Koon v. Sedgwick County, Kansas

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 8, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
GREG KOON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-3178
(D.C. No. 6:08-CV-01123-EFM)
SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Greg Koon appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of defendant Sedgwick County. The court concluded Mr. Koon failed to
establish a triable issue as to whether his transfer to a new work site was pretext
for retaliation. Because Mr. Koon’s pretext argument fails to address the specific
reasons proffered by the County for its decision to transfer, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Koon was hired by Sedgwick County’s public works department in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
1988. He was crew chief of the County’s Clonmell Yard from 2003 until his
transfer in 2007. As crew chief, Mr. Koon was second-in-command behind
Foreman Martin Seiter and, along with Mr. Seiter, was responsible for managing
the yard’s employees.
A crew chief and foreman are typically expected to work together, but Mr.
Koon and Mr. Seiter’s relationship grew increasingly dysfunctional. In early
2005, Dorsha Kirksey, the County’s diversity and employee relations manager,
investigated a sexual harassment complaint filed against Mr. Koon by one of his
co-workers. Although Ms. Kirksey found no evidence of harassment, she
nevertheless recommended Mr. Koon be removed from his supervisory post for
failing to provide adequate support to Mr. Seiter. Specifically, she reported that
“[a]ll of the employees feel that the morale at the yard is extremely low, and that .
. . Mr. Seiter and Mr. Koon are allowing an environment to exist that is hostile
and preferential.” (Appellant’s App. at 107.) Ms. Kirksey also reported Mr.
Koon would often confuse employees by changing or overriding Mr. Seiter’s
instructions and that he failed to “exhibit[] the skills and abilities necessary to be
an effective supervisor.” (Id.) Despite Ms. Kirksey’s recommendations, the
County only placed Koon on a ninety-day probation. It also directed Mr. Seiter to
attend supervisory and sexual harassment training.
In 2007, Ms. Kirksey was tasked with investigating another complaint, this
time against Mr. Seiter. During the investigation, Mr. Koon accused Mr. Seiter of
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using County property for personal benefit and abusing his employees. He also
blamed Mr. Seiter for low employee morale and turnover. Ms. Kirksey ultimately
concluded Mr. Seiter had taken County property for personal use, but she also
determined Mr. Seiter and Mr. Koon continued to “fail[] to work together and
present a united front to employees.” (Id. at 112.) Explaining that “[a]ny
disagreements between the Foreman and the Crew Chief should be kept between
them, and the Crew Chief is ultimately responsible for supporting the wishes of
the Foreman when communicating with employees, whether he is in agreement or
not,” Ms. Kirksey recommended that “both Mr. Seiter and Mr. Koon be
reassigned to positions at another location.” (Id. at 112-13.)
Based on Ms. Kirksey’s recommendations, the County moved Mr. Koon to
a new work yard and reduced his position from crew chief to equipment operator
level 2, the position he held before his promotion to crew chief, but continued to
pay his crew chief salary. Mr. Seiter was also transferred.
Mr. Koon originally sued the County under Kansas whistle-blower laws for
retaliatory demotion and Title VII. The Title VII claim was dropped during
discovery, but the district court retained jurisdiction over the state claim. On the
County’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Koon established a prima facie case
but could not overcome his burden to establish that the County’s reason for
transferring him was pretextual. This appeal followed.
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DISCUSSION
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court. See Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d
1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008). We view the facts, and all reasonable inferences
those facts support, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Mr. Koon.
See id. Because our review is de novo, we need not separately address arguments
that the district court erred by viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the
County or by treating disputed issues of fact as undisputed. See Rivera v. City
and Cnty. of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 920 (10th Cir. 2004). “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Under Kansas law, retaliatory demotion is evaluated under the same three-
step framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973). See Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 648 P.2d 234 (Kan. 1982).
The plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Should the
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must establish a genuine dispute of
material fact that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons but were mere pretext for retaliation. See Bracken v. Dixon Indus., Inc.,
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38 P.3d 679, 682 (Kan. 2002).
Assuming Mr. Koon established a prima facie case of retaliation under
Kansas law, we turn to the County’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for Mr.
Koon’s transfer and Mr. Koon’s challenge to the County’s reason as pretext for
retaliation. The County asserts Mr. Koon was transferred to resolve a poor work
environment at Clonmell Yard arising from caustic relationships both between
Mr. Koon and Mr. Seiter and between the two men as a management unit and
their subordinates. Mr. Koon’s response can be distilled into two assertions, both
of which he claims create triable questions as to whether the County’s proffered
reason for Mr. Koon’s reassignment is now being used to cover up
mismanagement of Clonmell Yard by the County’s off-site leadership. First, Mr.
Koon points to evidence that his co-workers approved of his performance as crew
chief, therefore the County had no justifiable reason to transfer him. Second, Mr.
Koon argues Ms. Kirksey’s report contains overwhelming evidence against Mr.
Seiter but only occasional references to Mr. Koon’s performance, yet both men
were transferred.
Any argument for pretext based on whether Mr. Koon was actually
respected by his fellow employees for his performance as crew chief fails to
address our inquiry of whether the County honestly relied in good faith upon the
reported leadership deficiencies and animosity between Mr. Koon and Mr. Seiter.
“Evidence that the employer should not have made the termination decision—for
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example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not
sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.”
Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1169-70 (10th Cir.
2007). We may infer from evidence presented by Mr. Koon that several
employees thought he was a good leader. However, this inference fails to address
Mr. Koon’s relationship with Mr. Seiter and its effect on the yard’s overall work
environment. The County did not relocate Mr. Koon because he was unqualified,
dishonest, or lazy, (see Appellant’s App. at 144-49), but rather because he failed
to “work in concert” with his foreman and “present a united front” to the other
employees, (id. at 112).
Furthermore, the focus in Ms. Kirksey’s 2007 report on Mr. Seiter rather
than Mr. Koon is hardly surprising given the subject of her report was a complaint
against Mr. Seiter, not against Mr. Koon. When presented with both the 2005 and
2007 reports, however, the County had sufficient information to conclude it
should separate the two men in order to improve workplace morale and decrease
turnover.
At its core, Mr. Koon’s pretext argument is based on the theory that the
County wished to spread blame for Clonmell Yard’s misfortune onto both Mr.
Seiter and Mr. Koon in order to punish Mr. Koon for embarrassing the County’s
off-site management. However, he has not provided any specific facts that speak
to this assertion. Nor has he effectively addressed the specific reason proffered
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by the County for his transfer. We therefore AFFIRM.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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