Coleman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 8, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CECILE DENISE COLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-3177
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF (D.C. No. 05-CV-4149-JAR)
KANSAS, INC., (D. Kansas)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Cecile Coleman (Plaintiff) appeals the district court’s dismissal of claims arising
from her termination as an employee of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas (Blue Cross).
Plaintiff alleges (1) retaliation under Kansas’s workers’ compensation statute; (2)
interference under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA); (3) retaliation under the
FMLA; (4) intentional discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA);
and (5) retaliation under the ADA. The district court found Plaintiff’s response to Blue
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Cross’s motion for summary judgment deficient, and granted summary judgment in favor
of Blue Cross. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
I
Plaintiff commenced this action in December 2005, and after the completion of
discovery, Blue Cross moved for summary judgment. Blue Cross’s summary judgment
motion included a list of ninety-one factual allegations, each supported by a citation to
specific evidence in the record. Plaintiff’s response to that motion included a reply to
each of those ninety-one allegations, but failed to cite to the record in support her contrary
factual averments in all but three instances. Plaintiff did attach her sixteen page affidavit
to her response. Her response made a general reference to her affidavit as providing a
response to Blue Cross’s statement of facts by stating, “[m]y answer to defendant’s
statement of alleged facts is incorporated by reference herein.” Coleman Summ. J. Aff. ¶
6. But as regards defendant’s statement of facts, Plaintiff’s response did not include any
specific citations to specific points in the affidavit, and made only a general reference to
the affidavit, saying “[a]ll responses to defendant’s alleged statement of facts were
provided by Ms. Coleman under oath as indicated in the attached affidavit.” Pl.’s Br.
Summ. J. 2.
Blue Cross argued in its reply brief that Plaintiff’s statement of facts failed to
comply with the court’s local rules of practice in that it was essentially not responsive to
the facts asserted by Blue Cross. Blue Cross argued that because Plaintiff did not cite to
specific evidence in her responses to Blue Cross’s statement of facts, the district court
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should disregard Plaintiff’s factual averments and accept its factual allegations as true.
Blue Cross also argued that Plaintiff’s affidavit included inadmissible statements of
hearsay and opinion, and often did not reflect the first person perceptions of Plaintiff. It
suggested that to the extent the district court considered the affidavit, it should disregard
those portions constituting inadmissible evidence. Blue Cross also contended that
Plaintiff’s affidavit contradicted aspects of her prior deposition testimony, and should
therefore be treated as a “sham” affidavit and disregarded.
Plaintiff moved to amend her response, submitting a proposed amended response
that attempted to cure the defects identified by Blue Cross.1 After briefing on the issue of
whether to allow the amendment, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend her
response. The district court treated the motion to amend as a motion to file out of time,
which the court may grant only upon a showing of excusable neglect. The court
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish excusable neglect and denied Plaintiff’s
motion to amend.
The district court then addressed the specific defects in Plaintiff’s original
response. The court agreed with Blue Cross that Plaintiff had failed to comply with the
local rules of practice. As a result, the court refused to credit her responses to Blue
Cross’s statement of facts, with the exception of the three instances where she did comply
with the local rule by supporting her allegations with a citation to the record. The court
1
The district court’s opinion indicates that many of these defects were not cured
by the proposed amended response. Order Granting Mot. Summ. J., May 16, 2007, at 8-
9.
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then ruled that to the extent it would consider Plaintiff’s affidavit, it would disregard
those averments which relied upon inadmissible evidence and those which contradicted
her prior deposition testimony so as to amount to a “sham” affidavit. The district court
then granted summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross on all claims.
II.
This court reviews the district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de
novo, viewing the disputed issues of fact in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2008).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not adequately challenge the district court’s
denial of her motion to amend. See Aplt. Br. at 25-28. Her arguments deal exclusively
with whether the affidavit attached to her initial response to Blue Cross’s motion was
admissible. She offers no legal or factual support for her argument that the district court
erred in denying her motion to amend. As a result, we must conclude that she has waived
any challenge to the court’s denial of her motion to amend. See Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the
opening brief are waived.”). By waiving this argument, we only consider Plaintiff’s
original response to Blue Cross’s motion for summary judgment in reviewing the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.
Plaintiff’s response to Blue Cross’s motion for summary judgment fails to comply
with either Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 for the District of Kansas, or the basic
requirements of summary judgment practice in the federal courts. Local Rule 56.1
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provides that
(1) A memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute shall
be numbered by paragraph, shall refer with particularity to those portions of
the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall
state the number of movant’s fact that is disputed.
(2) If the party opposing summary judgment relies on any facts not
contained in movant’s memorandum, that party shall set forth each
additional fact in a separately numbered paragraph, supported by references
to the record, in a manner required by subsection (a) above. All material
facts set forth in this statement of the non-moving party shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the reply of the moving party.
D. Kan. R. Civ. P. 56.1(b). Plaintiff’s response does include numbered paragraphs
corresponding to Blue Cross’s statement of facts. But only three of those ninety-one
paragraphs comply with the requirement that any fact in the moving party’s statement that
the non-moving party wishes to contradict include a citation to the record supporting their
alternative view of the facts. See Pl.’s Br. Summ. J. at ¶ 57, 68, 77.
Plaintiff does not dispute that her original response did not comply with the local
rule. She instead argues that her affidavit, as well as several other documents attached to
her response to Blue Cross’s motion for summary judgment, should be considered
regardless and, if considered, we should conclude that she has raised questions of material
fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Plaintiff’s response does mention her
affidavit, but it does so only generally. In a single sentence preceding Plaintiff’s response
to each of the ninety-one numbered paragraphs provided by Blue Cross in its statement of
facts, the memorandum provides “[a]ll responses to defendant’s alleged statement of facts
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were provided by Ms. Coleman under oath as indicated in the attached affidavit.” Pl.’s
Br. Summ. J. 2. At no point does the response specifically cite a particular part of the
affidavit, or any other evidence for that matter, as a source of Plaintiff’s contrary factual
allegation.
By citing to the affidavit in this general way, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the
requirement that a memorandum opposing summary judgment “shall refer with
particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies.” D.
Kan R. Civ. P. 56.1(b) (emphasis added). As such, while Plaintiff correctly notes that a
party opposing summary judgment may rely on an affidavit attached to their
memorandum, Plaintiff’s failure to properly reference specific points in the affidavit as
support for each of her allegations is a legitimate grounds for its exclusion.
We agree with the district court that it is not the court’s responsibility “to conduct
a fishing expedition of plaintiff’s affidavit or any other record evidence in order to
support the assertions made in her response.” Order Granting Mot. Summ. J., May 16,
2007, at 11. Faced with pleadings that did not comply with either the local practice rule
or summary judgment practice in general, the district court was correct to admit all facts
asserted in Blue Cross’s summary judgment motion “that are not controverted by a
readily identifiable portion of the record.” Id. This approach is consistent with Cross v.
Home Depot, where this court held that “it is the responding party’s burden [at summary
judgment] to ensure that the factual dispute is portrayed with particularity, without . . .
depending on the trial court to conduct its own search of the record.” 390 F.3d 1283,
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1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Downes v. Beach, 587 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir. 1978)).
As noted by the district court, Blue Cross “has properly supported its motion for summary
judgment with affidavits, deposition testimony, and other admissible evidence. In
response, defendant has failed to controvert the facts asserted in defendant’s motion.”
Order Granting Mot. Summ. J., May 16, 2007, at 13. As a result of this deficiency, we
proceed in the same manner as the district court, and “consider[] only whether [Blue
Cross] is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, based on the undisputed facts
set forth in its motion.” Id.III.
Given Plaintiff’s failure to provide an adequate response brief, the facts as
described by Blue Cross in its motion for summary judgment are accepted as true for
purposes of summary judgment. This court then views those facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, as the non-moving party. The disputed issues of fact appearing in
paragraphs 57, 68, and 77 of Blue Cross’s motion are also construed in favor of Plaintiff,
having been adequately supported by a reference to the record.
In presenting her arguments on appeal, Plaintiff relies exclusively on documents
attached to her response to summary judgment that the court did not admit and her
inadmissible affidavit. In addition, a number of the facts accepted as true from Blue
Cross’s motion for summary judgment directly refute the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. As
Plaintiff has failed to support her arguments with facts supported by admissible evidence,
we must affirm.
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1) Kansas Workers’ Compensation Claim
Plaintiff first brings a retaliation claim pursuant to Kansas’s workers’
compensation statute, alleging that Blue Cross fired her for exercising her rights under the
Act. In making this claim, she relies primarily on an e-mail chain between her superiors
discussing the status of her employment and the number of workers’ compensation claims
she had made. Plaintiff did attach this evidence to her response to Blue Cross’s motion
for summary judgment, but we cannot consider it because Plaintiff failed to cite to it in
her response to Blue Cross’s statement of facts. We therefore affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment, as facts from Blue Cross’s motion for summary judgment,
which we now must accept as true, make clear Plaintiff was fired for cause, and not as an
act of retaliation.
2) FMLA Claims
Plaintiff brings two claims pursuant to the FMLA. Her first FMLA claim alleges
that her supervisor illegally interfered with her right to FMLA leave. In support of her
interference claim, Plaintiff cites a note taken by an unnamed employee of Blue Cross
indicating that her supervisor wished to fire her in April 2004 after her next deficient
performance report. Plaintiff argues the FMLA was violated because her supervisor’s
hostility towards her created a “powerful disincentive” to using leave, in violation of the
statute. See 29 CFR § 825.220(b). She also cites her affidavit in claiming that she
requested to work at a reduced rate, and Blue Cross refused in violation of the FMLA.
See 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(D). Neither piece of evidence was properly cited in Plaintiff’s
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response to Blue Cross’s statement of facts. Uncontroverted facts in Blue Cross’s motion
for summary judgment establish that Blue Cross approved nearly every FMLA request
Plaintiff made, and that Blue Cross fired Plaintiff for cause, rather than her repeated
FMLA requests.
Plaintiff also claims that Blue Cross fired her in retaliation for her use of FMLA
leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Plaintiff does not cite any specific evidence
establishing a causal connection between her firing and her use of FMLA leave. She
appears to rest her argument primarily on the e-mail chain that supports her Kansas
workers’ compensation claim, which, as discussed previously, is among the documents
attached to her response to the motion for summary judgment, but not properly cited to
controvert the facts alleged by Blue Cross. In addition, the uncontroverted facts in Blue
Cross’s motion for summary judgment establish that Blue Cross fired Plaintiff for cause.
Accordingly, we must affirm the district court’s finding that “[p]laintiff does not explain,
or point to evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact about whether
plaintiff was terminated because of her August 2004 request for intermittent leave.”
Order Granting Mot. Summ. J., May 16, 2007, at 31.
3) ADA Claims
Plaintiff also asserts ADA claims, alleging that she is disabled under the statute
and Blue Cross discriminated against her by firing her because of her disability. In order
to establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, she must establish that (1) she is a
disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) she is qualified, with or without reasonable
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accommodation to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) she
suffered discrimination by an employer or prospective employer. Bones v. Honeywell,
Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 877-78 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court found that Plaintiff
failed to support her allegation that she is disabled with sufficient evidence. We agree
with the district court’s view and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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