United States v. Raifsnider

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 25, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 07-3099
v. (D . of Kan.)
(D.C. No. 06-CV-3165-M LB)
LARRY RAIFSNIDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before H E N RY, T YM KOV IC H, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges. **
Larry Raifsnider seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the
district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition to vacate,
modify, or set aside his sentence. Raifsnider challenges the district court’s
determination that (1) he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal
his sentence, and (2) he was represented by constitutionally effective counsel.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
W e agree with the district court that Raifsnider is not entitled to a COA and
DISM ISS this appeal.
I. Background
On April 4, 2005, Raifsnider pleaded guilty to kidnaping and possession of
a firearm during a crime of violence. His plea agreement contained the following
waiver of the right to appeal:
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or
collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution,
conviction and sentence. The defendant is aware that Title 18,
U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the conviction
and sentence imposed. By entering into this agreement, the
defendant knowingly waives any right to appeal a sentence imposed
which is within the guideline range determined appropriate by the
court. The defendant also waives any right to challenge a sentence
or otherwise attempt to modify or change his sentence or manner in
which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not
limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255 [except as
limited by United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th
Cir. 2001)] and a motion brought under Title 18, U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). In other words, the defendant waives the right to
appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any,
the court departs upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline
range determined by the court. However, if the United States
exercises its right to appeal the sentence imposed as authorized by
Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is released from this waiver
and may appeal the sentence received as authorized by Title 18,
U.S.C. § 3742(a).
R., Vol. I, Doc. 14 at 4–5. In a separate agreement that he signed on the same
day, he also pleaded guilty to bank fraud. This plea agreement contained an
identical waiver. Raifsnider filed a motion to withdraw his pleas on M ay 26,
2005, and subsequently withdrew the motion. The court sentenced Raifsnider on
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July 8, 2005, and imposed a 30-year sentence for kidnaping and possession of a
firearm during a crime of violence, and a concurrent 30 year sentence for bank
fraud.
Raifsnider filed a pro se § 2255 habeas petition on June 16, 2006, alleging
the following: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel in the negotiation of his plea
agreement; (2) lack of jurisdiction by the district court that sentenced him; (3)
violation of Rules 3, 4, 5, 20, and 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;
and (4) illegal extradition from Oklahoma to Kansas. The court dismissed claims
2, 3, and 4, agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, and appointed attorney Kari Schmidt to represent Raifsnider in that
hearing.
After the evidentiary hearing was completed, the district court concluded
Raifsnider knowingly and intelligently waived all appellate rights except for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the court determined Raifsnider’s
attorney was constitutionally effective, the court denied him relief under § 2255.
II. Discussion
Provisions in plea agreements w aiving the right to appeal and collaterally
attack a conviction and sentence are enforceable if (1) the disputed issue falls
within the scope of the waiver, (2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his rights, and (3) the waiver w ill not result in a miscarriage of justice.
See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per
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curiam). A miscarriage of justice occurs (1) where the district court relied on an
impermissible factor such as race, (2) where ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, (3)
where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) where the waiver is
otherw ise unlawful. Id. at 1327.
On appeal, Raifsnider argues the district court erred in concluding that (1)
he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, and (2) he received
constitutionally effective assistance in the negotiation of his plea agreements. W e
review the district court’s legal rulings de novo and its findings of fact for clear
error, United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001).
A. Knowing and Intelligent W aiver
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his waiver was not
knowing and voluntary. United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 872–73 (10th Cir.
2003). W hen evaluating the validity of a waiver, a court primarily considers
“‘whether the language of the plea agreement states that the defendant entered the
agreement knowingly and voluntarily’ and whether there was ‘an adequate
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.’” United States v. Leon, 476
F.3d 829, 834 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325).
W e agree with the district court that the plea agreements clearly state that
Raifsnider “knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or collaterally
attack any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction and sentence.”
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R., Vol. I, Doc. 14 at 4; R., Vol. I, Doc. 38, Ex. A. Furthermore, the court
conducted the required plea colloquy, and the defendant testified under oath that
he understood the consequences of the plea agreement, did not have any mental
problems, had sufficient time to discuss his case with his counsel, and was
satisfied with his counsel’s representation. In a subsequent hearing on the
withdrawal of his motion to withdraw his plea, he again testified under oath that
he understood the consequences of the waiver. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court [affirming a plea
agreement] carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of
conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal,
as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.”).
Raifsnider nonetheless argues that he lacked the mental capacity to make a
know ing and intelligent waiver. He claims statements he made to the FBI suggest
that he is incompetent. After Raifsnider was arrested on November 29, 2004, he
told FBI agents that he:
1. made 20,000–25,000 fictitious identifications;
2. designed various toxins and explosives;
3. took guerilla w arfare training in M exico;
4. created a formula that could be brought on airplanes
undetected;
5. murdered for hire seven or eight people in M exico and Canada;
6. was hired by the IRA to kill someone in Canada with a poison
blow dart with poison from a Brazilian frog;
7. was hired by and worked for John Gotti and other Italian
organized crime ring leaders;
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8. supplied foreign governments w ith documents relating to
American military bases;
9. had information that Iran wanted to take out various consumer
markets in the United States, such as W alM art;
10. trained with a Colombian armed forces group
11. met with Al-Qaeda operatives in M exico.
Presentence Report (“PSR”), Aplt. App. 16–19. According to the PSR,
“authorities w ere never able to verify information regarding the defendant’s
reported murders or connections to foreign government.” Id. at 19, ¶ 87. W hile
these statements suggest Raifsnider has a colorful imagination, the PSR by itself
fails to establish that Raifsnider was incompetent at the time of the April 4, 2005,
plea hearing.
In a memorandum submitted to the court prior to the § 2255 evidentiary
hearing, Raifsnider also made the following assertion: “[m]y attorney did not
inform the court nor investigate the head trauma I suffered years back and refused
to have me evaluated for compitency [sic] that I have nearological [sic] damage
and that my actions stemed [sic] from this head trauma.” M emorandum of Law in
Support of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 M otion, R., Vol. 1, Doc. 38 at 11. At the evidentiary
hearing, Raifsnider and his attorney failed to produce medical testimony or any
other evidence substantiating this claim.
The United States rebutted Raifsnider’s claim of incompetency by
submitting an affidavit from Raifsnider’s trial attorney, Assistant Federal Public
Defender Steven Gradert. He states,
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Raifsnider claims that Affiant did not address the issues related to his
claim that he had suffered a head trauma that might have affected his
mental capacity. Affiant submits that these issues were not raised
with the Court. Affiant did discuss the possibility of seeking a
psychological evaluation with the defendant based on both the
history of the defendant and the Affiant’s own observations about the
behavior of the defendant during the representation. The defendant
requested that he be evaluated but changed his mind and did not want
to be sent away.
Affiant was convinced that Raifsnider understood his charges as he did his
own research regarding many issues and was clearly able to assist with his
defense. Affiant was satisfied that Raifsnider knew and understood the
terms of his plea agreements and the sentence he was to receive.
A ff. of Steven G radert, R ., V ol. I, Doc. 46 at 5–6, ¶ 9. Based on this record, w e
conclude Raifsnider did not produce sufficient evidence establishing that he
lacked the capacity to knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive his right to
appeal his sentence.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance.”
Strickland v. W ashington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). W hen a defendant
challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must first show that “counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. at 687. In order
to prove deficient performance, the defendant must identify acts or omissions that
are “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.
Second, a defendant must establish prejudice. Id. A defendant demonstrates
prejudice by showing that the attorney’s ineffective performance “affected the
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outcome of the plea process. In other words . . . that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” M iller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072
(10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (emphasis
added)).
Raifsnider argues G radert’s performance was deficient because he failed to
request an evaluation of Raifsnider’s competency. In support of this proposition,
he quotes an article describing Rule 1.14 of the Kansas Rules of Professional
Conduct. According to the article, “the law yer may make necessary disclosures to
protect the client, even when the client directs the lawyer not to disclose, and
suggests that before making disclosures, a lawyer should consider whether a
person is likely to use the information to act adversely to the client’s interests.”
Aplt. Br. 8 (quoting Sheila Reynolds, Revised Rule for Representing Clients with
Diminished Capacity, J. Kan. B. Ass’n, July–Aug. 2007, at 24, 25). The rule the
author w as describing, however, did not become effective until July 1, 2007, id. at
24, and therefore did not govern Gradert’s conduct.
The prior version of Rule 1.14 indicates that an attorney is not required to
seek an evaluation of a client’s competency if he does not believe it is in the
client’s best interest. The comment to the rule explains, “disclosure of the
client’s disability can adversely affect the client’s interest. For example, raising
the question of disability could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for
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involuntary commitment. The law yer’s position in such cases is an unavoidably
difficult one. The lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.”
Kan. Rule Prof’l Conduct R. 1.14 cmt. (2006) (emphasis added). The rule does
not indicate that the attorney must seek guidance from a medical expert.
As noted above, Gradert stated he discussed with Raifsnider the possibility
of obtaining a psychological evaluation. “The defendant requested he be
evaluated but changed his mind and did not want to be sent away.” Aff. of Steven
Gradert, R. Vol. I, Doc. 46 at 5, ¶ 9. Gradert also concluded it was unnecessary
to raise the issue before the court because he was “convinced that Raifsnider
understood his charges as he did his own research regarding many issues and was
clearly able to assist with his defense. Affiant was satisfied that Raifsnider knew
and understood the terms of his plea agreements and the sentence he was to
receive.” Id. at 6, ¶ 9. The district court also held an evidentiary hearing
regarding Raifsnider’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Gradert testified at
the hearing, and Raifsnider’s attorney had ample opportunity to cross examine
him. The district court concluded that Raifsnider “was ably represented
throughout this case by qualified, competent counsel. There is no evidence that
M r. Gradert’s performance was deficient in any manner.” R., Vol. I, Doc. 59 at
21.
Because Gradert’s representation was within the “wide range of
professionally competent assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, we agree that
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Raifsnider failed to assert a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
that w ould vitiate the plea agreement.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we DEN Y Raifsnider’s application for a CO A and DISM ISS
this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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