United States v. Thornton

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 12, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 04-6137
v. (D.C. No. 03-CR-145-R)
(W .D. Okla.)
D A RRYL R AY TH O RN TO N ,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before EBEL, M cW ILLIAM S and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
In this direct criminal appeal, Defendant-Appellant Darryl Ray Thornton
challenges his three forty-eight-month sentences for using a telephone to facilitate
a drug conspiracy. The district court ordered these three sentences to run
consecutively, for a total of 144 months’ imprisonment. In imposing this term of
incarceration, the district court, by relying upon court-found facts found by a
preponderance of the evidence to enhance Thornton’s sentences, comm itted
*
This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
constitutional Booker 1 error. Because the Government has failed to show that this
error was harmless, we REM AND for the district court to vacate Thornton’s
sentence and resentence him.
I. B ACKGR OU N D
A jury convicted Thornton on three counts of using a telephone to facilitate
a drug trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), 2 but acquitted
Thornton of conspiring to distribute drugs and possessing drugs w ith the intent to
distribute. 3 4
In calculating Thornton’s sentence, the district court found that he
was responsible for the equivalent of 3,723.3 kilograms of marijuana, which
1
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2
Section 843(b) makes it
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any
communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the
commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision
of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. Each separate use
of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this
subsection. For purposes of this subsection, the term “communication
facility” means any and all public and private instrumentalities used or
useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
of all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other
means of communication.
3
See United States v. Pow ell, 469 U.S. 57, 62, 59-60 (1984) (“Consistency
in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it
were a separate indictment.”)
4
The trial court dismissed another possession count at the G overnment’s
request.
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resulted in a base offense level of thirty-four. 5 The court then enhanced that
offense level by two, to thirty-six, after finding that Thornton played a managerial
role in the offense. An offense level of thirty-six combined with Thornton’s
criminal history score of II resulted in a guideline range of between 210 and 262
months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table. A telephone solicitation
conviction under § 843(b), however, carries a statutory maximum sentence of
only forty-eight months. 6 See 21 U.S.C. § 843(d). In light of that, U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.2(d) required the district court to impose consecutive forty-eight-month
sentences for each of Thornton’s three telephone facilitation convictions,
resulting in a total imprisonment of 144 months. 7 Thornton challenges that
5
The district court applied the 2003 sentencing guidelines to calculate
Thornton’s sentence.
6
The sentencing court rejected the Government’s assertion that Thornton
had a prior state-court conviction that made him subject instead to an eight-year
statutory maximum.
7
“Section 5G1.2 addresses the interplay between statutory maximums and
sentences arrived at through application of the Guidelines in sentencing
multi-count indictments.” U nited States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1242 (10th Cir.
2002), overruled on other grounds by Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Section
5G1.2(d) provides that
[i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory
m aximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed
on one or m ore of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to
the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total
punishment. In all other respects sentences on all counts shall run
concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.
(continued...)
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sentence on several grounds. Having jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we REM AND to the district court
with instructions to vacate Thornton’s sentence and resentence him.
II. STANDA RD O F REVIEW
Even after Booker, this court continues to review the legal determinations
underlying a district court’s sentencing decision de novo and any factual findings
for clear error. See United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006).
Because Thornton, at sentencing, unsuccessfully objected under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the trial court’s enhancing his sentence based
upon a drug quantity found by the sentencing court, this court will review
Thornton’s constitutional challenge to his sentence de novo. See United States v.
Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 775 (2005); see
also United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005)
(assuming Apprendi objection preserved claim alleging non-constitutional Booker
error).
7
(...continued)
Further,
“[t]otal punishment,” as defined in the com mentary to the Guidelines,
means the “combined length of sentences” and “is determined by the
adjusted offense level.” In other words, the “total punishment” is the
sentence arrived at for all counts through application of the Guidelines,
including determination of the base offense levels, application of
grouping provisions, and calculations of other adjustments.
Lott, 310 F.3d at 1242.
-4-
III. ANALYSIS
A. Drug quantity used to calculate Thornton’s base offense level.
The base offense level for a telephone facilitation conviction is governed
by U.S.S.G. § 2D1.6, which directs the district court to apply the base offense
level “applicable to the underlying offense.” The district court therefore applied
the guideline pertaining to drug trafficking, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Section 2D1.1
determines a defendant’s offense level based upon the type and amount of drugs
for w hich he w as responsible. Because Thornton’s offenses involved two
different drugs, crack and marijuana, the district court used § 2D1.1’s
equivalency tables, see § 2D1.1, application note 10, to determine that Thornton
was responsible for the equivalent of 3,723.3 kilograms of marijuana. That
amount of marijuana produced a base offense level of thirty-four. W ith a
two-level increase for Thornton’s role in the offense (the validity of which is
discussed below , in section III.B) and Thornton’s criminal history category of II,
the guideline range was 210-262 months’ imprisonment.
Had the fact finder, instead, determined that Thornton was responsible for
an undetermined amount of crack, his base offense level would have been only
twelve. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.6, application note 1 (noting § 2D1.1 provides for a
minimum base offense level of twelve when the offense involves cocaine or
crack). Adding two levels for Thornton’s role in the offense would have resulted
in an offense level of fourteen; combined with a Category II criminal history,
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Thornton’s guideline range would have been eighteen to twenty-four months. See
U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
Thornton argues that the district court’s finding by a preponderance of the
evidence of the drug quantity on which his sentence was based amounted to
constitutional Booker error. 8 In Booker, the Supreme Court “held that mandatory
application of the [federal sentencing] Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment
when judge-found facts, other than those of prior convictions, are employed to
enhance a sentence.” U nited States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731 (10th
Cir.) (en banc) (citation, quotation, alteration omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
495 (2005). In the wake of Booker, there are two distinct errors that are possible:
constitutional Booker error, which involves the district court using factual
findings it made by a preponderance of the evidence to enhance the defendant’s
sentence; and non-constitutional Booker error, which involves the district court’s
applying the federal sentencing guidelines in a mandatory manner.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731-32 (citations omitted). “A case involving
constitutional error . . . will always involve non-constitutional Booker error as
well.” United States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2005).
8
Because Thornton filed his opening brief in this appeal before the Supreme
Court decided Booker, he asserted this constitutional argument under the
precursor to Booker, Blakely v. W ashington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). But “raising
his Sixth Amendment issue pursuant to Blakely in his opening brief is sufficient
to invoke Booker.” United States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231, 1243 (10th Cir.
2006).
-6-
Thornton first contends that at trial the jury specifically found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he was responsible for no drugs. According to Thornton,
the district court was bound by that determination at sentencing. W e conclude,
however, that the jury did not specifically find that Thornton was responsible for
no amount of drugs.
The verdict form, in setting forth the conspiracy and possession counts on
which the jury acquitted Thornton, did provide spaces w here jurors could indicate
the type and amount of drugs underlying those offenses. In acquitting Thornton
of those charges, the jury left those spaces for drug quantity blank. Thornton
contends that those blank spaces mean that the jury actually found that he had not
been involved with any drugs. But by the very language of the verdict form, the
jurors never had to reach the question of drug quantity. Rather, the verdict form
required jurors to find drug quantity only “[i]f you have found the defendant
Darryl Ray Thornton guilty of the offense of” conspiracy or possession of drugs
with the intent to distribute. Because the jurors did not find Thornton guilty of
any of those offenses, they never had occasion to make a finding as to drug
quantity. And the verdict form did not require the jury to find drug quantity for
the three telephone facilitation charges on which the jury did convict Thornton.
Under these circumstances, then, and presuming as w e must that the jurors
followed the instructions the trial court gave them, see United States v. Almaraz,
-7-
306 F.3d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 2002), the verdict form does not indicate that the
jury specifically found that Thornton was not involved with any drugs at all.
Nevertheless, the district court did commit constitutional Booker error
when it enhanced Thornton’s offense level from twelve to thirty-four based upon
its finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Thornton was responsible for
the equivalent of 3,723.3 kilograms of marijuana. See Brooks, 438 F.3d at 1243.
This error requires resentencing unless the Government can show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that this constitutional error was harmless, see United States v.
W aldroop, 431 F.3d 736, 743 (10th Cir. 2005); that is, that the error did not affect
Thornton’s “substantial rights,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). 9
[T]here are at least two ways that a defendant’s substantial rights may
have been affected in cases of constitutional Booker error [where the
sentence falls within the Guideline range]. First, a defendant’s
substantial rights may be affected if a jury applying a reasonable doubt
standard would not have found the sam e material facts that a judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, a defendant’s
substantial rights may also be affected if there is a reasonable
probability that, under the specific facts of his case as analyzed under
9
Thornton asserts that constitutional Booker error is structural error
requiring resentencing. This court, however, has previously rejected such an
argument. See United States v. Leach, 417 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting argument that constitutional Booker error is structural error); see also
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 734 (holding non-constitutional Booker error is not
structural error).
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the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 10 , the district court would
reasonably impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range.
United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1190 & n.15 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1180, 1377, 2050 (2006) (citation, quotation omitted, and footnote,
emphasis added).
The Government must show that the constitutional Booker error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See W aldroop, 431 F.3d at 743. In cases
where there is only non-constitutional error, this court will instead “review
whether the error was harmless by a preponderance of the evidence.” United
States v. M ontgomery, 439 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2006). But where, as here,
there is constitutional as well as non-constitutional error, this court has applied a
unitary harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when review ing both
aspects of the Booker error; that is, this court has not subdivided the review
standards in those cases between constitutional and non-constitutional error. See
W aldroop, 431 F.3d at 743 (concluding constitutional Booker error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no reason to believe the district
court would impose a different sentence upon remand); see also Small, 423 F.3d
at 1190-91 (reviewing to determine whether preserved constitutional Booker error
10
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides that, in imposing a sentence, the district
court should consider such things as the nature and circumstances of the offense;
the defendant’s history and characteristics; the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense; the need for deterrence, public protection and
rehabilitation; the kinds of sentences available as w ell as the applicable
sentencing guideline range; and the need to provide victims with restitution.
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was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). In this case, the Government has not
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional Booker error was
harmless, that is, that it did not affect Thornton’s substantial rights.
1. W hether a jury w ould find the same drug quantity beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The Government has not shown that, had the jury been asked, it would have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the same drug quantity that the district court
found by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court based its drug
quantity finding on seven transactions: 11
a. M arch 31, 2003.
The district court found that Thornton was responsible for 7.1 grams of
crack he obtained from his co-defendant Kenneth Charles (“K.C.”) Brown on
M arch 31, 2003. At trial, the Government played a recording of two telephone
11
“The Guidelines require a sentencing court to consider ‘relevant conduct’
at sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, including uncharged drug quantities if they
are part of the same conduct for which the defendant was convicted.” United
States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Thornton did not challenge at sentencing, and does not challenge now on appeal,
that these seven transactions are part of the relevant conduct on which his
sentence should be based.
In calculating the relevant drug quantity under the guidelines, U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1 provides that where there is “an agreement to sell a controlled
substance,” the district court can use the amount agreed upon unless “the
defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was not
reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled
substance.” Id., application note 12.
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calls 12 made that night between Thornton’s girlfriend, Elizabeth Lyons, and
Brown, an admitted drug dealer. 13 During the first call, Thornton can be heard in
the background directing Lyons to ask questions and relay information to Brown.
During that call, Lyons tells Brown they need “one of them.” Brown testified that
what Lyons meant by “one of them” w as one-quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams, of
crack. During the second call, Lyons told Brown that Thornton had asked her to
call and see if they could get it now. Brown testified that after that second call,
Thornton came over to Brown’s home that same evening and bought a quarter
ounce of crack. Police officers followed Thornton and were able to verify that he
did briefly go to Brown’s home that night.
The jury found that Thornton had used the telephone on this date to
facilitate a drug transaction, but acquitted him of possessing crack with the intent
to distribute. It may be that jurors acquitted Thornton of possessing the crack
because they did not find Brow n’s testimony credible. 14 It was only Brow n’s
12
Neither party has provided this court with the tapes of the telephone calls
at issue in this case. W e, therefore, rely on the trial testimony describing the
contents of these calls.
13
In this same prosecution, Brown had previously pled guilty to being one
of two leaders of a drug trafficking conspiracy involving cocaine, crack, and
marijuana.
14
Alternatively, jurors may have found that Thornton possessed this amount
of crack, but did not intend to distribute it. There was conflicting evidence
presented at trial on the question of whether Thornton could have been purchasing
this amount of crack for personal use instead of intending to resell it. It was
(continued...)
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testimony that would have supported the jury finding that Thornton actually
obtained any crack that night. Likewise, it was only Brown’s testimony that
would have supported a finding that Thornton’s wanting “one of them” meant that
he was specifically seeking to buy a quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams, of crack. If, as
may be the case, the jury did not find Brown’s testimony credible as to the fact
14
(...continued)
unclear from the evidence whether Thornton even used crack, and if so, how
much he used and with what frequency. The evidence did establish that
Thornton’s girlfriend, Lyons, was a crack addict, but there was again no evidence
as to the frequency and amounts she used. During at least one of the taped
telephone calls, Lyons commented to Brown about how good the stuff was that
Thornton had just obtained from Brown, suggesting that Lyons had used at least
some of the crack Thornton had bought from Brown. Brown testified that a
person could individually use the amount of crack Thornton purchased from him,
although Brown believed Thornton was instead reselling it to his own customers.
On the other hand, several Government witnesses testified that, in their
experience with crack addicts, one-quarter ounce of crack was too large a quantity
for personal use and so Thornton must have been purchasing this amount of crack
for resale. Further, there are several references during the taped telephone calls
indicating that Thornton had customers to whom he was going to sell the crack he
obtained from Brown. The Government, however, was unable to produce any
evidence tending to prove that Thornton actually did resell any of the crack.
The evidence, then, was disputed as to whether or not Thornton could have
himself used all the crack he purportedly purchased from Brown, or instead
whether he resold most of that crack to his own customers. So it may be that the
jury acquitted Thornton of possessing the crack on M arch 31 because the
Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Thornton actually
possessed the crack. On the other hand, the jury may have acquitted Thornton of
possessing the crack with the intent to distribute because the Government failed
to prove that Thornton intended to distribute the crack instead of use it
personally. In light of that ambiguity, the Government cannot meet its burden on
appeal of establishing that a jury, had it been asked, would have found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Thornton obtained 7.1 grams of crack on M arch 31, 2003.
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that Thornton actually bought crack from Brown that night, then there is no
reason to think that the jury would, nevertheless, have found Brown’s testimony
credible as to the amount of crack that was being discussed over the telephone.
At a minimum, then, the evidence is sufficiently equivocal that the Government
cannot establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, had it been asked,
would have found Thornton responsible for a transaction involving 7.1 grams of
crack on this date.
b. April 3, 2003.
The district court next found that Thornton was responsible for a
transaction involving one-quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams, of crack occurring on April
3, 2003. At trial, the Government played recordings of four calls occurring on
this date involving Lyons, Thornton and Brown. According to Brown, during the
first call, Thornton asked to buy some crack, but Brown did not have any
available to sell. 15 Lyons called Brow n twice more that night, on Thornton’s
behalf, to see if Brown had been able to obtain any more crack. All Brown had
available were “rocks,” just pieces of crack in quantities smaller than a quarter
ounce. Brown testified that he went by the Lyons/Thornton residence that night
and sold them w hat crack he had left for $140. (According to Brown, Thornton
15
B row n equivocated throughout his testimony. For example, while Brow n
testified on direct examination that Thornton was calling to see if he could buy
some crack, on cross-examination Brown testified instead that he did not know if
that conversation actually involved crack.
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ordinarily paid $200 for a quarter ounce of crack.) Brown testified on direct
examination that the amount he distributed to Thornton on this night was actually
$300’s worth of crack, which would presumably be more than a quarter ounce;
but on cross-examination, Brown testified instead he sold Thornton less than
one-quarter ounce that night.
Again, it is only Brown’s testimony that indicates that Thornton was
specifically trying to buy a quarter ounce of crack. Further, Brown’s own
testimony is inconsistent as to the amount Brown purportedly sold Thornton.
Therefore, the Government has not shown that a jury would have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Thornton was responsible for a quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams,
of crack on April 3.
c. April 6, 2003.
On April 6, 2003, police intercepted a call between Thornton and Brown,
during which Brown asked Thornton if he had some “green” to sell Brown.
Brown explained at trial that when he used the term green, he meant marijuana.
(Brown testified that he had previously purchased “a little sack” of marijuana
from Thornton, worth $20 to $30.) During this April 6 call, Thornton replied that
he only had a “zip,” or one ounce of marijuana. Thornton went on, however, to
tell Brown that Thornton’s “people w ould be back the following morning” with
more; it would cost $ 425 a pound, if Brown bought five pounds or more; and
Thornton’s people should have between “twenty and eighty.” Brown testified that
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that meant Thornton’s supplier would have between twenty and eighty pounds of
marijuana available to sell the next day. Brown told Thornton he wanted all of it.
It is undisputed, however, that Brown never obtained any marijuana from
Thornton on this occasion, either by buying it directly from Thornton, or having
Thornton broker a transaction between Brown and Thornton’s “people.” Based
upon this call, the jury convicted Thornton of using the telephone to facilitate a
drug transaction. In sentencing Thornton, the district court found that he was
responsible for eighty pounds of marijuana stemming from this telephone call.
In calculating the relevant drug quantity under the guidelines, U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1 provides that where there is “an agreement to sell a controlled
substance,” the district court can use the amount agreed upon unless “the
defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was not
reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled
substance.” Id., application note 12. There appear to be at least two problems
with the evidence supporting a factual finding that Thornton had agreed to, and
was capable of, arranging for Brown to purchase eighty pounds of marijuana.
First, it is not at all clear that Thornton and Brown ever reached an
agreement regarding this marijuana purchase. M ost importantly for our purposes,
Brow n and Thornton never settled on an amount. Rather, they discussed Brow n’s
buying between twenty and eighty pounds, whatever Thornton’s supplier had
available the next day. For that reason, the Government has not shown beyond a
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reasonable doubt that a jury, had it been asked, would have found that Thornton
agreed to provide Brown with eighty pounds of marijuana.
Secondly, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Thornton was
actually capable of providing Brown with that much marijuana. Brown testified
at trial that he had previously bought marijuana from Thornton, but only in much
smaller amounts. Further, Robert Ryan, an agent with the Drug Enforcement
Agency, testified at Thornton’s sentencing hearing that Thornton was always
trying to broker bigger drug deals, but that these deals w ould inevitably fall
through and never actually occur. And while Agent Ryan also testified that he
believed Thornton could have pulled off this deal, the evidence is sufficiently
equivocal such that the Government has not shown that a jury, had it been asked,
would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Thornton was responsible for
eighty pounds of marijuana resulting from this negotiation.
d. April 7, 2003.
The district court also found that Thornton was responsible for 7.1 grams of
crack based upon a call between Lyons and Brown occurring on April 7, 2003.
Several calls involving Lyons, Thornton and Brown occurred on this date. During
one of these calls, Lyons told Brown that Thornton wanted “two.” A ccording to
Brown, that meant Thornton wanted to buy two quarter ounces of crack. In a later
call, Brown told Thornton to come and get it. Brown testified that as a result of
this call, Thornton went to Brown’s residence, where Brown sold Thornton one
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quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams, of crack. It is again only Brown’s testimony, which
the jury may not have found credible, that establishes the amount of crack that he
sold Thornton on that date. In addition, Brown’s own testimony about the amount
is inconsistent. In light of that, there does not appear to be a reasonable
probability that a jury would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Thornton was responsible for one-quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams, of crack on this
date.
e. April 13, 2003.
The district court also found that Thornton was responsible for another 7.1
grams of crack based upon a telephone call occurring on April 13, 2003 between
Thornton and Brown. During this call, Thornton told Brown he was “ready,”
meaning, according to Brown, that Brown should come by with more crack.
Brown testified that later that same day, Brown sold Thornton one-quarter ounce
of crack. Police were able to verify that Brown went to the Lyons/Thornton
residence briefly on that date. But at trial, the jury acquitted Thornton both of
using a telephone on this date to facilitate a drug transaction and of possessing
crack with the intent to distribute. It appears clear, then, that the jury, had it been
asked, would not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Thornton was
responsible for 7.1 grams of crack on this date. 16
16
Of course, on remand, the district court, treating the Guidelines as only
advisory, may still find sentencing facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See
(continued...)
- 17 -
f. April 22, 2003.
The district court found that Thornton was responsible for one ounce of
crack on this date, based upon a telephone conversation between Thornton and
Brown. According to Brown, during this call, Thornton wanted to buy an ounce
of crack on behalf of “Richard,” who would pay $800 for that ounce. Again, the
only evidence of the quantity involved in this transaction comes from Brown, who
the jury may not have found to be credible. Further, although Brown testified at
trial that Thornton was trying to buy an entire ounce of crack, four times what
Brown asserted Thornton would ordinarily buy, Brown had previously told police
that he had never sold Thornton more than a quarter ounce of crack at any one
time. In light of this equivocal evidence and the jury’s possible disbelief of
Brown’s testimony, the Government has not shown that a jury would have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Thornton was responsible one ounce of crack on
this date.
g. April 23 and 24, 2003.
The district court found that Thornton was responsible for 4.5 ounces of
crack stemming from a series of telephones calls occurring over this two-day
16
(...continued)
United States v. Dalton, 409 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005). And in making
those sentencing findings, the district court is not bound by the jury’s acquittal
verdict, made under “the more onerous reasonable doubt standard.” United States
v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 920 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 683-85 (10th Cir.) (applying United States v. W atts,
519 U.S. 148 (1997), post-Booker), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 468 (2005).
- 18 -
period of time. According to Brown, these telephone conversations focused on
Thornton’s attempts to purchase, for someone else, nine ounces of crack, a much
larger amount than Brown had ever before sold Thornton. Brown told Thornton
he did not have that much readily available, but to check back with him later.
Brown was eventually able to acquire nine ounces of crack, but was only willing
to sell Thornton half of that amount, or 4.5 grams. Ultimately, Thornton bought
only his usual one-quarter ounce.
The district court, nevertheless, found that Thornton was responsible for
4.5 ounces of crack. Once again, however, this amount is based only upon
Brow n’s testimony, which the jury may have found to be incredible generally. In
addition, Brown testified that he had previously told police he had never sold
Thornton any amount of crack larger than a quarter ounce at any one time. Even
assuming this deal was originally for nine, and then later 4.5 ounces, of crack,
and although the substance of the conversations indicates it was actually Brown
who was having trouble finding enough crack to conduct this transaction, the
evidence is disputed as to whether Thornton himself could have actually
conducted this transaction. According to Brow n, Thornton had never before
purchased this much crack. And when Brown eventually offered to sell Thornton
at least 4.5 ounces, Thornton backed down and just bought what Brown
characterized as Thornton’s usual amount–one-quarter ounce. Further, although
Thornton told Brow n that he intended to show this quarter ounce to his customers
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to determine if they were still interested in buying more, there is no indication
that Thornton ever tried to conduct or broker a later sale. Again, based upon the
equivocal nature of this evidence, the Government cannot show that a jury would
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Thornton was responsible for 4.5
ounces of crack stemming from this two-day transaction.
h. Conclusion.
The district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Thornton
was responsible for the equivalent of 3,723.3 kilograms of marijuana, based upon
the above-referenced seven incidents. However, because of the disputed and
tenuous nature of the evidence supporting that drug quantity, the Government is
unable to show on appeal that a jury would have found these same sentencing
facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial court’s constitutional
Booker error did affect Thornton’s substantial rights and he is entitled to
resentencing.
2. W hether the district court, now treating the G uidelines as
advisory and considering 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s factors, is
likely on remand to impose a sentence outside the guideline
range.
Although we need not further address whether the district court, in treating
the guidelines as advisory and considering § 3553(a)’s factors, would on remand
impose a sentence outside the guideline range, see Small, 423 F.3d at 1190-91(noting “[t]his court need not even reach the second . . . alternative if it concludes
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that a jury likely would not have found the quantity of drugs required for [the
defendant’s] sentence beyond a reasonable doubt”), there is a reasonable
probability that the court would do so on remand.
Among the § 3553(a) factors that the district court will have to consider on
remand are the need to avoid sentencing disparity among similarly historied
defendants, the need to promote respect for the law and to provide just
punishment, the kinds of sentences available, and the nature of the offense. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (3), (6). Under the mandatory guideline regime,
the district court had to impose Thornton’s three sentences consecutively,
resulting in a 144-month term of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d). On
remand, however, this will not be required since the Guidelines are no longer
mandatory. Further, while the jury at trial acquitted Thornton of being a part of
Brown’s drug trafficking conspiracy and of possessing any crack with the intent
to distribute it, Brown, the admitted leader of that conspiracy, received a
146-month sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute drugs. The
fact that both Thornton and Brown received practically the same sentence whereas
arguably Brown was more culpable may provide a basis under the § 3553(a)
factors for the district court to resentence Thornton outside the advisory guideline
range, although the sentencing calculation may take into account each of these
men’s prior convictions, the fact that Brown pled guilty, accepting responsibility
for his offenses, and cooperated with the Government by testifying against his
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co-defendants. Therefore, because there is a reasonable probability that the
district court, on remand, will impose a lighter sentence outside the advisory
guideline range, Thornton is entitled to resentencing on this basis as w ell.
3. Conclusion.
The Government has failed to show that the constitutional Booker error
occurring during Thornton’s sentencing did not affect his substantial rights.
Therefore, Thornton is entitled to be resentenced. Because, on remand, the
district court will still have to consider the advisory Guidelines before imposing a
new sentence, we will address Thornton’s remaining issues. 17
B. Role in the offense.
Thornton argues that the district court erred in denying him a decrease in
his offense level because he played only a m inimal or minor role in the offense.
The district court, instead of decreasing Thornton’s offense level, actually
increased it by two after finding, instead, that Thornton played a managerial or
supervisory role in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The district court based
this two-level increase on the court’s finding that Thornton directed Lyons to
17
Thornton argues that applying the remedial Booker holding, requiring the
district court on remand to treat the G uidelines as advisory, will violate Ex Post
Facto principles; that is, Thornton asserts that he is “entitled to the benefit of
[Booker’s] Sixth Amendment holding . . . , but cannot be disadvantaged by
retroactive application of [its] remedial opinion.” W e have, however, previously
rejected such an argument. See United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1089 (2006).
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make some of the calls to Brown on Thornton’s behalf. 18 See U.S.S.G § 3B1.2(a)
and (b). Thornton now argues that the district court’s factual finding that
Thornton did not play a minimal or minor role was clearly erroneous. See United
States v. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 2003) (reviewing
district court’s refusal to apply downward adjustment for defendant’s role in the
offense for clear error). W e disagree.
Section 3B1.2 “provides a range of adjustments for a defendant who plays a
part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the
average participant.” Id., application note 3(A). The four-level decrease for one
who is a minimal participant applies to
defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved
in the conduct of the group. Under this provision, the defendant’s lack
of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the
enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as
minimal participant. It is intended that the downward adjustment for a
minimal participant will be used infrequently.
18
On appeal, Thornton argues that the district court, in finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that Thornton played a managerial role in the
offense and then using that finding to enhance his offense level, again comm itted
constitutional Booker error. W e agree. But because Thornton did not raise an
Apprendi objection to this enhancement at sentencing, we review this
constitutional error only for plain error. See United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d
1162, 1212 (10th Cir. 2006). And because, as discussed below, there is plenty of
evidence in the record from which a jury would have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Thornton played a managerial role, Thornton is not able to meet his
burden, under a plain-error analysis, of establishing that this constitutional
Booker error affected his substantial rights. See id.- 23 -
Id., application note 4. And the two-level decrease in an offense level for a
defendant who is a minor participant applies “to a defendant . . . who is less
culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as
minimal.” 19 Id., application note 5. “A defendant has the burden of establishing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to a reduction in his base
offense level under § 3B1.2.” Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d at 1131 (quotation,
alteration omitted).
The focus of the inquiry concerning a defendant’s role in the offense is on
“the defendant’s knowledge or lack thereof concerning the scope and structure of
the enterprise and of the activities of others in the offense.” United States v.
Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d 1271, 1277 (10th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 859 (2004). Further, “[a] defendant is not entitled to a minimal
participant adjustment if he plays a ‘significant role’ in facilitating a drug
trafficking scheme,” including orchestrating the sale of drugs. Virgen-Chavarin,
350 F.3d at 1131. “The defendant’s own assertion that he was a minimal
participant is not enough to overcome the clearly erroneous standard.” Id.In this case, the evidence indicated that Thornton made numerous telephone
calls arranging drug transactions in which he was, at times, both the buyer and the
19
In this case, even a two-level reduction would have significantly affected
Thornton’s offense level because § 2D1.1(a)(3) provides that if “the defendant
receives an adjustment under § 3B1.2 (M itigating Role), the base offense level
under this subsection shall not be more than level 30.” (Emphasis in original.)
Thornton’s base offense level, instead, was thirty-four.
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seller, or at least the broker of a potential sale. Even when it was Lyons, rather
than Thornton, who called Brown to arrange a drug transaction, the evidence
indicated either that Thornton was in the background directing Lyons’s
conversation with Brown, or that Thornton had asked Lyons to make the call on
his behalf. And the drug transactions resulting from Lyons’s calls were always
conducted between Brown and Thornton. In light of this evidence, we cannot
conclude that the district court’s finding that Thornton was more than a minimal
or minor participant was clearly erroneous.
IV . C ON CLU SIO N
For these reasons, we REM AND this case to the district court with
directions to VACATE Thornton’s sentence and resentence him.
Entered for the Court
David M . Ebel
Circuit Judge
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