McNeil v. Anderson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 7, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DELBERT MCNEIL, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-6132
(D.C. No. CIV-05-429-F)
JOHN CLAY ANDERSON, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, Delbert McNeil, Jr. alleges that John Clay
Anderson, an Oklahoma state trooper, used excessive force in the aftermath of an
investigatory traffic stop. McNeil appeals the district court’s granting of Trooper
Anderson’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.
We affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
In the late-night hours of June 2, 2003, Anderson stopped McNeil’s pickup
truck for traveling erratically at an excessive speed on an interstate highway. As
he walked toward the truck, Anderson noticed a gas can with an attached hose in
the truck bed and several cans of starter fluid, items associated with the
manufacturing of methamphetamine. Approaching the driver’s side window,
Anderson recognized McNeil from an earlier traffic encounter in which Anderson
was exposed to a chemical vapor spewing from McNeil’s vehicle. Anderson also
knew that McNeil had been arrested previously on charges of assaulting a police
officer.
Because of this history, Anderson ordered McNeil to step out of his
vehicle, move to the grassy ditch area next to the highway, stand up, and place his
hands behind his back. 1 Events unfolded quickly after that. In response to
McNeil’s statement that he was getting a cell phone from his pants, Anderson
shouted that if McNeil pulled out anything but a phone, he would kill McNeil.
1
Anderson’s patrol car was equipped with a dashboard camera, which
recorded the incident. See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 n.5 (appending
link to videotape to opinion, stating “We are happy to allow the videotape to
speak for itself.”). A DVD copy of the audio and video record was submitted as
an exhibit to Anderson’s summary judgment motion. R., Doc 45, Ex. 5. The core
of McNeil’s claim concerns events that occurred in the ditch, outside the range of
the camera. The parties’ statements, however, are audible from the microphone
inside the patrol vehicle or the microphone on Anderson’s person. This court has
disregarded McNeil’s unsupported allegations that Anderson covered his
microphone and uttered racial epithets.
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Speaking in a loud and excited voice, Anderson repeatedly issued commands to
McNeil to put his hands behind his head. After he saw McNeil throw an object,
he ordered McNeil to lay down and put both hands behind his back. A scuffle
ensued in the ditch, ending with McNeil’s running to the front of his pickup truck.
Anderson retreated to his patrol car, retrieved a shotgun, and called for backup.
When he again ordered McNeil to lay down in the ditch (and again threatened to
kill him if he did not), McNeil became cooperative. He remained in the ditch
until backup officers arrived to assist with handcuffing him. Upon a search of the
surrounding area, Anderson found a bag that had been emptied of
methamphetamine.
One of the backup officers took McNeil to jail, where he did not request or
receive medical treatment. McNeil was charged with possession of a controlled
dangerous substance (methamphetamine), resisting an officer, and speeding.
After a trial, an appeal, and a re-trial, McNeil was convicted of resisting an
officer.
McNeil filed this civil-rights case, alleging excessive force during the
roadside arrest. According to McNeil, Anderson fabricated the speeding,
erratic-driving, and methamphetamine-paraphernalia allegations because he
wished to “execute” McNeil in “revenge” for the prior incident. Aplt. Br. at 2.
Anderson found “the right time of night” and location for an attempt to kill
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McNeil. Id. Though Anderson failed to kill him, McNeil claims, the encounter
injured his back and caused emotional trauma.
Anderson moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.
The magistrate judge assigned to the case reviewed the parties’ filings, including
the DVD recording, determined that Anderson did not use constitutionally
excessive force and recommended granting the motion for summary judgment.
The district court reviewed the matter de novo, adopted the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, and entered summary judgment in favor of Anderson.
II.
A.
“Public officials facing civil liability for alleged constitutional violations
may assert qualified immunity. The doctrine, which provides ‘immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability,’ prevents undue interference with public
affairs by cutting short baseless litigation against government actors.” Mecham v.
Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
“In resolving questions of qualified immunity,” the “‘threshold question’”
is whether, “‘[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,
do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?’”
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)). A court proceeds to the question of “‘whether the right was
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clearly established’” only if it “finds a violation of a constitutional right.” Id.(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “Whether a plaintiff has alleged conduct . . .
that violates the Constitution” is a legal question to be reviewed de novo.
Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998).
At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff “must . . . show evidence that
[the defendant] affirmatively violated a constitutional right and that the right was
clearly established at the time.” Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 455 F.3d 1146,
1150 (10th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff is obligated to “present some evidence to
support the allegations” because “mere allegations, without more, are
insufficient.” Id. at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Unsubstantiated
allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a summary judgment motion,
“[t]he plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case. . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard applies to McNeil’s
claim of excessive force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The
court views “a particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396.
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments–in circumstances that
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are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. “Not every push or shove,
even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates
the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 396 (citation and quotations omitted).
The ultimate question “is whether the officers’ actions are objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Id. at 397(internal quotations marks omitted). This determination “‘requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Casey v. City of Federal Heights, No. 06-
1462 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (10th Cir., currently in circulation).
B.
Putting aside his unsupported allegations of a revenge plot, McNeil has not
provided any evidence supporting his excessive-force claim. The parties’
encounter was prompted by Anderson’s decision to conduct a traffic stop of a
speeding, improperly driven vehicle. Upon his approach to McNeil’s truck,
Anderson observed methamphetamine-related items in the truck bed and
recognized McNeil, thereby arousing reasonable safety concerns. Thus, Anderson
was justified in ordering McNeil to exit the truck, move to the rear of the truck,
and go to the ditch at the side of the highway.
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McNeil escalated the potential safety threat by failing to comply with
Anderson’s orders, struggling with Anderson, and then actively resisting arrest.
Even if, as McNeil alleges, Anderson exaggerated the previous incident, issued
contradictory commands, pointed weapons at him, wrestled with him on the
ground, and kneed him in the back, the encounter did not involve constitutionally
excessive force. See Mecham, 500 F.3d at 1205 (concluding that plaintiff’s
disregard for instructions at side of a highway justified use of force to subdue
her).
From Anderson’s perspective, the rapidly developing encounter was fraught
with danger. His conduct was objectively reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. As a consequence, McNeil’s claim of excessive force cannot
survive summary judgment proceedings.
III.
We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds. We remind McNeil of his obligation to continue making
partial payments of his appellate filing fee until the entire balance is paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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