Mambo v. Vehar

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 23, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PETER MA M B O,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-2356
(D.C. No. CIV-05-408-LH)
LARRY VEH AR ; RA LEY'S OF NEW (D . N.M .)
M EXICO, INC., a foreign corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and M U RPH Y, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Peter M ambo appeals from orders of the district court granting
summary judgment to defendants Larry Vehar and Raley’s of New M exico, Inc.
(Raley’s) and denying his post-judgment motions. Exercising our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. Background
On October 22, 2002, plaintiff sued Raley’s, his former employer, in
New M exico state court asserting one count of race/national origin discrimination
under the New M exico Human Rights Act. The parties have denominated that
case M ambo I. Raley’s moved for summary judgment in M ambo I, and its motion
was granted on June 17, 2004. Plaintiff appealed the order granting summary
judgment to the New M exico Supreme Court, and while that appeal was pending,
on December 30, 2004, he filed the instant case, also in state court. Since the
parties have denominated this case M ambo II, we will continue with that
terminology.
In M ambo II, plaintiff asserts a single count of discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1981. In addition to Raley’s, he named Larry Vehar, a Raley’s
employee and his former manager. The factual allegations contained in the
M ambo II complaint are identical in all material respects to those set forth in the
M ambo I complaint. On April 11, 2005, the defendants removed M ambo II to
federal district court and filed a simultaneous motion to dismiss, alternatively
styled a motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that plaintiff’s claim
in M ambo II was foreclosed by the state court’s disposition of M ambo I pursuant
to the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The district court treated
defendants’ request as a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion on
August 18, 2005. Plaintiff filed a M otion to Amend Order on August 31, 2005,
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and a M otion to Request Relief From Order on September 1, 2005, both of which
were denied. This appeal followed.
Since plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal in this action, the New M exico
Supreme Court issued its decision in M ambo I. The court affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment to Raley’s, holding that plaintiff’s claim that
he was subject to discriminatory remarks about his race and national origin was
“unsupported by any record evidence,” and that he “fail[ed] to show pretext or
unlawful discrimination.” M ambo v. Raley’s of N.M ., Inc., No. 28,892, slip op.
at 5 (N.M . M ar. 20, 2006). M ambo filed a motion for rehearing in the
New M exico Supreme Court, which was denied on April 18, 2006.
II. Discussion
“On appeal, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same legal standards as employed by the district court.
In doing so, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment.” B-S Steel of Kan., Inc. v. Tex. Indus., 439 F.3d
653, 660 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). The familiar standard requires
that summary judgment be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answ ers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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A. Summary Judgment
Defendants’ motion required the district court to consider the preclusive
effect of M ambo I on M ambo II under New M exico law. The court did so by
carefully analyzing each of the elements of the doctrine of res judicata as set forth
in M yers v. Olson, 676 P.2d 822, 824 (N.M . 1984). It found that (1) although
Vehar was not a party to M ambo I, Raley’s and Vehar were in privity for purposes
of res judicata; (2) the subject matter of each suit was identical; (3) the character
and capacity of the parties was the same in each suit; and (4) both suits involved
the same “cause of action” for purposes of res judicata notwithstanding the
technical differences between plaintiff’s state and federal claims. Since all the
elements of res judicata were met, the district court concluded that plaintiff’s
claim in M ambo II was precluded by M ambo I and therefore dismissed the case.
On appeal, plaintiff challenges primarily the district court’s finding that
Vehar was in privity with Raley’s. He also argues that his claims in M ambo I and
M ambo II were different and that there was no final judgment for purposes of
res judicata because his appeal in M ambo I was pending when he filed M ambo II.
W e are not persuaded by plaintiff’s arguments. W e agree with the well-reasoned
opinion of the district court that the elements of res judicata have been met under
the circumstances of this case and that plaintiff’s § 1981 claim is barred.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants
for substantially the same reasons articulated in its August 18, 2005, order.
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B. Plaintiff’s Post-Judgment M otions
Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s denial of his M otion to Amend
Order filed August 31, 2005, and his M otion to Request Relief From Order filed
September 1, 2005. He argues that the court erred in finding his motions
time-barred under Rule 59 and that he should have been permitted to file an
amended complaint and sur-reply in opposition to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
W hile plaintiff is technically correct that his motions were timely under
Rule 59(e), 1 his appeal nonetheless fails because the substantive bases of his
post-judgment motions lacked merit. As a pro se litigant, the district court
construed his motions in the most favorable light possible and decided them on
the merits pursuant to Rule 60(b). The court concluded that its dismissal of
plaintiff’s claims based on res judicata was not a mistake of law because
plaintiff’s pending appeal in M ambo I did not effect the finality of the state court
judgment. It also rejected plaintiff’s contention that because of its disposition on
1
“The ten-day period prescribed by Rule 59(e) begins to run only upon entry
of a final judgment.” Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir.
1988). In this case, it appears that the district court never entered a separate
judgment pursuant to Rule 58, and the August 18, 2005, order does not satisfy
Rule 58’s separate document requirement. See Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 185
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a district court order containing detailed legal
analysis and reasoning, standing alone, could not trigger appeal process).
Under these circumstances, judgment was not entered for purposes of Rule 59
until 150 days after entry of the court’s order in the civil docket.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2)(B).
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summary judgment, M ambo I was not decided on the merits. The court concluded
that plaintiff had failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting relief
under Rule 60(b) and that therefore, the filing of an amended complaint was not
permissible.
Our standard of review is abuse of discretion, whether the district court
construed plaintiff’s motions pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b). Adams v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1179, 1186 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000) (Rule 59(e));
Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006) (Rule
60(b)). In this case, plaintiff’s post-judgment motions simply rehashed arguments
made in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which we have
already held w as properly granted. W e likew ise conclude that the district court
acted within its discretion in denying the post-judgment motions.
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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