since he or she knows the facts and relevant law of
the case intimately. Any potential bias can be removed by the district court’s
application of § 455 and this court’s review thereof.
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Accordingly, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to recuse from DeClerck’s case. Since we conclude no jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court correctly denied D eClerck’s
motion under § 2255, we deny DeClerck’s application for a COA and dismiss his
appeal.
B. Section 2255’s One-Year Limitations Period
Although we dispose of DeClerck’s COA on the grounds discussed above,
we also note that his motion to the district court was untimely. Section 2255
imposes a one-year statute of limitations for federal prisoners to bring their
motion. “The limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which the judgment
of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶6(1). A judgment of conviction
becomes final when the Supreme Court “affirms a conviction on the merits on
direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for
filing a certiorari petition expires.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527
(2003). Here, the Supreme Court denied DeClerck’s certiorari petition on
February 21, 2006. DeClerck v. United States, 546 U.S. 1199 (2006) (mem.).
DeClerck filed his § 2255 motion on February 22, 2007— one year and one day
later. 3
3
There is no indication that DeClerck took advantage of the prison mailbox
rule, which would compel us to deem his motion filed when mailed, instead of
when received by the district court. He has not shown that he utilized the
prison’s legal mail system, nor has he submitted a declaration in compliance with
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The Supreme Court has held that federal district courts “are permitted, but
not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas
petition.” Day v. M cDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). Nothing in the
language or purpose of the habeas provisions gives us reason to doubt that district
courts are also “permitted, but not obliged” to review, sua sponte, a federal
prisoner’s § 2255 motion to determine whether it has been timely filed. Our
Tenth Circuit case law is clear that a court may raise a procedural bar in the
habeas corpus context on its own motion. See, e.g., Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971
F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1992); Hines v. United States, 971 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1992). 4
Given our disposition of this case on the merits, however, we find no need to
reach the statute of limitations issue.
3
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28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement setting forth the requisite facts. See
Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1165–67 & nn.6–8 (10th Cir. 2005).
4
W e have maintained that a court of appeals should raise a procedural bar
sua sponte if it promotes “the interests of judicial efficiency, conservation of
scarce judicial resources, and orderly and prompt administration of justice.” E.g.,
Hines, 971 F.2d at 509; accord Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987)
(holding that a federal court of appeals may consider a belated non-exhaustion
defense in a § 2254 habeas action, based on considerations of comity and judicial
efficiency). The Supreme Court noted a circuit split on this issue, but declined to
resolve it at that time. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 90 (1997).
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we DENY DeClerck’s petition for a COA
and DISM ISS this appeal. W e also DISM ISS A S M OOT his motion to proceed in
form a pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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