Madewell v. Department of Veterans Affairs & Agency

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 18, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MARSHA MADEWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-7086
(D.C. No. 6:06-cv-00526-FHS)
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS (E.D. Okla.)
AFFAIRS and Agency; R. JAMES
NICHOLSON, Secretary of
Department of Veterans Affairs and
Agency, Agency Head, in his official
capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, PORFILIO, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Marsha Madewell appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to her former employer, the Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA),
on her claims of disability discrimination and retaliation and also dismissing her
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
state-law tort claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We review the
district court’s judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
I.
Ms. Madewell was a Veterans Claims Examiner (VCE) in the VA’s
Education Division from September 1988 until July 2005. As a VCE,
Ms. Madewell was responsible for receiving, reviewing, and making decisions on
veterans’ applications for educational benefits. In 2002, the VA implemented
national performance standards for the VCEs, including a minimum production
component. Ms. Madewell believed that this aspect of the system rewarded VA
managers with bonuses for the amount of work processed by VCEs, but not for
the quality of that work. According to Ms. Madewell, the standards led to the
incorrect adjudication, and perhaps wrongful denial, of veterans’ claims. She
expressed this viewpoint to her supervisors and to the office of her United States
Senator.
From May 2003 through her discharge date, Ms. Madewell met the
minimum production requirement only intermittently. The VA took disciplinary
steps: Ms. Madewell was counseled, given additional assistance, admonished,
and placed on improvement plans. Ms. Madewell felt that many of the counseling
meetings were for the purpose of harassing and humiliating her. She informed
her director, managers, and supervisors that the workplace stress exacerbated the
pain and fatigue caused by her existing medical conditions, which included
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fibromyalgia, arthritis, scoliosis, degenerative disc disease, migraines, and vision
problems. During the time of her employment difficulties, she developed
insomnia, irritable bowel syndrome, anxiety, depression, and symptoms of pre-
menopause. Management, however, denied Ms. Madewell’s requests to continue
with a “mega-flex” work schedule and to change her work duties to accommodate
her medical needs. Reply Br. at 16, 27-30. In response to this situation, she filed
an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging disability
discrimination in September 2004. The outcome of this complaint is not part of
the district court record.
In July 2005, the VA terminated Ms. Madewell’s employment for failure to
meet the May 2005 minimum production standard. At that point, she had not met
the standard in May, June, July, October, and November of 2003; February, June,
and December of 2004; and January, February, and May of 2005. After her
discharge, Ms. Madewell brought disability-discrimination and whistle-blower
claims to the Merit Systems Protection Board. Although it is apparent that
Ms. Madewell was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings, the record does
not contain a Board decision.
Ms. Madewell then filed this lawsuit in district court alleging disability
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794a;
retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3; discrimination and retaliation under the Whistle Blower Protection Act
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(WPA), see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b); and state-law tort claims. In a sixteen-page
Opinion and Order, the district court described the background facts, discussed
the applicable law, and concluded that the VA was entitled to summary judgment
on all claims.
II.
Although she was represented by counsel in the district court,
Ms. Madewell appears pro se in this appeal. We therefore treat her appellate
filings liberally and construe her briefs as seeking review of all issues decided by
the district court. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal.
Santana v. City of Tulsa, 359 F.3d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary
judgment is appropriate if “the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Disability Discrimination
To meet the threshold element of her disability discrimination claim,
Ms. Madewell was required to show that she was a disabled person within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The Act defines the term disability in
pertinent part as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B). Standing alone, evidence of
physical impairments does not demonstrate entitlement to the protections of the
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Rehabilitation Act. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that her impairments
substantially limit a major life activity, “functions such as caring for one’s self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii). This court looks at “only the major life
activity or activities asserted by the plaintiff” in district court. Justice v. Crown
Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d. 1080, 1086 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted)
(construing a claim under the similar Americans with Disabilities Act).
Ms. Madewell asserted that she was substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. Under this premise, she was required to present some
evidence that she was “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The district court determined that Ms. Madewell had not made this
showing in her summary-judgment filings.
Our review of the record indicates that the district court’s evaluation of the
evidence was correct. Moreover, Ms. Madewell’s own reply brief debunks her
claim that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. She
states that she does “everything I can to take care of myself so I am able to work,
that is just about all I could do.” Reply Br. at 19. Summary judgment was the
appropriate disposition of Ms. Madewell’s Rehabilitation Act claim.
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Title VII Retaliation
Ms. Madewell’s Title VII retaliation claim relies on a showing that the VA
discriminated against her for “oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful
employment practice” by Title VII.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A retaliation
plaintiff may prove her case with direct or circumstantial evidence, with the
burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-05 (1973), coming into play where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence. Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145
(10th Cir. 2008).
A plaintiff proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework must first
establish a prima facie case with a showing that “(1) she engaged in protected
opposition to Title VII discrimination; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.” Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1227
(10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). A prima facie showing shifts the burden to
the employer to “proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her
termination.” Id. Then, the plaintiff “has the burden of demonstrating that the
[employer’s] asserted reasons for her termination are pretextual.” Id.Because Ms. Madewell lacked direct evidence of retaliation, the McDonnell
Douglas procedure applied to her case. The VA and the district court assumed
that Ms. Madewell had demonstrated a prima facie case and proceeded to the
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issue of whether the VA’s expressed nondiscriminatory reason for termination
(failure to meet production standards) was a “pretext masking discriminatory
animus.” Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted). Ms. Madewell alleged that managers treated her differently
after she filed her EEO charge and also that no other VCEs were fired for failure
to meet the monthly production requirements. But she failed to provide any
factual basis for her allegations and therefore failed to demonstrate that the VA
provided a pretextual reason to terminate her employment. The district court
properly entered summary judgment on Ms. Madewell’s discrimination-retaliation
claim.
Whistleblowing Retaliation
Ms. Madewell claims that she was entitled to damages under the WPA
because the VA’s discharge decision was prompted, in part, by her revealing the
VA’s wrongful emphasis on quantity over quality. The WPA, however, protects
disclosures of alleged misbehavior only if based on the employee’s objective,
reasonable belief “that the disclosed information evidences a violation of law,
rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority,
or substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” Giove v. Dep’t of
Transp., 230 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “A purely subjective perspective
of an employee is not sufficient even if shared by other employees.” Lachance v.
White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Moreover, “there is a presumption
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that public officers perform their duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in
accordance with the law and governing regulations.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“[T]his presumption stands unless there is irrefragable proof to the contrary.” Id.(quotation omitted).
As the district court stated, Ms. Madewell “offer[ed] nothing other than
unsupported, conclusory allegations . . . to support her claim of retaliation for
engaging in whistleblowing activities.” R., Vol. II, Doc. 78 at 15 n.6. Her
statements do not constitute the necessary “irrefragable proof” of wrongdoing on
the part of VA employees and officials. Lachance, 174 F.3d at 1381. As a
consequence, Ms. Madewell’s disclosures were not protected by the WPA, and
her whistleblowing claim was subject to summary judgment.
Tort claims
Ms. Madewell also appeals the dismissal of her state-law tort claims of
infliction of emotional distress and failure to direct, supervise and train
employees. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides the exclusive avenue
of relief for these claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. And “[t]he
FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted
their administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993). Because Ms. Madewell “failed to heed that clear statutory command,” the
tort claims were not properly before the district court. Id. The district court
correctly dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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III.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Ms. Madewell’s motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Her motion asking this
court to reconsider appointment of counsel is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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