United States v. Doe

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 28, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-6236
v. (W .D. Oklahoma)
JOH N D OE, * (D.C. No. CR-05-113-1-C)
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT **
Before TACH A, Chief Circuit Judge, PO RFILIO and A ND ER SO N, Circuit
Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
W e grant appellant’s unopposed motion to conceal his true identity
throughout this order and judgment, and we make permanent the provisional seal
placed on this entire matter on December 5, 2006.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellant pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment followed by
five years of supervised release. He appeals his sentence, which we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On M ay 19, 2005, United States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”)
authorities intercepted a suspicious package mailed from Long Beach, California
to an individual named “Chris Hall” in Norman, Oklahoma. On M ay 20, the
authorities intercepted another suspicious package also mailed from Long Beach
and addressed to the same “Chris Hall” but in Ponca City, Oklahoma. W hen a
drug-sniffing dog alerted to both packages, search warrants were obtained and a
search of the two packages revealed they contained methamphetamine. 1
Controlled deliveries of the packages were made, following which appellant was
arrested in N orman, Oklahoma, and two other individuals, Alfred Lee M oore, Jr.
and Buck Allen Jones, were arrested in Ponca City.
Appellant apparently began cooperating with law authorities after his
arrest. He offered information about the crimes with which he was charged, and
also offered to help authorities identify his California source. Although appellant
identified his California source, apparently no federal investigation and
1
One package also contained a substance which field tested positive for
cocaine.
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prosecution were successfully initiated. Instead, the California source was
arrested by local law enforcement authorities in California. Appellant also
offered to provide information about another individual being prosecuted on
unrelated charges in Oklahoma, but authorities ultimately concluded appellant
was not reliable and he was never called as a w itness to testify at that individual’s
trial. Appellant testified at his sentencing hearing that he believed that his
cooperation induced M oore to cooperate.
U ltimately, a four-count superceding indictment charged appellant with tw o
counts: one for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and one for
possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The
indictment charged M oore and Jones with possession of methamphetamine and of
a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Jones pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, and appellant and M oore
proceeded to trial.
D uring the trial, appellant, without a plea bargain, pled guilty to the two
counts against him. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to
strike its Notice of Prior Convictions which it had filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 851. After M oore’s trial ended in a hung jury, he pled guilty to two counts of
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using a cellular telephone to facilitate possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute.
Jones was the first one sentenced. The government filed a motion for
downward departure based on his provision of substantial assistance, including
testifying at the trial of M oore and appellant. The district court granted the
motion, and Jones was sentenced to forty months’ imprisonment, followed by five
years of supervised release. M oore was then sentenced to two forty-eight month
sentences, to run consecutively, followed by one year of supervised release.
Finally, appellant was sentenced to two concurrent 235-month sentences,
followed by five years of supervised release. Prior to his sentencing hearing,
appellant filed a sentencing memorandum asking the court for a downward
departure or deviation from the advisory sentencing range under the United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines M anual (“USSG ”). Also prior to the
sentencing hearing, the government filed a motion for an acceptance of
responsibility downward adjustment to reduce his total offense level by one point
if the court awarded a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Furthermore, in anticipation of his sentencing hearing, the United States
Probation Department prepared a presentence report (“PSR”), which assessed
appellant a total adjusted offense level of thirty-seven and a criminal history
category of VI. That yielded an advisory Guideline range of 360 months to life.
Appellant raised a number of objections, which the district court addressed at
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appellant’s sentencing hearing. After upholding two of his objections, the court
determined that appellant’s total adjusted offense level was thirty-three, which,
with a criminal history category of VI, yielded a Guideline range of 235 to 293
months.
During the sentencing hearing, appellant again sought a downward
departure or a variance from the advisory guideline range on the basis of his
cooperation. 2 The district court found “there are no circumstances warranting a
departure from the guidelines in this case.” Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 39, R. Vol.
3. The court recognized, however, that “[t]hat does not resolve the question . . .
whether the guidelines sentence is an appropriate sentence.” Id. The court went
on to note that “[t]he most compelling reasons that I see for a sentence outside the
guidelines in this case is that I believe that [appellant] should have been
considered for a downward departure.” Id. at 40. After acknowledging that the
court could not “force the government to move for a departure for substantial
assistance and I can’t depart absent that motion,” id., the court proceeded to
2
W e have recently clarified the difference between a departure and a
variance with respect to an advisory Guidelines range:
[W ]hen a court reaches a sentence above or below the recommended
Guidelines range through application of Chapter Four or Five of the
Sentencing Guidelines, the resulting increase or decrease is referred
to as a “departure.” When a court enhances or detracts from the
recommended range through application of § 3553(a) factors,
however, the increase or decrease is called a “variance.”
United States v. Atencio, No. 05-2279, 2007 W L 102977, at *5 n.1 (10th Cir.
Jan. 17, 2007).
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inquire whether a variance from the guideline range was appropriate in light of
appellant’s assistance to the government. At this point, a cell phone began
ringing, and the district court directed the person with the phone to leave the
hearing. The court then pronounced sentence as follow s:
I believe that a substantial and lengthy sentence is necessary to
protect the public. I believe a substantial and lengthy sentence is
necessary to serve as an example to others, even your own children,
as to w hat happens w hen lives are lived without regard for the law.
I believe that a substantial sentence is necessary in order to
provide any kind of drug rehabilitation and treatment for you so that
you can return eventually to society drug-free.
Considering all of the goals of sentencing, I think that the
guideline range is appropriate in this case based primarily on your
substantial criminal history. It is therefore my judgment that you be
imprisoned for a term of 235 months on all counts, to be served
concurrently.
Id. at 41.
Appellant appeals, arguing “the district court erred as a matter of law
because it did not take the defendant’s cooperation with the government into
account and determined it was compelled to impose a sentence within the range of
imprisonment established by the United States Sentencing Guidelines.”
Appellant’s Br. at 2. W e disagree.
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D ISC USSIO N
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005), the formerly mandatory federal sentencing Guidelines are now
advisory. “Post-Booker, we review sentencing decisions for reasonableness,
which has both procedural and substantive components.” Atencio, 2007 W L
102977, at *6. “In setting a procedurally reasonable sentence, a district court
must calculate the proper advisory Guidelines range and apply the factors set
forth in § 3553(a).” Id. “A substantively reasonable sentence ultimately reflects
the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the case.” Id.
Because district courts continue to calculate a Guidelines sentence as part
of their determination of a reasonable sentence, “we continue to review the
district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo, and we review any factual
findings for clear error.” U nited States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1275-76 (10th
Cir. 2007). W here a district court “correctly applies the G uidelines and imposes a
sentence within the applicable Guideline range, that sentence ‘is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.’” Id. at 1276 (quoting United States v.
Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
USSG §5K1.1 provides that:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart
from the guidelines.
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Prior to Booker, we held that “a district court’s authority to consider a
defendant’s substantial assistance claim at sentencing is conditioned upon a prior
motion of the government.” U nited States v. Duncan, 242 F.2d 940, 944 (10th
Cir. 2001). W hile w e have declined to address “the continued vitality of this rule
in the aftermath of . . . Booker,” United States v. Doe, 398 F.3d 1254, 1259 n.7
(10th Cir. 2005), we need not determine that issue in this case. The district court
in this case clearly recognized that, despite the absence of a motion to depart
downward, it had the authority to vary from the advisory Guideline range if the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) so counseled. Id. at 1260-61. The
district court specifically considered whether appellant’s cooperation with and
assistance to the government supported a variance. Ultimately, the court
concluded that the sentencing factors in § 3553(a), particularly the appellant’s
criminal history and the need to protect the public from further crimes, did not
support a variance. It accordingly sentenced appellant in accordance with the low
end of the advisory Guideline range. W e conclude that the sentence imposed was
both reasoned and reasonable.
C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence in this case.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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