United States v. Dotson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 13, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-6001
ERIC WAYNE DOTSON, (D.C. No. 5:98-CR-00203-M-1)
(W. D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, MURPHY and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
Eric Wayne Dotson, a Georgia state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
denial of his “Motion for Order Directing the U.S. Attorney General to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Immediately Obtain Custody of Defendant.” Construing Dotson’s motion as a
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, we reverse and remand to the
district court with instructions to vacate its denial of relief and to dismiss the
motion without prejudice.
I. FACTS
This case requires consideration of the interaction of three separate
sentences imposed against Dotson for a series of armed jewelry store robberies
that occurred in several states from 1997 to 1998. Dotson outlines the following
history of his incarceration.
The state of Kentucky imposed the first of the three sentences at issue.
Dotson asserts that he entered Kentucky state custody on June 4, 1998. ROA,
Vol. 1 at 29. Dotson was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life
imprisonment in the state of Kentucky on July 12, 1998. ROA, Vol. 2 at 15; see
also ROA, Vol. 1 at 29. According to Dotson, this life sentence was subsequently
reduced to thirty years’ imprisonment. ROA, Vol. 1 at 30.
Then, on November 4, 1998, a federal grand jury in the Western District of
Oklahoma returned an indictment charging Dotson with one count of interference
with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, one count of using a
firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1), and one count of knowingly transporting at least $5,000 worth of stolen
property in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Id. at 13–15.
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Pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, Dotson was transferred
from Kentucky state custody to federal custody in the Western District of
Oklahoma. ROA, Vol. 2 at 1.
After a jury trial in the Western District of Oklahoma, Dotson was
convicted on all counts. ROA, Vol. 1 at 16. On December 10, 1999, the district
court sentenced Dotson to a total of 322 months’ imprisonment – 142 months for
robbery, 60 months for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of
violence, and 120 months for knowingly transporting at least $5,000 worth of
stolen goods in interstate commerce, with each term to be served consecutively. 1
Id. at 16–17. The judgment imposing this sentence specified that “all terms of
imprisonment [were] to be served after any other sentence that he [wa]s presently
serving.” Id. at 17. After the district court imposed his federal sentence, Dotson
was returned to Kentucky state custody to continue serving his Kentucky state
sentence. Id. at 29. According to Dotson, “[t]he U.S. Marshal’s Service [then]
lodged a detainer for the [federal] sentence . . . with the state of Kentucky.” Id. at
30.
1
Dotson directly appealed his convictions and sentence, and this court
affirmed. United States v. Dotson, 242 F.3d 391 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).
Dotson then filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied. United States v. Dotson, 28 F.
App’x 801, 802 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). This court declined to grant a
certificate of appealability with respect to the district court’s denial of this
motion. Id.3
Dotson was subsequently transferred from Kentucky state custody to
Georgia state custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Id.In the state of Georgia, Dotson was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to
twenty years’ incarceration on June 16, 2000. Id. He was then returned to
Kentucky state custody to continue serving his Kentucky state sentence. Id.Dotson asserts that, at that point, the state of “Georgia filed a detainer with the
State of Kentucky.” Id.On September 2, 2004, after the state of Kentucky granted him parole from
his Kentucky state sentence, Dotson was transferred to Georgia state custody to
serve his Georgia state sentence. Id. Federal authorities filed a detainer with the
state of Georgia in 2009. Id. at 31. Dotson unsuccessfully pursued several
actions in Georgia state court asserting that he was improperly placed in Georgia
state custody prior to his service of his federal sentence. Aple. Br. at 37–38 (Ex.
2). Dotson remains in Georgia state custody. Aplt. Br. at 2.
On November 10, 2010, Dotson filed his “Motion for Order Directing the
U.S. Attorney General to Immediately Obtain Custody of the Defendant” in the
Western District of Oklahoma. ROA, Vol. 1 at 29–32. In the motion, Dotson
argued that he was improperly transferred to Georgia state custody after he was
granted parole from his Kentucky state sentence and that, instead, he should have
been placed in federal custody. In support, Dotson asserted that, because the
federal detainer was filed with the state of Kentucky prior to the Georgia state
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detainer, he should have been placed in federal custody prior to Georgia state
custody. Id. at 30. Further, he contended that his federal and his Georgia state
sentences were to run concurrently. He explained that his federal sentence was to
commence “after any other sentence that he [wa]s currently serving.” Id. at 17.
He reasoned that, because his Georgia state sentence had not been imposed at the
time of his federal sentencing, id. at 30, the federal sentence necessarily was to
run concurrent to his Georgia state sentence. He also noted that his Georgia state
sentence was ordered to run “concurrent to both the Kentucky and federal
sentences.” 2 Id. Thus, Dotson argued that his placement in Georgia state custody
deprived him of his right to serve his federal and Georgia state sentences
concurrently.
On this basis, Dotson requested that the district court order federal
authorities to immediately place him in federal custody and to award him credit
against his federal sentence for the six years he erroneously spent in Georgia state
custody. Id. at 32. Without analyzing its jurisdiction, the district court
summarily denied Dotson’s motion on December 10, 2010. Id. at 34. The district
2
Dotson noted, “[t]he transcript of Georgia sentencing says the sentence is
to be concurrent to both the Kentucky and federal sentences, but the Georgia
court’s final disposition is silent on the matter.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 30. Further, the
government provided documentation suggesting that the Georgia state sentence
was to run consecutive to his federal sentence. Aple. Br. at 64. Thus, it is
unclear whether the Georgia state court intended Dotson’s Georgia state sentence
to run concurrent to his federal sentence.
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court reasoned that “[Dotson] has not articulated sufficient cause for this Court to
provide the extraordinary relief requested.” Id. Dotson’s notice of appeal from
the district court’s decision was filed on January 4, 2011. Id. at 35.
II. ANALYSIS
Because Dotson is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally.
See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). There are
two ways in which we could construe Dotson’s “Motion for Order Directing the
U.S. Attorney General to Immediately Obtain Custody of Defendant”: (1) as an
application for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361; or (2) as a
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the execution of his federal
sentence. 3 We conclude that Dotson failed to establish the requisite conditions
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. However, when construing Dotson’s motion as
a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, we conclude that the district court
should have dismissed the motion without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
A. Petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361We first construe Dotson’s motion as a request for a writ of mandamus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, “[t]he district courts shall
3
Because we construe Dotson’s motion as either a petition for a writ of
mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 or a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
rather than a motion in his criminal case, we conclude that Dotson’s notice of
appeal was timely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (“When the United States . . .
is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed within 60 days after the judgment or
order appealed from is entered.”).
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have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.” To be eligible for this relief, a petitioner must establish
“(1) that he has a clear right to relief, (2) that the respondent’s duty to perform
the act in question is plainly defined and peremptory, and (3) that he has no other
adequate remedy.” Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005). We
review de novo whether the conditions for issuing a writ of mandamus are
satisfied. Marquez-Ramos v. Reno, 69 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1995). We
conclude that Dotson did not establish the requisite conditions for relief under 28
U.S.C. § 1361.
Dotson’s argument regarding the order in which the federal and Georgia
state detainers were filed with the state of Kentucky does not evidence a clear
right to relief. “[T]he determination of custody and service of sentence between
[two different sovereigns] is a matter of comity to be resolved by the executive
branches of each sovereign.” Hernandez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 689 F.2d 915, 917
(10th Cir. 1982). Federal and state authorities have broad discretion to determine
the order in which a prisoner may serve his sentences. See Hall v. Looney, 256
F.2d 59, 60 (10th Cir. 1958) (per curiam). Detainers are filed to assure that a
prisoner is not released from confinement until the jurisdiction asserting a right to
custody has had an opportunity to act. We could locate no authority for Dotson’s
proposition that the sequence in which detainers are filed dictates the order
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sentences are to be served. Thus, Dotson’s assertion that his federal detainer was
filed prior to his Georgia state detainer does not establish the requisite conditions
for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
With regard to his argument that the federal and Georgia state sentences
were to run concurrently, we conclude that Dotson had another adequate remedy
available to him to pursue relief. As the government argues, Dotson could have
asserted this argument in a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This
argument could be characterized as an attack on the execution of his federal
sentence. See Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 attacks the execution of a sentence . . . .”); see also
United States v. Eccleston, 521 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (considering a state
prisoner’s argument that he was “entitled to serve his sentence in the custody of
the [Bureau of Prisons] and that his federal and state sentences must be served
concurrently” in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Further, Dotson
satisfies the “in custody” requirement for habeas purposes because “a prisoner
may challenge a sentence that was imposed consecutively to his current sentence
but which he has not yet begun to serve.” United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 1240,
1242 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Because
Dotson could have asserted this argument in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, he
cannot establish the requisite conditions for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
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B. Habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241We alternatively construe Dotson’s motion asserting that his federal and
Georgia state sentences should run concurrently as a challenge to the execution of
his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 4 However, before we reach the
merits, we note that Dotson filed his motion in the wrong federal district. “A
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . must be filed in the district where the
prisoner is confined.” Bradshaw, 86 F.3d at 166 (emphasis added). Dotson is
currently incarcerated in the state of Georgia. Thus, the district court in the
Western District of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to consider this argument in a
28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition.
The “jurisdictional defects that arise when a suit is filed in the wrong
federal district may be cured by transfer under the federal transfer statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1631, which requires a court to transfer such an action if the transfer is
in the interest of justice.” Haugh v. Booker, 210 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Nonetheless, . . . a court is authorized
[first] to consider the consequences of a transfer by taking a peek at the merits to
avoid raising false hopes and wasting judicial resources that would result from
4
We note that, to the extent his motion is construed as a habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the execution of his federal sentence, Dotson
is not required to obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s
denial of relief. See Miller, 594 F.3d at 1241 (explaining that a state inmate
challenging the execution of his federal sentence is not required to obtain a
certificate of appealability).
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transferring a case which is clearly doomed.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Based on our review of Dotson’s motion and of the record, we conclude
that a transfer is not in the interest of justice. “The exhaustion of available
administrative remedies is a prerequisite for [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 habeas relief . . .
.” Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010). At no point does
Dotson assert, and the record provides no evidence, that he pursued the available
administrative relief within the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prior to filing his motion
in the district court. According to BOP Program Statement 5160.05 § 8, a BOP
Regional Director may “designate a state institution for concurrent service of a
federal sentence” when “consistent with the intent of the federal sentencing court
or the goals of the criminal justice system.” 5 A prisoner may request that BOP
designate his state prison facility as the place of his federal confinement
regardless of whether he is in state or federal custody. See id. § 9(b)(4)(b) (“This
type of request will be considered regardless of whether the inmate is physically
located in either a federal or state institution.”); see also Eccleston, 521 F.3d at
1252 (discussing the BOP administrative relief that a state inmate pursued with
regard to his undischarged federal sentence). Because Dotson has not pursued
5
We note this BOP Program Statement only to suggest an avenue for
exhaustion. We are not ruling on the merits of Dotson’s contention that his
federal and Georgia state sentences are to run concurrently.
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available administrative remedies, habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241cannot be granted. Thus, we conclude that a transfer of his motion is not in the
interest of justice.
III. CONCLUSION
Construing Dotson’s motion as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate its denial of
the relief requested and to dismiss the motion without prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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