Simmons v. Bruce

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 2, 2006
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DAVID B. SIMMONS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 05-3379
(D.C. No. 03-CV-3302-SAC)
L. E. BRUCE, Warden, Hutchinson (D. Kan.)
Correctional Facility; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
KANSAS,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
David B. Simmons, a Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas relief. The
district court determined that Mr. Simmons failed to file his habeas petition
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
within the applicable one-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and
alternatively, that Mr. Simmons’s claims were procedurally defaulted. Thereafter,
the district court declined to issue Mr. Simmons a certificate of appealability
(COA), but it granted him leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
Mr. Simmons then filed in this court an application for a COA, asserting that his
habeas petition was not time-barred and his claims were not procedurally
defaulted. This court granted Mr. Simmons a COA to consider these two issues.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We review
de novo the district court’s dismissal of a federal habeas petition as time-barred.
Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 2004). We likewise review
de novo the district court’s dismissal of a federal habeas petition based on
procedural default. Anderson v. Attorney Gen. of Kan., 342 F.3d 1140, 1143
(10th Cir. 2003). Because Mr. Simmons is pro se, we construe his pleadings
liberally. Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1998).
In a December 12, 2005, motion to supplement his opening brief,
Mr. Simmons asserts for the first time on appeal that the district court erred by
not tolling the applicable one-year statute of limitations during the twenty-day
period in which he could have filed a motion for rehearing from the Kansas
Supreme Court’s June 1, 2001, decision affirming the denial of a post-conviction
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motion. Serrano, 383 F.3d at 1185 (holding time allotted by the state for filing
motion for rehearing tolls limitation period); Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 7.06 (“A motion for
rehearing . . . may be served and filed within twenty (20) days of the date of
decision.”). Mr. Simmons never made this argument in the district court. Lyons
v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 722 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[I]ssues not
passed upon below will not be considered on appeal); see also Miller v. Marr,
141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that § 2244(d) is not jurisdictional).
But even if he had made the argument, we would still hold–having carefully
considered the briefs, the record, and the applicable law–that he procedurally
defaulted his claims. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for
substantially the same reasons stated in its order dated September 27, 2005.
R. Doc. 29. Mr. Simmons’s December 12, 2005, motion is GRANTED. All other
outstanding motions are DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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