Martinez-Diaz v. Holder, Jr.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 25, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JUAN JOSE MARTINEZ-DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 11-9512
(Petition for Review)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Juan Jose Martinez-Diaz, proceeding pro se, petitions for review
of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the
decision by the immigration judge (IJ) denying his request for cancellation of
removal. Exercising our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the
petition.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United
States as an immigrant in January 1995. In December 1997 Petitioner pleaded
guilty to violating Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-2-201 by conspiring to commit
aggravated motor theft in the first degree, as defined in Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-4-409(2). As part of his sentence, he was ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $14,809.31. In March 2007 he pleaded guilty to violating both
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-204, assault in the third degree, and Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-6-401(1)(a), child abuse.
The Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings
against Petitioner in April 2007, charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien who has been convicted of a crime of domestic
violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child
abandonment. Petitioner appeared before an IJ and denied that he was convicted
of a crime of child abuse and the corresponding charge of removability. Counsel
explained that Petitioner had not understood what he was pleading guilty to and
he was going to file for postconviction relief. At a hearing in September 2007 the
IJ sustained the charge of removability because there had been no ruling on the
request for postconviction relief and the child-abuse conviction had the requisite
degree of finality.
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In March 2008 Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal as a
permanent resident. An alien who is a permanent resident is eligible for
cancellation of removal if the alien “(1) has been . . . lawfully admitted for
permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States
continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not
been convicted of any aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
The IJ held an initial hearing on the application, but continued the hearing
to allow Petitioner to submit additional evidence on whether the 1997
motor-vehicle-theft offense was an aggravated felony. Petitioner submitted the
felony complaint and information, judgment of conviction and sentence, and
disposition for the 1997 offense.
At the conclusion of the continued hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision
denying cancellation of removal. The IJ determined that the record was
inconclusive on whether the 1997 offense qualified as an aggravated felony, but
noted that Petitioner bore the burden of proof to demonstrate his eligibility for
relief. The IJ explained that the BIA and this court had held that if the record is
inconclusive on whether an alien had committed a disqualifying offense, then the
alien has failed to prove his eligibility for relief. Accordingly, the IJ concluded
that Petitioner had not established his eligibility for cancellation of removal. The
BIA upheld the IJ’s determination, relying on the same reasoning.
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II. Discussion
Petitioner seeks review of the denial of discretionary relief, a determination
we ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),(ii).
The denial of relief in this case, however, turned on the legal questions of
whether Petitioner had the burden of proving that he had not been convicted of an
aggravated felony and whether an inconclusive record of conviction can satisfy
that burden. We have jurisdiction to review these questions of law. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D); Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288, 1289 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009). We
review the questions de novo. See Herrera-Castillo v. Holder, 573 F.3d 1004,
1007 (10th Cir. 2009).
First, Petitioner appears to suggest that the government had the burden of
proving that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. If the government
were charging Petitioner with being removable as an aggravated felon under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), then the Petitioner would be correct, because the
government bears the burden of proving removability in those circumstances. See
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a). But the aggravated-felony issue was not relevant to
Petitioner’s removability. The government charged Petitioner with removability
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien who had been convicted of a crime
of child abuse. The IJ sustained the charge of removability on this basis and
Petitioner did not challenge this determination on appeal to the BIA.
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The relevance of whether Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony
is that such a conviction makes a permanent resident ineligible for cancellation of
removal. After the IJ sustained the charge of removability, Petitioner sought
cancellation of removal, and an alien seeking relief from removal has the “burden
of establishing that he or she is eligible for any requested benefit or privilege and
that it should be granted in the exercise of discretion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d); see
Garcia, 584 F.3d at 1290 (“There is no question in this case that [the alien] is
removable. Therefore, the burden shifted to him to prove the absence of any
impediment to discretionary relief.”). The regulations further provide that “[i]f
the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the
application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.8(d). Accordingly, the agency did not err in concluding that Petitioner
bore the burden to prove that he had not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
Petitioner next argues that the inconclusiveness of the record regarding the
basis of his conviction demonstrates that he met his burden of proving that he was
not necessarily convicted of an aggravated felony. He relies on Sandoval-Lua v.
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2007). In Garcia, however, we rejected
the reasoning of Sandoval-Lua. See 584 F.3d at 1290. We wrote:
The fact that [the alien] is not to blame for the ambiguity
surrounding his criminal conviction does not relieve him of his
obligation to prove eligibility for discretionary relief. Because it is
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unclear from his record of conviction whether he committed a
[disqualifying crime], we conclude he has not proven eligibility for
cancellation of removal.
Id.; see Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 116 (4th Cir. 2011) (following Garcia).
Petitioner attempts to distinguish Garcia by noting that his case involves a
lawful permanent resident and an aggravated felony whereas Garcia involved a
nonpermanent resident and a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). But this
proposed distinction has no support in the language of the pertinent regulation. In
both situations the alien seeks the discretionary relief of cancellation of removal,
and the burden of persuasion is on the alien to prove eligibility for such relief.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). The regulation does not distinguish between aliens
based on whether they are permanent aliens, nor does it distinguish among
different grounds of eligibility for cancellation of removal. We therefore agree
with the BIA that “[Garcia’s] holding applies equally to lawful permanent
residents who bear the burden of establishing that they are not aggravated felons
under [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)],” Admin. R. at 4.
Applying Garcia’s holding to Petitioner’s case, the BIA properly
determined that he had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating his eligibility
for the relief he requested. Petitioner was convicted of conspiring to commit
aggravated motor theft, as defined in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-409(2). A person
may be convicted under that statute for knowingly obtaining or exercising control
over the motor vehicle of another either “without authorization” or by “threat or
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deception.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-409(2). As relevant to this case, an alien
convicted of conspiracy is convicted of an aggravated felony when the substantive
crime that was the object of the conspiracy was an offense that involved “fraud or
deceit” and the potential loss to the victim or victims exceeded $10,000. See
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and (U).
The BIA noted, “It is entirely possible that [Petitioner’s] conviction was for
theft by deception, which necessarily involves deceit,” and “[i]t is also unclear
whether or not the potential loss to the victim exceeds $10,000, although . . .
[Petitioner] was ordered, along with his co-conspirator, to pay restitution to his
victim exceeding $10,000.” Admin. R. at 4. Accordingly, the BIA determined
that because the record of conviction was inconclusive, Petitioner had failed to
meet his burden of establishing his eligibility for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at 5. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the BIA committed
legal error in this decision.
III. Conclusion
We DENY the petition for review. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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