United States v. Garcia

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 20, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-2144
v. (D. New Mexico)
JOSE PABLO GARCIA, (D.C. Nos. CV-05-0240 JP/WDS;
CR-04-803 JP)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Jose Pablo Garcia, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Mr. Garcia was convicted
after a guilty plea of unlawfully reentering the United States after a conviction of
an aggravated felony, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (2), and (b)(2). The
district court sentenced him to 46 months’ imprisonment.
Mr. Garcia now argues that the district court’s reliance on a prior conviction
to enhance his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights under United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), because the government did
not allege the prior conviction in the indictment and did not submit to the jury the
issue of existence of the prior conviction.
In order to obtain a COA, Mr. Garcia must make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He may make this
showing by demonstrating that “‘reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)).
Mr. Garcia has not made the necessary showing. As the district court
observed, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1998), the
Supreme Court held that a prior conviction is not an element of a § 1326 unlawful
entry offense, and that, as a result, a prior conviction need not be alleged in the
indictment. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Booker, Blakely, and Apprendi
have not altered this principle. Indeed, this circuit had held post-Booker that the
existence and classification of prior convictions used to enhance a defendant’s
sentence need not be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. See
United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are bound by
existing precedent to hold that the Almendarez-Torres exception to the rule
announced in Apprendi and extended to the Guidelines in Booker remains good
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law . . . . We therefore conclude that the government need not charge the ‘fact’ of
a prior conviction in an indictment and submit it to a jury.”).
Moreover, Mr. Garcia did not file a direct appeal and he may therefore not
pursue this claim in a § 2255 proceeding. See United States v. Cox , 83 F.3d 336,
341 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that, when a petitioner “fails to raise an issue on
direct appeal, he is barred from raising the issue in a § 2255 proceeding, unless he
establishes either cause excusing the procedural default and prejudice resulting
from the error, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice if the claim is not
considered ”). Additionally, to the extent that his claim is based on Booker, we
note that that case was decided after Mr. Garia’s conviction became final and that
“Booke r does not apply retroactively on collateral review.” United States v.
Bellamy , 411 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Garcia’s application for a COA and DISMISS
this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
United States Circuit Judge
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