United States v. Garcia-Salas

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 27, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 07-2126
v. (D. New Mexico)
RAY GARCIA-SALAS, (D.C. No. CR-06-2259-JP)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
Having interpreted this court’s precedents as virtually foreclosing variances
from the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court imposed a
sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. We might disagree with that
interpretation but it is unnecessary to revisit our precedents. Under the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions in Gall v. United States, No. 06-7949, 2007 WL 4292116(S. Ct. Dec. 10, 2007), and Kimbrough v. United States, No. 06-6330, 2007 WL
4292040 (S. Ct. Dec. 10, 2007), it is clear that the district court had greater
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
sentencing discretion than it thought it did. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2005, Albuquerque police officers recovered a duffle bag
containing two handguns and over 40 rounds of ammunition at the home of Ray
Garcia-Salas. He had previously been convicted of felony battery on a police
officer in New Mexico state court. On January 29, 2007, he pleaded guilty in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to one count of being
a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He
was 21 at the time.
The probation office prepared a presentence report (PSR). His base offense
level under the Sentencing Guidelines was 20 because he committed the present
offense following a felony conviction of a crime of violence. See USSG
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). After a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility under
USSG § 3E1.1, his total offense level was 17. Four criminal-history points—one
for a prior juvenile adjudication for unauthorized graffiti, one for a conviction of
battery of a peace officer, and two for committing the present offense while on
probation—placed him in criminal history category III. His Guidelines
sentencing range was therefore 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. The PSR
proposed that he participate in and complete a substance-abuse treatment program
as a special condition of release.
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Before the sentencing hearing Mr. Garcia-Salas filed a motion for a
downward departure under the Guidelines. First, he sought a downward departure
under § 5H1.4 because of an extraordinary physical impairment or condition.
When he was four years old he was hit by a train, which resulted in the
amputation of his left leg below the knee. He now wears a prosthetic limb. He
argued (1) that his condition would severely limit his ability to participate in
physical activity in prison and make him more vulnerable to attack and (2) that
accommodating his physical condition would increase the cost of his
imprisonment. Next he sought a downward departure under § 5H1.6 for
extraordinary family ties and responsibilities. Mr. Garcia-Salas fathered children
when he was 15 and 19 and became their primary caretaker, a stay-at-home father,
while the mother of the younger child worked. Also, he was active in the New
Mexico Young Fathers Project, through which “he has led groups, lectured at
schools . . ., and . . . participated on local and national panels.” R. Vol. I,
Doc. 18 at 4 (Def.’s Mot. for Downward Departure, Apr. 17, 2007). Finally, he
sought a downward departure under § 5H1.3 because of his mental and emotional
condition. In addition to losing his leg, he had suffered other traumatic
experiences, including abandonment by his mother when he was an infant and the
suicide of his stepmother in the family home on his tenth birthday. Mr. Garcia-
Salas asserted that these factors, both individually and in the aggregate, supported
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a departure. The government opposed the motion and the probation office
concluded that the facts did not justify a downward departure.
At the sentencing hearing the district court acknowledged the government’s
opposition to Mr. Garcia-Salas’s motion and agreed that “individually and in
combination the grounds asserted do not take this case outside of the heartland of
cases thereby justifying a downward departure.” R. Vol. III at 5. Mr. Garcia-
Salas then urged the court to grant him a downward variance under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). He argued that under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
the court could consider the “whole person” and vary from the Guidelines
accordingly. Id. The court responded that its discretion to vary was limited:
[T]he recent rulings of the Tenth Circuit . . . make it very difficult
for a sentencing judge to sentence under 18 [U.S.C. §] 3553(a). The
guideline sentencing range is presumptively reasonable, and a
sentence in that range would be virtually automatically affirmed.
Any sentence outside that range would have a very difficult time of
standing given the opposition of the government. . . . Theoretically,
I have discretion, but the recent opinions make it very difficult to
exercise that.
R. Vol. III at 6–7. The court then asked whether the government would “oppose
an 18-month sentence under 3553(a),” and the government responded that it
would. Id. at 8. After further argument by Mr. Garcia-Salas the court denied the
request to vary:
I think I feel constrained to stay within the guidelines. As I already
indicated, I don’t think the facts present a case outside the heartland
of cases. Even though I might be inclined otherwise to sentence
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under 3553(a) below the 30 months, I think that would invite a high
risk of reversal.
Id. at 9. The court sentenced Mr. Garcia-Salas to 30 months’ imprisonment, the
bottom of the Guidelines range.
The district court also ordered that Mr. Garcia-Salas “participate in and
successfully complete a substance abuse treatment program.” Id. at 12–13. In
response Mr. Garcia-Salas asserted that “there is no evidence at all that [he] has
any substance abuse problem at all.” Id. at 14. The court replied: “It’s a
condition recommended by probation and it’s within the discretion of probation
whether to require it or not. . . . There would be a required one-time urinalysis,
so if it’s negative, then probation could just disregard it.” Id. at 14–15. The
court’s judgment, however, contained no language conditioning the treatment on
failing a urinalysis. Mr. Garcia-Salas appeals both the prison sentence and the
drug-treatment condition of release.
II. DISCUSSION
Under Booker “we review sentencing decisions for reasonableness, which
has both procedural and substantive components.” United States v. Atencio, 476
F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007). Procedural reasonableness relates to the
manner in which the court arrives at its sentence. “In setting a procedurally
reasonable sentence, a district court must calculate the proper advisory Guidelines
range and apply the factors set forth in § 3553(a).” Substantive reasonableness
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relates to the length of the sentence. “A substantively reasonable sentence
ultimately reflects the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to
the case.” Id. We have stated that within-Guidelines sentences are, with respect
to substantive reasonableness, “presumptively reasonable.” United States v.
Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). That presumption was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).
Only a few weeks ago, however, did the Supreme Court provide further
guidance on review of sentences not within the Guidelines range. In Gall and
Kimbrough the Supreme Court explained that such a sentence can be set aside
only for an abuse of discretion. In particular, the Court held “impermissible” any
“presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.”
Gall, 2007 WL 4292116, at *5. This is not to say that the district court is free to
impose any sentence whatsoever on remand. But there is undoubtedly some room
below the Guidelines minimum for a “reasonable” sentence.
Because we remand for resentencing, we need not address the propriety of
the special condition of release imposed on Mr. Garcia-Salas, as the issue may
well not arise at resentencing.
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We REVERSE Mr. Garcia-Salas’s sentence and REMAND for
resentencing.
Judge McWilliams dissents.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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