Fonseca-Ortega v. Cline

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
January 19, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
A N TO N IO FO N SEC A-O RTEG A,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 06-3199
(D . Kan.)
SAM CLINE, W arden, Ellsworth (D.C. No. 05-CV-3246-JTM )
Correctional Facility; ATTO RN EY
GEN ERAL O F KANSAS,
Respondents - Appellees.
OR DER *
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Antonio Fonseca-Ortega, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district
court’s order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Because w e conclude that M r. Fonseca-Ortega has failed
to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny
his request for a COA, and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Background
After the van he was driving struck a moving train, killing one of the
passengers in the van, a K ansas jury convicted M r. Fonseca-O rtega of involuntary
manslaughter, aggravated battery, reckless driving, and transportation of an open
container of alcohol. On appeal in state court, he claimed: 1) the reckless driving
conviction was multiplicatus of his conviction for involuntary manslaughter based
upon the commission of a DUI; 2) the reckless driving conviction was
multiplicatus of his conviction for aggravated battery; 3) the trial court erred
when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of driving under
the influence; 4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments
by improperly narrowing what the state had to prove and by engaging in improper
burden shifting; and 5) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
for involuntary manslaughter, aggravated battery, and reckless driving. The
Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for reckless driving as
multiplicatus but affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. M r. Fonseca-
Ortega then filed a habeas petition with the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas, raising improper jury instruction, prosecutorial misconduct
based on statements made during closing arguments, and insufficiency of the
evidence.
In a detailed M emorandum and Order, the district court denied M r.
Fonseca-Ortega’s petition on all three grounds. First, the district court found that
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it could not review the jury instruction issue because “[t]he Supreme Court has
never recognized a federal constitutional right to a lesser included offense
instruction in non-capital cases.” Fonseca-Ortega v. Cline, No. 05-3246, slip op.
at 4 (D. Kan. M ay 10, 2006) (quoting Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Citing this Circuit’s “automatic
non-reviewability” rule for claims based on a state court’s failure to give such an
instruction in non-capital cases, see Dockins, 374 F.3d at 938, the district court
declined to review whether the trial court improperly excluded a jury instruction
on the lesser included offense of driving under the influence rather than merely
instructing them on involuntary manslaughter.
Second, the court found that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred during
the closing statements. To w arrant habeas relief, prosecutorial misconduct must
have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.” Fonseca-O rtega, No. 05-3246, slip op. at 5 (quoting
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court found that since the prosecutor’s comments were proper, they
did not create any due process concerns. Although the prosecutor emphasized the
importance of proving that M r. Fonseca-Ortega was driving the car, he did not
state that it was the only element the state had to prove. Further, the court found
that the comments the prosecutor made regarding the weakness of the evidence
presented by M r. Fonseca-O rtega were reasonable.
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Third, the court found that the record included sufficient evidence to
support the conviction. In order to prevail on a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
the court required M r. Fonseca-Ortega to show that no “rational trier of fact could
have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 7 (quoting Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because the record indicated facts that could lead a rational juror to conclude that
M r. Fonseca-Ortega was the driver of the vehicle, was reckless, and was under the
influence of alcohol, the district court found that the evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to support his convictions. M r. Fonseca-Ortega seeks to appeal the
district court’s denial of his habeas petition on these same three grounds. 1
Discussion
A prisoner may appeal the denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
1
M r. Fonseca-Ortega also claims that his involuntary manslaughter
conviction and reckless driving conviction were multiplicatus. Since the Kansas
Court of Appeals already vacated his conviction for reckless driving, this claim is
moot.
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proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
W e have reviewed closely the district court opinion and find its reasoning
sound and its conclusions correct. M r. Fonseca-O rtega’s submission to this Court
contains no persuasive argument that the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner, nor does he show that the issues raised were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further. W e do not believe that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s determinations debatable or wrong.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we D EN Y M r. Fonseca-Ortega’s request for a COA and
DISM ISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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