Haynes v. State of Kansas

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 15, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CARLUS L. HAYNES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-3233
(D.C. No. 05-CV-1250-JTM)
STATE OF KANSAS; PHILL KLINE, (D. Kan.)
in his individual capacity; ERIC
RUCKER, in his individual capacity;
PAUL MORRISON, State of Kansas
Attorney General, in his official
capacity; DOUG FARMER, Chief of
Staff, in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, HOLLOWAY, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
Carlus Haynes appeals the dismissal of his employment-discrimination
action against defendants the State of Kansas, the Kansas Attorney General, and
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Eric Rucker, an employee in the Office of the Kansas Attorney General. The
district court concluded that Mr. Haynes’s claims were barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion. We affirm.
Mr. Haynes, an African American, was employed as a tobacco-litigation
attorney in the Kansas Attorney General’s office until his discharge on
October 13, 2003. The next month he filed a civil rights lawsuit against the
Attorney General, Mr. Rucker, and other employees. He alleged that “during his
employment and shortly after termination of his employment,” Aplee. App. at 7,
defendants violated his constitutional, common law, and statutory privacy rights
by unlawfully reviewing, copying, and retaining his personal e-mails and other
documents stored on his work computer. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on all claims.
While his first case was still pending, Mr. Haynes filed the present suit.
His complaint asserted several claims arising out of his employment situation and
termination: racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, infringement of his equal-protection rights in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the
doctrine of claim preclusion. Mr. Haynes filed his notice of appeal one day after
expiration of the thirty-day time period allowed in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
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Later, he filed a motion under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A) to extend the time to
file his notice of appeal. The district court granted the motion.
Because we acquire jurisdiction only on the filing of a timely notice of
appeal, Mr. Haynes’s appeal raises the threshold issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion in granting his motion to extend the time to file his
notice of appeal. See Alva v. Teen Help, 469 F.3d 946, 948 (10th Cir. 2006)
(stating a “timely notice of appeal in a civil case is . . . a jurisdictional
prerequisite to our review”); Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455
(10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing district court decision on extension motion for abuse
of discretion). A decision on whether a failure to meet a deadline is “excusable is
at bottom an equitable one, taking into account all of the circumstances,”
including: (1) prejudice to the other party, (2) the length of the delay and
potential affect on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, (4) the merits
of the claim, (5) the promptness of the attempted correction, and (5) the presence
or absence of a pattern of delay. Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 856-57
(10th Cir. 2005). In this instance, the district court applied the correct standard
and did not abuse its discretion in granting Mr. Haynes’s motion. We have
jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the appeal.
“We review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law on the
applicability of . . . claim preclusion.” Valley View Angus Ranch, Inc. v. Duke
Energy Field Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir. 2007). The doctrine
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“precludes the parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in the prior action.” Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep’t of Employment Div. of Labor
Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 503-04 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Its
application requires: “(1) a judgment on the merits in the earlier action;
(2) identity of the parties or their privies in both suits; and (3) identity of the
cause of action in both suits.” Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d 1142,
1149 (10th Cir. 2006).
There is no disagreement about the finality of judgment on the merits in
Mr. Haynes’s initial, privacy-based case or the identity of the parties in both his
cases. Thus, the first two elements of claim preclusion are satisfied. For the third
element–same cause of action–the Tenth Circuit has “adopted the ‘transactional
approach’ of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24.” Plotner v. AT&T
Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2000). “[A] cause of action includes all
claims or legal theories of recovery that arise from the same transaction, event, or
occurrence.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). In employment cases, “[t]his
court repeatedly has held that all claims arising from the same employment
relationship constitute the same transaction or series of transactions for claim
preclusion purposes.” Wilkes, 314 F.3d at 504 (quotation omitted).
Mr. Haynes acknowledges this precedent, but argues that the panel should
overrule the court’s previous holdings. We decline to do so. “[W]e cannot
overrule the judgment of another panel of this court. We are bound by the
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precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary
decision by the Supreme Court.” Shubargo v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 1086, 1088 n.1
(10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Moreover, Mr. Haynes’s contention that
“this Court stands alone in its definition of ‘transaction’” is simply wrong. Aplt.
Br. at 4. See, e.g., Adams v. Calif. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 689-93
(9th Cir.) (cert. denied, 76 USLW 3303 ( U.S. Dec. 10, 2007) (dismissing second
suit after conducting transactional analysis); Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Sys.,
Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1995) (determining that discrimination suit
and contract action arose out of common core of operative facts and were
identical).
We also reject Mr. Haynes’s contentions that his case should be excepted
from the general rule. The argument that EEOC filing requirements prevent
plaintiffs from raising discrimination claims in an initial suit has failed to
persuade the other circuit courts. See Havercombe v. Dep’t of Educ. of the
Commonwealth of P.R., 250 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001); Brzostowski, 49 F.3d at
339. And neither his lack of a “vexatious spirit,” Aplt. Br. at 10, nor defendants’
alleged awareness of his intention to file a second action has legal significance.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. This court’s order to
show cause, concerning the notice of appeal, is discharged.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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