Parkhurst v. Lampert

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 12, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DERRICK R. PARKHURST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-8030
(D.C. No. 06-CV-60-CAB)
ROBERT LAMPERT, in his official (D. Wyo.)
capacity; ROBERT LAMPERT;
ROBERT ORTEGA; PATRICK
ANDERSON; JUDITH UPHOFF;
SCOTT ABBOTT; VANCE
EVERETT, all in their individual
capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Derrick R. Parkhurst, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order dismissing his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as time barred.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts. Mr. Parkhurst, an inmate at the
Wyoming State Penitentiary, claims that beginning no later than July, 2001, the
prison was overcrowded, and as such, the defendants violated his civil rights. His
federal court lawsuit was filed on March 9, 2006. The district court dismissed the
complaint as time barred under Wyoming’s statute of limitations.
“Whether a court properly applied a statute of limitations and the date a
statute of limitations accrues under undisputed facts are questions of law we
review de novo.” Nelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 419 F.3d 1117, 1119
(10th Cir. 2005). “State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal
injury claims supply the limitations periods for § 1983 claims[.]” Beck v. City of
Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999). However, “federal
law governs the time of accrual of § 1983 claims[.]” Id. Wyoming’s state of
limitations for personal injury claims is four years, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1977), and the cause of action accrued when Mr. Parkhurst
knew or should have known that his constitutional rights had allegedly been
violated. Beck, 195 F.3d at 557.
According to the allegations in Mr. Parkhurst’s complaint, the
overcrowding (alleged violation) existed no later than July, 2001. However, he
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did not file suit until more than four years after July, 2001, and his suit therefore
is time barred. We also reject Mr. Parkhurst’s argument that Wyoming’s saving
statute applies for the simple reason, among others, that his “action [was not]
commenced in due time[.]” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-118 (1977). Similarly, he
cannot avoid the four-year statute of limitations under the theory of continuing
tort. Assuming the continuing violation doctrine applies to § 1983 claims, the
doctrine is triggered “by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from
the original violation.” Bergman v. United States, 751 F.2d 314, 317 (10th Cir.
1984) (quotation omitted). Because Mr. Parkhurst alleged the same ill effect from
the day the alleged overcrowding first existed, the doctrine does not apply.
We have carefully examined the parties’ briefs, the record, and the district
court’s order in light of the governing law. We conclude that the court correctly
dismissed the complaint, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons as
those in the court’s order dated March 8, 2007. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
We GRANT Mr. Parkhurst’s motion to proceed without prepayment of the entire
filing fee and remind him of his continuing obligation to make partial payments
until the fee has been paid in its entirety.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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