United States v. Flynn

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 27, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-7024
v. E.D. Oklahoma
BILLY RAY FLYNN, also known as (D.C. No. 05-CR-75-W H)
Billy Ray Abbott,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Billy Ray Flynn appeals from his conviction claiming the district court
improperly instructed the jury. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.
I. Background
Following a trial, a jury convicted Flynn of assault with intent to commit
murder in Indian country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(1), 1151 and 1153.
At trial, the government produced evidence showing both Flynn and the victim,
Sherry England, were drinking throughout the day of the incident. England
testified: she served a bowl of chili to Flynn that afternoon in her kitchen; Flynn
threw the chili in her face, struck her on her head and left the room; after she
wiped the chili out of her eyes, she grabbed a knife sharpener and went to
investigate Flynn’s whereabouts; as she opened the front screen door, Flynn
struck her in the chest with the sharp end of a pick axe.
II. Discussion
Flynn claims the court improperly refused to instruct the jury on his
defense of voluntary intoxication. “W e review de novo whether the district court
properly instructed on the applicable law, and we review the court's decision to
give or deny a particular instruction for an abuse of discretion.” Thom pson v.
United States, 223 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000).
Voluntary intoxication can be a defense to a specific intent crime if the
defendant was so intoxicated that he could not form the specific mens rea of the
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crime charged. W e agree with the district court the evidence at trial did not
warrant an instruction on voluntary intoxication. In United States v. Jackson,
although there was evidence the defendant “habitually used crack cocaine,” the
district court nevertheless properly refused to instruct the jury on voluntary
intoxication where there was no evidence the defendant’s “mental capacity was so
impaired by his voluntary ingestion of crack cocaine that he was unable to form
the specific intent necessary to commit the crimes . . . .” 213 F.3d 1269, 1294
(10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000). The same
result obtains in this case. Flynn correctly points to evidence of his alcohol
consumption the day of the crime. However, there was no evidence suggesting
the intoxication affected Flynn’s mental capacity. See United States v. Boyles, 57
F.3d 535, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A bald statement that the defendant had been
drinking or was drunk is insufficient — insufficient not because it falls short of
the quantum of evidence necessary, but because it is not evidence of the right
thing. In order to merit an intoxication instruction . . . the defendant must point
to some evidence of mental impairment due to the consumption of intoxicants
sufficient to negate the existence of the [specific] intent[.]”) (quotation and
citation omitted).
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During trial, defense counsel did not elicit testimony about Flynn’s
behavior, physical or mental condition, or other indicators of impairment. 1 The
district court properly ruled. Although there was evidence Flynn consumed
alcohol the day of the crime, “there was absolutely no evidence at all about his
level of impairment.” (R. Vol. II at 170.)
AFFIRM ED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
1
Flynn’s counsel argues Flynn mistakenly believed the knife sharpener
used by England was a knife raising an inference of intoxication. This is utter
speculation as no evidence was adduced at trial to support the claim. See United
States v. M archese, 46 F.3d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Counsels’ arguments
on [the] motion [to dismiss the indictment] did not constitute the presentation of
evidence for the purpose of determining guilt or innocence . . . .”).
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