United States v. Milton

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 21, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 11-3051
v. (D.C. No. 2:09-CR-20046-CM-7)
(D. Kan.)
CLIFTON MILTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, KELLY and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on the government’s motion to enforce the
appeal waiver contained in defendant Clifton Milton’s plea agreement.
Mr. Milton pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute, and possession with the
intent to distribute, heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, Mr. Milton waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge any
matter in connection with his prosecution, conviction or sentence, reserving only
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the right to appeal if the district court departed upwards from the applicable
sentencing guideline range determined by the court. Mot. to Enforce, attached
Plea Agreement, at A18. The district court determined that Mr. Milton’s advisory
guideline range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment and it sentenced him to
188 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the range.
Notwithstanding his appeal waiver, Mr. Milton has filed a notice of appeal
seeking to challenge his sentence. The government has filed this motion to
enforce the plea agreement pursuant to United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). We grant the government’s motion and
dismiss the appeal.
In Hahn, we held that “in reviewing appeals brought after a defendant has
entered into an appeal waiver,” this court will determine “(1) whether the
disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights;
(2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights;
and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
Id. at 1325. A miscarriage of justice will result if (1) “the district court relied on
an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid”;
(3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is otherwise
unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quotations omitted).
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Mr. Milton contends that his proposed appeal does not fall within the scope
of the appeal waiver because the waiver is ambiguous. It is unclear why he
asserts the waiver is ambiguous. As best we can tell, his argument is based on his
statement that, although the plea agreement indicates he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appeal rights, it also states that he is aware of his right to
appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. He also appears to be arguing that the provision
is ambiguous because it makes no reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which confers
jurisdiction over appeals.
The appeal waiver states in relevant part:
The defendant is aware that Title 18 U.S.C. § 3742 affords a
defendant the right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed.
By entering into this agreement, the defendant knowingly waives any
right to appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline
range determined appropriate by the court.
Mot. to Enforce, attached Plea Agreement, at A18.
It is clear under the plain, ordinary reading of this appeal waiver provision
that the first quoted sentence explains Mr. Milton’s general appellate rights and
the second quoted sentence explains that he is waiving those general appellate
rights by entering into the plea agreement with an appeal waiver. Mr. Milton’s
argument that the appeal waiver is somehow ambiguous because it does not
reference § 1291 (giving circuit courts jurisdiction over final decisions of a
district court) is patently frivolous.
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According to his docketing statement, Mr. Milton seeks to argue on appeal
that the district court erred in finding, for purposes of a sentence enhancement,
that he is responsible for a death that occurred as a result of his drug conspiracy.
Mr. Milton waived the right to appeal “any matter in connection with . . . the
components of the sentence to be imposed herein,” and any sentence “within the
guideline range determined appropriate by the court.” Mot. to Enforce, attached
Plea Agreement, at A18. Under the plain meaning of this unambiguous language,
Mr. Milton’s proposed appeal is within the scope of his appeal waiver.
Mr. Milton also argues he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
appellate rights because it was not adequately explained to him that he was
waiving his right to contest the district court’s finding that he was responsible for
a death that occurred as a result of his drug conspiracy. He asserts that the plea
agreement indicated that the government lacked evidence that directly linked him
to any deaths.
The plea agreement stated that Mr. Milton agreed that he conspired with a
heroin distribution organization, referred to as the Handy organization.
Mr. Milton agreed that:
Several overdoses and two directly linked deaths have resulted from
the sale of heroin by the Handy organization due to the high purity of
the drug being sold. Seven additional heroin overdose deaths are
being investigated that may ultimately be linked to the Handy
organization. At the time of this plea no deaths or overdoses related
to heroin use have been directly linked to Clifton Milton.
Id., at A4.
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At the plea hearing, Mr. Milton stated under oath that he understood he
could receive a sentence of up to forty years in prison, Mot. to Enforce, attached
Tr. of Plea Hr’g. at A29-30, and that if death of another resulted from his drug
use, his sentence could be up to life imprisonment, id. at A31. Mr. Milton also
stated that he understood there was no limitation on the reliable information the
court could consider at sentencing, including uncharged related criminal activity.
Id. at A35-A36. At the plea hearing, Mr. Milton stated under oath that he was
knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to appeal any matter in connection
with his prosecution, conviction and the components of his sentence as part of the
plea agreement. Id. at A40-A41. In light of the language of the plea agreement
and Mr. Milton’s answers during his plea colloquy, Mr. Milton has not met his
burden to establish that his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
Finally, Mr. Milton argues that it would be a miscarriage of justice to
enforce the appeal waiver because the sentence enhancement based on death
resulting from his drug conspiracy significantly increased the sentence he would
have received without this enhancement. This argument also lacks merit. As we
have repeatedly held, it matters not under the miscarriage-of-justice prong
whether the sentencing or other aspect of the proceeding involved legal error,
only whether the appellate waiver itself is otherwise unlawful. See e.g., United
States v. Shockey, 538 F.3d 1355, 1357 (10th Cir. 2008).
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In summary, based upon our review of the motion, the record and
Mr. Milton’s response, we conclude that Mr. Milton’s proposed appeal falls
within the scope of the appeal waiver, that he knowingly and voluntarily waived
his appellate rights, and that enforcing the waiver would not result in a
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to enforce the appeal
waiver and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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