Coppinger v. Zavaras

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 11, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CANDY COPPINGER,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 11-1107
v. (D. Colorado)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARISTEDES (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-02555-LTB)
W. ZAVARAS; GRIEVANCE OFFICER
ANTHONY DeCESARO; WARDEN
LARRY REID; ASSOCIATE WARDEN
KELLIE WASKO; MAJOR MCGOWN;
MAJOR THOMPSON, CAPTAIN FILER,
LIEUTENANT SCOLERI; LIEUTENANT
HUGHBANKS; SARGENT MINJAREZ;
SARGENT SALAZAR; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER MILLER; GRIEVANCE
COORDINATOR ELMA BIRD, and
UNKNOWN,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this court has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Candy Coppinger, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se,
filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting Defendants violated her
constitutional right to due process by failing to follow prison administrative
regulations in processing her grievances and failing to properly address the
grievances. She also alleged Defendants failed to provide her with necessary
information on administrative regulations, ACA standards, clinical standards,
statutes, dietary standards, medical standards, dental standards, and mental health
standards. Finally, she asserted claims relating to a prison disciplinary hearing
conducted on February 25, 2010. According to Coppinger, that hearing resulted
in her loss of a “two-man room,” good-time credits, and her prison job.
Coppinger sought monetary damages 1 and injunctive relief.
The district court dismissed Coppinger’s complaint as legally frivolous.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i). As to her claims challenging Defendants’
1
Coppinger’s claims for damages are barred by Heck v. Humprey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). The district court,
however, dismissed those claims with prejudice on the merits. This approach was
entirely proper. See Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 413 n.1 (10th Cir.
2004) (noting Heck is not jurisdictional and proceeding to evaluate the merits of
the Heck-barred claims).
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failure to follow administrative regulations, the court concluded those claims did
not implicate any due process rights. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995) (holding state-created liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause
are “limited to freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); see
also Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] failure to
adhere to administrative regulations does not equate to a constitutional
violation.”). As to the claims arising from the disciplinary hearing, the district
court determined Coppinger only had a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in the loss of good-time credits. 2 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. The court
proceeded to evaluate those claims under Wolff v. McDonnell, concluding
Coppinger had received all the safeguards to which she was entitled. See 418
U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974) (holding an inmate has a due process right to (1) advance
written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity to call witness and
present evidence, and (3) a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the disciplinary action).
2
In her claim for relief, Coppinger did not specifically seek the restoration
of the good-time credits. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)
(“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to
immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); see also United States v. Furman, 112 F.3d
435, 438 (10th Cir. 1997).
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The district court also addressed Coppinger’s claim that defendant Wasko
discriminated against her by making a derogatory comment in a letter and causing
her to lose her housing assignment. The court concluded Coppinger’s allegations
were conclusory and did not support a claim she was denied her constitutional
right to equal protection. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564
(2007) (holding dismissal of a complaint is appropriate if plaintiff fails to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Coppinger’s complaint as legally
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). The court thereafter denied
Coppinger’s “motion for reconsideration.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
Coppinger then filed the instant appeal together with a request to proceed
in forma pauperis. Having reviewed the record, Coppinger’s appellate brief, and
the applicable law, we discern no reversible error in the dismissal of Coppinger’s
§ 1983 complaint. Accordingly, the district court’s order dismissing Coppinger’s
complaint is affirmed for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in
its Order of Dismissal dated February 22, 2011. Coppinger’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis is denied and she is reminded that she must make immediate
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payment of the unpaid balance of her appellate filing fee. All other outstanding
motions are denied.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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