United States v. Herrera

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 11, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No.07-2043
(D.C. No. CR-06-1161 JCH)
v.
(District of New Mexico)
MARVIN ANTHONY HERRERA,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, HOLLOWAY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Marvin Anthony Herrera was charged in an indictment with one count of
illegally re-entering the United States after prior deportation in violation of 8
U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)(1), 1326(a)(2), and 1326(b)(2). Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Mr. Herrera pled guilty to the lone charge in the indictment. The Probation
Office prepared a Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) which alleged that in 2004, Mr.
Herrera was convicted of battery in a California state court under Cal. Penal Code
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P.32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
§ 242. The PSR stated that pursuant to Section 2L1.2 of the Guidelines,
unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States carries a base offense level
of eight. In addition to the initial base offense level of eight, the PSR
recommended a sixteen level “crime of violence” enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on the previous California battery conviction.
The final base offense level calculated by the PSR was twenty-one after a three
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
At sentencing, Mr. Herrera moved for a downward departure from the
PSR’s recommended criminal history category V, but did not challenge the
sixteen level enhancement. The district court denied the motion, adopted the
findings of the PSR, and sentenced Mr. Herrera to the low end of the guideline
range – a seventy month term of imprisonment. Mr. Herrera timely appealed and
argued, for the first time, that the application of the sixteen level enhancement
was in error. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. BACKGROUND
In October of 2004, Mr. Herrera was convicted of battery on a peace officer
under § 242 of the California Penal Code for which he received a two year
sentence in the California penal system. He was released from prison on October
17, 2005 whereupon his parole commenced. On December 14, 2005, Mr. Herrera
was deported to Honduras.
This prior California battery conviction provides the foundation for the
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issue raised in the instant case. It is critical to note that the PSR was the sole
source of the information concerning Mr. Herrera’s previous California battery
conviction. The government did not submit any documents from the California
court of conviction to establish that Mr. Herrera was convicted of battery in
California. Any information with respect to the California conviction was
discovered by the Probation Office and then used in formulating the PSR. The
government provided no court documents from the California state court of
conviction in support of the sixteen level enhancement.
The events giving rise to the instant appeal occurred on February 23, 2006,
when Mr. Herrera was apprehended by United States Border Patrol agents near
Hachita, New Mexico. On May 23, 2006, a New Mexico grand jury returned a
one count indictment against Mr. Herrera charging him with illegally re-entering
the United States after a previous deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(2). Mr. Herrera pled guilty to the illegal re-entry
charge on June 30, 2006.
The Probation Office prepared the PSR and stated that the initial base
offense level for Mr. Herrera was eight, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). The
PSR also recommended that the sixteen level enhancement found in U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) be imposed because Mr. Herrera had previously been convicted
of a “crime of violence” as defined by the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt.
n.1(B)(iii). The PSR found Mr. Herrera to have a criminal history category V and
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determined the final base offense level to be twenty-one after a three level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Before the sentencing hearing, Mr. Herrera filed a motion for a downward
departure based on the argument that the criminal history category over-
emphasized his prior criminal conduct. The motion requested lowering the
criminal history category from V to IV. The motion did not contest the
imposition of the sixteen level enhancement. On February 6, 2007, the district
court held the sentencing hearing. The court denied the Defendant’s motion for a
downward departure and adopted the factual findings of the PSR. The advisory
guideline range for an offense level of twenty-one and a criminal history category
V was seventy to eighty-seven months’ imprisonment. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court sentenced Mr. Herrera to seventy months’
imprisonment. Mr. Herrera filed a timely notice of appeal on February 13, 2007.
On appeal, Mr. Herrera presents a new argument not made below.
Specifically, Mr. Herrera contends that battery under § 242 of the California
Penal Code is not categorically a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines and
therefore the sixteen level enhancement should not be applied in the instant case.
Mr. Herrera urges this court to remand for re-sentencing with instructions to
remove the sixteen level enhancement.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
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Generally, this court exercises de novo review over the district court’s
interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v.
Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 975 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Contreras, 210 F.3d
1151, 1152 (10th Cir. 2000). The standard of review changes, however, when the
defendant fails to make a particular objection to the district court’s application or
interpretation of the guidelines. United States v. Munguia-Sanchez, 365 F.3d 877,
878 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1308 (10th
Cir.2000). In the instant case, Mr. Herrera did not make a specific objection to
the application of the U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement thereby limiting
this court to review only for plain error. Munguia-Sanchez, 365 F.3d at 878. As
we stated in Mungia-Sanchez, in order
[t]o establish plain error, [a defendant] must show: (1) an error, (2)
that is plain, which means clear or obvious under current law, and (3)
that affect[s] substantial rights. If these three elements are satisfied,
then we may exercise discretion to correct the error if it seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.
Id. at 878-879 (internal quotations and citations omitted; alterations in the
original). Mr. Herrera concedes that plain error is the appropriate standard of
review.
B. U.S.S.G. and California Statutory Provisions
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court committed plain error
when it applied the sixteen level “crime of violence” enhancement found in
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U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) to Mr. Herrera. Reviewing the language of the
relevant Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions is necessary in conceptualizing this
issue. Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Guidelines states that a sixteen level
enhancement is warranted “[i]f the defendant previously was deported...after (A)
a conviction for a felony that is...(ii) a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Under § 2L1.2 of the Guidelines, the phrase “crime of
violence” is defined as
any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary
of a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state, or local law that
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii)(emphasis added). Since battery is not
one of the twelve enumerated offenses, the relevant language for the instant
appeal is the catchall provision providing that a crime of violence is any
offense “that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.” Id.
Having laid out the framework of the Sentencing Guidelines provisions at
issue, we now must turn to the underlying California statute of conviction, § 242
of the California Penal Code. California Penal Code § 242 defines battery as the
“...willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Cal.
Penal Code § 242. As stated above, battery is not one of the twelve enumerated
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offenses in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Therefore, in order to determine if
§ 242 qualifies under the Guidelines as a crime of violence, we must decide
whether battery under California law “...has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii).
Mr. Herrera contends that a California battery conviction under § 242 is not
necessarily a crime of violence because it does not require that an individual use,
attempt to use, or threaten to use physical force against the person of another.
Mr. Herrera argues that battery under § 242 includes crimes that do not have as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another as required by the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence.
Put another way, one can commit battery in California, thereby violating § 242,
without using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against the
person of another. Mr. Herrera maintains that this prevents battery under § 242
from being a categorical crime of violence under the Guidelines.
Certainly, § 242 does indeed cover crimes of violence as defined by the
Guidelines under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). This is clear because § 242
would include a category of crimes that have as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. However,
Mr. Herrera argues that § 242 also proscribes another category of crimes – crimes
not involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
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the person of another – that are not covered by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii).
Mr. Herrera contends that both of these categories of conduct are covered by §
242: (1) conduct involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of force
against the person of another and (2) conduct not involving the use, attempted use
or threatened use of force against the person of another. Thus, Mr. Herrera
argues that § 242 is too broad to be a categorical crime of violence as defined
under the Guidelines because there is no way to discern which type of conduct
was committed.
Ultimately, Mr. Herrera maintains that it is possible to commit battery
under Cal. Penal Code § 242 and yet not commit a crime of violence under §
2L1.2 of the guidelines. Thus, Mr. Herrera contends that a reversal of the sixteen
level crime of violence enhancement is required and he requests remand to the
sentencing court for re-sentencing. This argument, the crux of the appeal, will be
explored in depth in section D. However, prior to addressing that issue, we must
address the proper approach to be used in evaluating whether or not Mr. Herrera
committed a crime of violence under the Guidelines when he was convicted of
battery under § 242 of the Cal. Penal Code.
C. Pure Categorical v. Modified Categorical Approach
This area of sentencing review is complicated and is prone to producing
decisions that may, at times, lack the utmost clarity. Luckily, this court has had
the opportunity to review this area recently. In evaluating whether or not an
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underlying conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” this court has had the
opportunity to comment on the appropriate approach – pure categorical or
modified categorical – to use in determining whether the application of the
enhancement was proper. See United States v. Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d 1207(10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2008).
Regardless of the approach used, our precedent indicates that it is proper
for this court to look to the state court’s analysis of its own law in interpreting the
underlying state law conviction which serves as the basis for the sixteen level
“crime of violence” enhancement. See United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d
1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[s]ince the language of the statute is
broad, we turn to Colorado courts for interpretive assistance”); United States v.
Reina-Rodriguez, 468 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bolanos-
Hernandez, 492 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9thCir. 2007).
The pure categorical approach focuses on the elements of the underlying
conviction alone without evaluating the underlying facts of the defendant’s
conduct. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990); United States v.
Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005). However, there is an
exception to the pure categorical approach. The exception allows for the
sentencing court to consult reliable court documents from the underlying court of
conviction. This is called the modified categorical approach.
In applying Taylor, we have stated that the modified approach applies
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where the underlying statute of conviction “is ambiguous, or broad enough to
encompass both violent and nonviolent crimes, [then] a court can look beyond the
statute to certain records of the prior proceeding, such as the charging documents,
the judgment, any plea thereto and findings by the sentencing court.” Perez-
Vargas, 414 F.3d at 1284. In United States v. Hays, this court stated that “[w]hen
the underlying statute [of conviction] reaches a broad range of conduct, some of
which merits an enhancement and some of which does not, courts resolve the
resulting ambiguity by consulting reliable judicial records, such as the charging
document, plea agreement, or plea colloquy.” Hays, 526 F.3d at 676 (quoting
United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005). This
statement resembles that made by the Supreme Court in Taylor, and cited above.
However, Hays also contains a critical limiting factor that narrows the number of
situations when the modified categorical approach may be used. In Hays, we said
that “[s]uch review does not involve a subjective inquiry into the facts of the
case, but rather its purpose is to determine ‘which part of the statute was charged
against the defendant and, thus, which portion of the statute to examine on its
face.’” Hays, 526 F.3d at 676 (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F.3d
1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
The key portion of the statements from Hays informs us that the modified
approach is properly used when the underlying statute of conviction contains
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multiple element sets and is therefore divisible. This statement, that documents
may be consulted when the statute provides two distinct avenues for a violation,
limits the initially broad statement by the Supreme Court in Taylor that a statute
need only be ambiguous and reach both violent and non-violent conduct in order
for the sentencing court to utilize the modified approach and properly consider
judicial documents. For example, in Hays, we examined a Wyoming battery
statute that read as follows: “[a] person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully
touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b). There
are two ways that a person may commit battery in Wyoming: first, the individual
may unlawfully touch another in a rude, insolent or angry manner and second, the
individual may intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to
another. Id. Thus, since there are two ways to commit battery in Wyoming, the
court may properly consider reliable judicial documents in an attempt to discern
which method was used by the defendant in committing battery.
However, in Hays, the only document provided in the record that
referenced the Wyoming battery conviction was the PSR in the ongoing federal
criminal case. No documents from the Wyoming court of conviction were
provided to the sentencing court. With regard to that situation, we stated that the
“presentence report in the present case...is not one of the documents that this
court may examine to resolve this ambiguity.” Hays, 526 F.3d at 678. This
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discussion of Hays indicates that the modified categorical approach is properly
used when the underlying crime of conviction may be accomplished by two or
more separate element sets.
It is also helpful that this court recently decided United States v.
Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2008), which tackled the issue of the
proper approach to be implemented when deciding if the defendant’s underlying
conviction constituted a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. As in the
instant case, Maldonado-Lopez dealt with the definition of a “crime of violence”
as defined under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d at 1208-09. In
Maldonado-Lopez, we considered whether or not the defendant had three prior
convictions for crimes of violence which would warrant the imposition of a four
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(E). Id. at 1208. The defendant
in Maldonado-Lopez had three prior convictions for harassment in Colorado; the
precise question before the court in Maldonado-Lopez was whether the
convictions were considered crimes of violence under the Guidelines. Id.
Ultimately, the Maldonado-Lopez court decided that the statute of
conviction, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111(1)(a), provided that an individual
committed harassment in Colorado without the use of physical force, thereby
preventing the four level enhancement from automatically applying. 517 F.3d at
1210. We reasoned that Colorado’s harassment statute was broad enough to cover
violent crimes, such as striking a victim, and also non-violent crimes, such as
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spitting on a victim. Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d at 1209.
The majority opinion then stated that because the statute was broad enough
to cover both violent and non-violent crimes, it was proper for the sentencing
court to look to the charging documents (indictment, jury instructions, plea
transcripts, judgments, and plea agreement if any exist) from the defendant’s
three prior convictions. Id. The court determined that in two of the convictions,
sufficient information existed in the plea transcripts that supported the sentencing
court’s finding that the defendant had committed a crime of violence. Id.However, with respect to the third harassment conviction, the court only had the
judgment from the court of conviction to consult and it failed to provide evidence
that the defendant engaged in conduct that constituted a crime of violence.
Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d at 1209-10. Ultimately, we held that the
enhancement was not supported and remanded for re-sentencing. Id. at 1210.
The concurrence by Judge McConnell focused on which approach was
appropriate in that case: the pure categorical approach or the modified categorical
approach. Id. at 1210. At the outset, the concurrence explains the pure
categorical approach and when it is utilized and also explains the “exception” to
the pure categorical approach – also known as the modified categorical approach:
[w]hen a sentencing enhancement is framed in terms of the statute of
conviction, the categorical approach applies and the sentencing court
must look not to the particular facts of the prior conviction but to the
terms of the underlying statute. United States v. Martinez-
Hernandez, 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005). Even within the
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scope of the categorical approach, however, the Supreme Court has
recognized an “exception” for cases where the jury was actually
required to find all the elements of the generic offense in order to
convict, but where it is not clear from the statute itself which version
of the crime the defendant was charged with. Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S.
13, 17 (2005). In such a case, the sentencing court may consult the
indictment, jury instructions, plea colloquy transcript, and written
plea agreement, if these exist.
Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d at 1210 (internal citations omitted). Both the
concurrence and the majority agreed that the Colorado statute at issue did not
necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another. However, the concurrence concluded that what the
defendant actually did was irrelevant in determining whether the underlying
statute of conviction had as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another. Thus, the concurrence
recommended utilizing the pure categorical approach and not examining the
charging documents as allowed under the modified categorical approach. In
contrast, the majority opinion considered it appropriate to examine further into
the charging documents to determine if they would reveal what part of the
Colorado harassment statute was violated and whether or not that violation
qualified as a crime of violence. The concurrence stated that utilizing the
modified categorical approach, where charging documents are examined, is
appropriate where “the statute itself has subparts with different enumerated
elements, and it is not clear which set of elements the defendant was convicted
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under.” Id. at 1211. This principle echoes the analysis in Hays. Looking to the
charging documents when the underlying statute of conviction at issue has
subparts allows the sentencing court to determine under which set of elements the
defendant was convicted.
Another recent case, United States v. Zuniga-Soto, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL
2252561 (10th Cir. 2008), furthers the analysis found in Hays and Maldonado-
Lopez. In Zuniga-Soto, the defendant pleaded guilty to assaulting a public servant
in violation of Tex. Pen.Code § 22.01. 1 Zuniga-Soto, 2008 WL 2252561, *2. As
in the instant case, the same sixteen level crime of violence enhancement from the
Guidelines was at issue in Zuniga-Soto. Id. at *3. The court addressed which
approach – pure categorical or modified categorical – to use in analyzing whether
the defendant’s underlying Texas assault conviction qualified as a crime of
violence under the Guidelines. Id. at *7-8. The Zuniga-Soto court noted, as
mentioned above, that there appears to be an intra-circuit split where at times the
opinions have allowed
an inquiry beyond the statutory definitions of crimes. E.g., United
States v. Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir.2008)
(noting that a sentencing court applying § 2L1.2's definition of
“crime of violence” may “deviate from the categorical approach to
determine whether a conviction under [a Colorado harassment
statute] is a crime violence”); United States v. Hernandez-Garduno,
460 F.3d 1287, 1294 (10th Cir.2006) (observing that “[i]f the
1
Tex. Pen.Code § 22.01 reads:
(a) A person commits an [assault] if the person:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another...
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charging documents, plea agreement, transcript of a plea colloquy, or
sentencing court findings of the prior state court conviction
demonstrate that third-degree assault did, in fact, involve the use ...
of physical force, then the particular defendant's prior assault
conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)”).
Zuniga-Soto, 2008 WL 2252561, *8 (alterations in original).
Ultimately, the Zuniga-Soto court held that consistent with our precedent,
“the express focus of § 2L1.2's definition of crime of violence was on the
elements of the state crime at issue rather than the unique underlying
circumstances of the crime. Id. at *9 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The court first looked at the Texas assault statute and found that the state could
obtain a conviction against an individual by showing that a person “intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another...” Tex. Pen.Code §
22.01(a)(1). The Zuniga-Soto court found that while the statute was
grammatically divisible, there was no evidence that the defendant “was convicted
under a part of § 22.01 that excluded recklessness from its definition of assault.”
Zuniga-Soto, 2008 WL 2252561, *10. The court then proceeded to apply the pure
categorical approach to the underlying Texas assault statute. Id. at *9-10.
An analysis of Cal. Penal Code § 242 results in our conclusion that the pure
categorical approach is appropriate in the instant case. Similar to the Texas
assault statute in Zuniga-Soto, here, the underlying statute, Cal. Pen. Code § 242,
is one that contains a disjunction “or” in its text, but does not contain multiple
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element sets or subparts. This mirrors the potential grammatical division found at
issue in Zuniga-Soto. Section 242 defines battery as “any willful and unlawful
use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Cal. Pen. Code § 242. One
could read this statute as having subparts or multiple element sets by construing
the disjunction “or” as follows:
(1) the willful and unlawful use, of
(a) force, or
(b) violence,
(2) against the person of another.
However, one could read the statute’s phrase “force or violence” as a term of art
that is not meant to be treated as two completely separate and distinct terms.
Since there are two reasonable interpretations of the ambiguous statute, pursuant
to Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d at 1286, we look to the California state courts for
interpretive assistance.
In People v. Page, the California Court of Appeal stated that the term
“force or violence” has “the special legal meaning of a harmful or offensive
touching.” People v. Page, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 857, 864 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(emphasis added); see also Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1059
(9th Cir. 2006); Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006).
The California state courts’ determination that “force or violence” has a special
legal meaning that differs from the ordinary meaning of the two words makes it a
term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a term of art as: “[a] word or phrase
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having a specific, precise meaning in a given specialty, apart from its general
meaning in ordinary contexts.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1511 (8th ed. 2004); see
also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 118 (1974).
Since the phrase “force or violence” is a term of art, as determined by the
California courts, it is not possible to separate § 242 into subparts or multiple
element sets. Additionally, the California Supreme Court states that “force or
violence...has the special legal meaning of a harmful or offensive touching.
People v. Pinholster, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 (Cal. 1992). In Page, the California
Court of Appeals stated that “[i]t has long been established, both in tort and
criminal law, that the least touching may constitute battery.” Page, 20
Cal.Rptr.3d at 864 n.1 (citing People v. Colantuono, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 908 (Cal.
1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
In People v. Mansfield, 245 Cal.Rptr. 800, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), the
California Court of Appeals stated that to constitute battery, “force against the
person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm
or even pain, and it need not leave any mark.” Mansfield, 245 Cal.Rptr at 803
(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also People v. Martinez, 83
Cal.Rptr. 914, 915 (1970)(“Any harmful or offensive touching constitutes an
unlawful use of force or violence.”). Furthermore, there is no indication from the
California courts that an individual could be charged with only using force to
commit battery or only using violence to commit battery. The California battery
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statute does not have multiple element sets, nor does it have subparts that provide
for a variety of elements that may be found by a jury (or plead guilty to by a
defendant) in order to convict the individual for battery. Section 242 is composed
of one single statement that defines battery. In California, all that is required for
battery is the intent to commit a “willful and unlawful use of force or violence
upon the person of another.” People v. Lara, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402, 405 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996)(citing People v. Colantuono, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 908 (Cal. 1994)). Any
individual who either pleads guilty to or is found guilty of battery in California
satisfies the following elements – and only these elements – in every situation: (1)
willful and unlawful use of, (2) force or violence, (3) against the person of
another.
Based on the Zuniga-Soto opinion and our recently developed jurisprudence
in this area, the pure categorical approach will be used in the instant case where
the underlying statute of conviction, Cal. Penal Code § 242, does not proscribe
battery in multiple element sets or subparts. The pure categorical approach does
not allow for charging documents to be considered in discerning whether or not
the defendant committed a crime of violence. As Judge McConnell stated in his
Maldonado-Lopez concurrence, under the pure categorical approach “[t]he
elements are the elements, and they can be determined only by reading and
interpreting the statute itself.” 517 F.3d at 1211.
In fact, this case is very much like those in Maldonado-Lopez and Zuniga-
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Soto where the underlying statute of conviction encompasses both violent and
non-violent crime. The concurrence recommended applying the formal
categorical approach and we adopt that recommendation in the instant appeal for
the following reasons. Were this court to apply the modified categorical
approach (thereby allowing the examination of the Taylor-Shepard approved court
documents from the underlying conviction) the particular conduct of the
defendant would be examined and taken into account, which is improper. In
United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2005), cited by the concurrence in
Maldonado-Lopez, the Seventh Circuit explained the function of allowing the
sentencing court to examine the charging documents in the underlying conviction:
The list in Shepard is designed to identify documents that illuminate
what crime the defendant committed, which can be hard to pin down
if one statute defines both ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’ versions of a
single offense. Using additional materials such as affidavits to
ascertain how this person violated a statute departs from the
categorical approach that Shepard and Taylor adopt.
Lewis, 405 F.3d at 515. For example, the consultation of documents pertaining to
the underlying conviction would be particularly helpful were the statute one that
had two distinct subparts – with which an individual may be charged – which
individually provided (1) an element set for a violent version of the crime and (2)
another different element set for the non-violent version of the crime. Thus, by
examining the court documents, there may be an indication as to which element
set the individual was charged with and convicted under – not what the defendant
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actually did to the victim. See Zuniga-Soto, 2008 WL 2252561, * 8 (holding that
a court may examine judicial records to determine which part of a statute was
charged against the defendant but not to engage in a subjective inquiry into the
factual circumstances of the underlying conviction).
However, in the instant case, the California battery statute does not have
subparts or distinct element sets, but it does encompass both violent and non-
violent versions of battery which is substantially similar to the situation in
Maldonado-Lopez and Zuniga-Soto. See Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d
1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the pure categorical approach is used
when determining whether Cal. Penal Code § 242 constitutes a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16). Since we have concluded that the categorical approach
applies in the instant case, we are not allowed to examine any judicial documents
from the underlying court of conviction or from the ongoing federal case in
determining whether the conviction has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of force against the person of another.
D. § 242 and the Use, Attempted Use, or Threatened Use of Physical Force
This is the crux of the instant appeal: whether § 242 has as an element the
use, threatened use, or attempted use of physical force against the person of
another. Under Perez-Vargas, noted above, it is proper for this court to consider
the state court’s interpretation of the underlying statute of conviction, in this case
§ 242. Furthermore, we give deference to the state court’s interpretation of its
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own law. See United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir.
2005); see also United States v. Bolanos-Hernandez, 492 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that under the Taylor-Shepard framework, state statutes are
read according to the state court interpretation); United States v. Reina-
Rodriguez, 468 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that when utilizing the
categorical approach, the court is bound by the state court's interpretation of the
statute) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 851
(9th Cir.2007) (en banc).
In reviewing California Supreme Court precedent, we find that “the least
touching constitutes battery.” People v. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th 206, 214, n.4
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is a general statement about
battery under § 242 in California. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), is relevant in analyzing this statement from
Colantuono. In Leocal, the court examined whether or not a driving under the
influence offense from Florida qualified as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16 – which defines a crime of violence with a broader definition than that found
in the Guidelines. 543 U.S. at 5; see United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d
845, 849 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[n]otably, ‘crime of violence’ is defined more narrowly
in § 2L1.2 than in other contexts because the definition does not encompass acts
involving the use of force against property or acts that merely pose a risk of harm
to another person.” See United States v. Calderon-Peña, 383 F.3d 254, 261 (5th
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Cir.2004) (en banc)). As cited by Hays, the Court in Leocal contemplated the
category of crimes qualifying as crimes of violence under § 16 or the Guidelines
as “violent, active crimes.” Id. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. at 11). The
principle in Leocal – that crimes of violence suggest a category of active, violent
crimes – does not correlate with the statement made by the California Supreme
Court in Colantuono – that the least touching constitutes battery in California
under § 242.
A closer look at § 242 as interpreted by the California courts reveals
similar concerns about the disparity between conduct covered by § 242 and more
violent conduct covered by the crimes of violence definition under the Guidelines.
For example, in People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571 (Cal. 1992), the court stated
that the “[a]ny harmful or offensive touching constitutes an unlawful use of force
or violence” and that throwing a cup of urine in someone’s face was battery. 824
P.2d at 622 (citing People v. Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970)). Also, in County of Santa Clara v. Willis, 179 Cal.App. 3d 1240, 1251 n.6
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the court stated that “[t]he least unprivileged touching may
constitute a criminal battery.” In Willis, the court went on to further define
battery when it quoted from People v. Rocha, 3 Cal.3d 893, 899, n.12 (Cal. 1971),
“[i]n other words, force against the person is enough, it need not be violent or
severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave any
mark.”
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These interpretations of battery under § 242 have been reaffirmed recently
in People v. Thomas, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 473, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see Galeana-
Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006) (reviewing California
state court interpretation of Cal. Penal Code § 242). A recent Ninth Circuit case
is particularly noteworthy. In Bushell-McIntyre v. City of San Jose, 252
Fed.Appx. 810, 811 (9th Cir. 2007), the court held that an officer had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for battery because the defendant touched the
officer’s badge.
Having clearly found that offensive non-violent touching qualifies as
battery under Cal. Penal Code § 242, we must determine whether or not § 242's
definition has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another as required by the enhancement at issue. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Leocal, crimes of violence suggest a category of
violent, active crimes. 543 U.S. at 11. This categorical statement conflicts with
the California courts’ numerous holdings that the least offensive touching may
constitute battery under § 242. Based on the cited statement from the Supreme
Court in Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11, which we have interpreted in Hays, non-violent
touching seems to exist outside the category of active, violent crimes.
Aiding in our analysis are two other cases from the Ninth Circuit that
warrant discussion. The first, United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, (9th Cir.
1992), held that § 242 was a crime of violence – because it had as an element the
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use of physical force – for the purposes of determining the defendant’s career
offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
The second Ninth Circuit case is Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d at
1018. The Ortega-Mendez court held that § 242 is not categorically a crime of
violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16 – which defines a crime of
violence in broader terms than in the instant case. See United States v.
Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[n]otably, ‘crime of violence’
is defined more narrowly in § 2L1.2 than in other contexts because the definition
does not encompass acts involving the use of force against property or acts that
merely pose a risk of harm to another person. See United States v.
Calderon-Peña, 383 F.3d 254, 261 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc)). In contrast to
Robinson, the court in Ortega-Mendez examined California state court
interpretation of § 242 and found the same reasoning and came to the same
conclusion as we have discussed above, i.e. that § 242’s “force or violence”
phrase “is a term of art, requiring neither a force capable of hurting or causing
injury nor violence in the usual sense of the term.” Ortega-Mendez, 450 F.3d at
1016. The extensive analysis and review of California state court opinions
provide the basis for our consideration of Ortega-Mendez as persuasive authority.
See Ortega-Mendez, 450 F.3d at 1016-18; see also Servin v. Gonzales, 186
Fed.Appx. 780, 781 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Ortega-Mendez with approval).
Based on our own independent analysis and interpretation of Cal. Penal
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Code § 242, a thorough review of California state court interpretation of § 242,
the Ninth Circuit's examination of § 242, and the Supreme Court's interpretation
of what constitutes a crime of violence, we find that § 242 is not a categorical
crime of violence as defined by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii).
E. Plain Error Review
The Defendant-Appellant has conceded that the alleged error below was not
objected to, thereby requiring plain error review. United States v. Lopez-Flores,
444 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir.2006). “Plain error occurs when there is (1) error,
(2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Defendant-Appellant contends that the district court committed plain error by
imposing the sixteen level enhancement.
First, the defendant must show that the district court committed an error.
Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the
foregoing rationale from the California state courts and our own analysis of those
opinions, we find that it was an error to impose the sixteen level enhancement on
Mr. Herrera. An examination of the California courts’ interpretation of § 242
reveals the disparity in conduct covered by § 242 and more violent conduct
covered by the Guidelines’ crime of violence definition.
Second, the defendant must show that the error was plain. Lopez-Flores,
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444 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993), the Supreme Court defined a “plain” error as one that
is obvious or clear. The Court also indicated that the error must be plain under
law at the time of the district court's decision. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. We have
stated in United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2000), that an
improper interpretation or application of the Guidelines is plain error. See also
United States v. Alessandroni, 982 F.2d 419, 420 (10th Cir. 1992) (same). We
have also recently reaffirmed this principle, albeit in dicta, in Zuniga-Soto. 2
In the instant case, we determined above that § 242 does not necessarily
have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another. This necessarily means that the district court
wrongly interpreted § 242 as having as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another. We are not
concluding that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Guidelines; we
are holding that the district court erred in interpreting Cal. Penal Code § 242.
The question then is whether this error is plain, clear or obvious.
Under Olano, the Supreme Court held that “[a]t a minimum, a court of
appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to [Fed. R. Crim. Proc.] 52(b) unless the
error is clear under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. The error in this case,
2
The Zuniga-Soto panel did not need to address the argument that an incorrect
interpretation of the Guidelines satisfied the second prong of the plain error
analysis because the opinion reversed the enhancement on alternative grounds.
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that § 242 had the required element of force, is plain under our precedent in
Malone; but the error is also plain based on the numerous and unanimous
opinions of the California state courts interpreting § 242. Furthermore, we
discussed above the Ninth Circuit case, Ortega-Mendez, that existed at the time
the district court made the determination. Thus, the jurisprudence discussed
heretofore was in place and controlling at the time the district court applied the
sixteen level enhancement. Based on our foregoing analysis, we find that Mr.
Herrera has met the second prong of the plain error test.
The third prong of the plain error review test requires that the defendant
show that the plain error affected substantial rights. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d at
1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Herrera received a sixteen level
enhancement because of the plain error committed by the district court. This
results in a substantial increase in his base offense level and his term of
imprisonment.
It is well-settled that sentences must be reasonable, which limitation has
both procedural and substantive components. United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d
800, 803 (10th Cir.2008). Procedural reasonableness entails a district court's
proper calculation of the base offense level. Gall, 128 S.C. at 597. When this
does not occur, the sentence is not procedurally reasonable and a remand is
appropriate unless the error was harmless. United States v. Scott, --- F.3d ----,
2008 WL 2502524, *6 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Todd, 515 F.3d
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1128, 1134-35 (10th Cir.2008); see United States v. Kristal, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055
(10th Cir.2006) (holding that a non-harmless error applying the Guidelines
warrants remand). Thus, because the sixteen level enhancement is substantial and
necessarily affected the calculation of Mr. Herrera's base offense level, we find
that the error affected substantial rights.
Finally, the fourth prong asks whether the plain error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Lopez-Flores,
444 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Eddy,
523 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008), we stated that in order to meet the
requirement of the fourth prong, the defendant must show that a failure to correct
the error would be egregious and result in a miscarriage of justice. At the outset,
we note that the Defendant-Appellant’s base offense level was substantially
increased due to the sixteen level enhancement. We also note that there is a
reasonable likelihood that were this court to vacate the sentence and remand, a
significantly lower sentence would result. United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d
1151, 1161 (10th Cir. 2003). We consider it to be egregious and a miscarriage of
justice for a Defendant’s incarceration to be significantly lengthened based on an
improper interpretation of the law and an improper imposition of a significant
Guidelines’ enhancement. We conclude that there was plain error in the instant
case and that a remand for re-sentencing is proper.
IV. CONCLUSION
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We REMAND this case to the district court with instructions to vacate the
present sentence of Mr. Herrera and to impose a new sentence in conformity with
this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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