Anderson v. Regis Corporation

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 27, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
D EBRA A N D ER SO N ,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
No. 05-1377
v.
(D.C. No. 04-CV-597-REB-BNB)
(D . Colo.)
R EG IS C OR PO RA TIO N ,
Defendant – Appellee.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Debra Anderson, formerly an executive in charge of managing hair salons,
appeals the dismissal on summary judgment of her claims that she was fired by
the Regis Corporation in breach of an implied contract to issue an employee three
warnings before firing her. She also appeals the dismissal of her claim that Regis
promised to issue warnings and was required to do so under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. Her appeal has no merit. Under Colorado law, Anderson
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
was an employee-at-will, and Regis never manifested any intention, nor made any
promise, to follow a particular procedure before dismissing an executive.
Accordingly, we A FFIR M the district court’s decision.
I
Anderson was first hired by Regis to w ork as a cosmetologist in 1996. As a
new hire, she received a packet entitled “Important Information for the New
Employee.” The second page of the packet set forth the nature of her relationship
with Regis:
Nothing in the information provided herein, nor in any other written
or unwritten policies or procedures creates or is intended to create an
express or implied contract, covenant, promise or representation
between the company and any employee. All employees are at-will
and the company has the right to terminate any employee at any time
with or without notice. Any exception to the at-will relationship
must be evidenced by a written agreement signed by the affected
employee and the company president.
Anderson also signed a “Personnel Data Sheet” w hich stated:
I further understand that no provision contained in “Important
Information for the New Employee” is intended to create a contract
or guarantee of employment between Regis Corporation and any
employee, or to limit the rights of the company and its employees to
terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason in
the company’s sole discretion.
In 1999, Anderson was promoted to the position of Salon M anager. W hen she
was promoted, she w as given a handbook called “The Regis Salons M anager’s
Reference Guide,” (the “Guide”) w hich explained how she should conduct herself
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in her new position. It was explicitly targeted at Salon M anagers; nothing in it
discussed the responsibilities of any other level of Regis employee.
In the last section of the Guide, there were recommendations for steps a
Salon M anager should take when disciplining an employee. This section included
a “warning notice” form. On the form, there were three categories of warnings:
“verbal,” “written,” and “final.” Nowhere in the Guide is there any requirement
that Salon M anagers issue warnings before discharging an employee; the only
provisions on termination that use the imperative are admonitions that a Salon
M anager may not fire anyone for a discriminatory or prejudicial reason and must
not discuss any termination with another employee or a customer.
The Guide also clearly and conspicuously stated:
This guide is intended only to assist Regis salon managers in their
operation of Regis salons, and does not create a contract between
Regis and any of its salon managers and/or salon employees.
In 2000, Anderson was promoted to the position of “Area Supervisor.”
This position is not located in a salon; it is an executive position, responsible for
managing the operation of several salons. She did not sign a written employment
contract when she was promoted and was given no documents outlining her rights
and responsibilities as an Area Supervisor.
During her time in this position, Anderson testified in a wrongful discharge
lawsuit brought by a Salon M anager she had fired. In deposition testimony, she
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said that she did not use “progressive discipline,” – i.e. issue w arnings – before
firing the employee because it w as not, in her judgment, appropriate.
Also during this period, Regis invited Anderson to attend a seminar entitled
“M anaging within the Law.” Only executives at the Area Supervisor level or
higher attended the seminar. It was conducted by outside attorneys, who stated at
the beginning of the seminar that they were not setting or explaining company
policy or making legal conclusions. Following the seminar, the attorneys handed
out a workbook (the “Workbook”) discussing in depth topics raised during the
event. The section on discipline suggested that managers issue warnings before
engaging in any harsher discipline, carefully using the w ord “should” before these
statements. It also stated clearly that, for employees-at-will, managers “do not
need to follow a specific ‘progressive discipline program.’” No language in the
W orkbook set forth a specific series of steps Regis employees w ere required to
take before discharging an employee.
Several years into her tenure as an Area Supervisor, Regis executives
determined that the sales performance of the salons for which Anderson was
responsible was insufficient. She w as given a verbal warning and put on 60 days’
probation. Soon after the probationary period expired, Anderson was fired.
Anderson brought suit in Colorado state courts, alleging that Regis violated
an implicit contract to issue warnings before discharging an employee. In the
alternative, she claimed that Regis was barred by promissory estoppel from
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treating her as an employee-at-will because of representations made in the Guide
and the W orkbook. Regis removed the suit to federal court and moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that
nothing in the documents handed out by Regis, nor anything in its practices, made
a promise or manifested a willingness to be bound to a limitation on at-will
employment for A rea Supervisors. Anderson now appeals.
II
Anderson appeals the district court’s decision that Regis did not create an
implied contract, or make a promise to which it is bound under promissory
estoppel, requiring three warnings to be issued before the termination of an Area
Supervisor. Her appeal is meritless. Regis did not make a promise or an implied
contract to use any specific form of discipline prior to discharging an executives
at her level. Absent such an implied contract or promise, Anderson was an
employee-at-will under Colorado law and Regis was entitled to terminate her
employment without warning. The district court correctly dismissed her claims
on summary judgment.
W e review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using
the same standard as did the district court. See Scull v. New M exico, 236 F.3d
588, 595 (10th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant
establishes that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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W e must “view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Scull, 236 F.3d at 595.
The parties agree that Colorado law governs this dispute. Employment in
Colorado is generally at-will, meaning that an employee can be fired at any time
without cause or notice. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711
(Colo. 1987). However, an employer can be liable for firing an employee if doing
so violates “an implied contract [that] arises out of company policy and
employment manuals or where an employee relies on the policies and manuals to
his detriment.” V asey v. M artin M arietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464 (10th Cir.
1994) (applying Colorado law). An implied contract can arise out of a personnel
manual or handbook that purports to limit an employer’s right to terminate
employees at will if the circumstances demonstrate that the employer manifested
a willingness to be bound by the terms of the manual. See Frymire v. Ampex
Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 769 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Colorado law). “To establish
that an employment manual creates contractual obligations, the employee must
show that the employer’s actions manifest to a reasonable person an intent to be
bound by the provisions of the document.” Evenson v. Colo. Farm Bureau M ut.
Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 402, 408-09 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
However, if an employer attaches a clear and conspicuous disclaimer
indicating the employer did not intend to create a contract, the disclaimer can
void indications in a handbook that an employer is bound to comply with certain
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policies. Id. Existence of a clear and conspicuous disclaimer is not dispositive;
an employer can be found to have manifested an intent to be bound by the terms
of a handbook even if there is a disclaimer if the handbook states that there are
mandatory termination procedures or that just cause is required for termination.
Id; see also Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat’l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991).
Anderson points to two documents – and only two documents – in which
she claims Regis created an implied contract that required it to issue warnings
before firing an Area Supervisor. First is the Guide. By its own language, the
Guide is intended to instruct Salon M anagers how to run a salon; it does not say
anything about company policy with regard to managers. Further, the section on
discipline in the G uide does not set forth a mandatory policy; it simply contains a
list of suggestions for Salon M anagers. Finally, the Guide contains a clear and
conspicuous disclaimer, stating that it “does not create a contract between Regis
and any of its salon managers and/or salon employees.” This document clearly
did not create any obligation on the part of Regis to issue warnings before firing
Anderson.
Second, Anderson points to the W orkbook, which was handed out at a
seminar for Regis managers. As noted above, the seminar and the W orkbook
were given to employees at the Area Supervisor level and above and was
specifically aimed at teaching these employees how to treat lower-level
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employees. This W orkbook does not set forth specific, mandatory procedures
about discharging employees – in fact, it explicitly says that “at-will employment
also means that you do not have to follow any specific procedures or processes
before you terminate someone.” It simply gives advice to managers about best
practices. Further, the attorneys who conducted the seminar clearly stated that
they were not setting company policy. Anderson’s argument that the W orkbook
created a mandatory policy is also contradicted by the goal of seminar, which she
acknowledges was avoiding lawsuits from salon employees. How a seminar
aimed at avoiding lawsuits gives rise to an employment contract that creates the
potential for them is not explained by Anderson.
Based on these undisputed facts, the district court rightly found that
Anderson could not maintain a claim for breach of an implied contract and
summary judgment was appropriate.
Even if no contract was formed, a fired employee can, under some
circumstances, maintain a claim under promissory estoppel that an employer
promised to follow policies in a manual and that the employee relied upon these
promises to her detriment. Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1466. In order to prove a
promissory estoppel claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) the employer should
reasonably have expected the employee to consider the employee manual as a
comm itment from the employer to follow policies contained in the manual, (2) the
employee reasonably relied on the termination procedures to his detriment, and
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(3) that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the termination
procedures.” Id. (citing Continental Air Lines Inc., 731 P.2d at 712). However,
our careful record review discloses no evidence that demonstrates Regis should
reasonably have expected Anderson to have personally considered either the
Guide or the W orkbook as a commitment to follow the claimed termination
policies. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed this claim on summary
judgment as well.
W e AFFIRM the district court’s decision dismissing Anderson’s breach of
implied contract and promissory estoppel claims on summary judgment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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