Benton v. Town of South Fork

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 24, 2014
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DENNY BENTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-1127
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02668-LTB)
TOWN OF SOUTH FORK; RANDY
HERRERA, Former Police Chief; (D. Colo.)
JAMES CHAVEZ, Current Police
Chief; SHARON FAIRCHILD, Acting
Town Manager and Clerk; TODD
WRIGHT, Former Town Manager;
LARRY HEERSINK, Former Mayor;
BILL MATTHEWS, Town Manager;
GROVER HAWTHORN, Trustee;
COLORADO STATE PATROL
DISPATCH ALAMOSA,
COLORADO; PAM STEWART,
Police Officer; JOHN CROSS;
SARAH COOK,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Denny Benton is a former police officer who was forced to resign from
the Police Department for the Town of South Fork. In the amended complaint, he
*
This order and judgment does not constitute precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R.
32.1(A).
alleges race discrimination, age discrimination, retaliation, legal malpractice,
defamation, and failure to release records. The district court summarily dismissed
the action.
Mr. Benton appeals and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We grant
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In the appeal, we affirm in part and remand in
part. We affirm the dismissal on the claims involving race discrimination, age
discrimination, and retaliation. The court failed to acknowledge state claims
under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act and the Colorado Open Records Act.
But, these claims were facially deficient; thus, any error in failing to address these
claims would not have been prejudicial. We would be left with two state-law
claims not discussed by the district court: legal malpractice and defamation. We
remand for the district court to address these claims in the first instance.
The Appeal
I. Preliminary Review
On screening, the district court had to determine whether the amended
complaint stated a claim on which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In addition, the district court could address Eleventh
Amendment immunity even if the issue had not been raised. See United States ex
rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 2008).
Our review is de novo. See Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th
Cir. 2009) (failure to state a valid claim); Chamber of Commerce of United States
2
v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 760 (10th Cir. 2010) (Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
II. The Police Department’s Status
In the caption of the amended complaint, Mr. Benton includes the town’s
police department as a separate defendant. Third Am. Compl. at 1. But Mr.
Benton twice omitted the police department when listing the defendants. Id. at 2,
6.
The district court did not treat the police department as a separate party.
Mr. Benton challenges this omission, arguing that the court should have
considered the police department as a party.
Even if the court erred, the error would not have been prejudicial because
the police department “is not a separate suable entity.” Martinez v. Winner, 771
F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds, 778 F.2d 553 (10th
Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, Tyus v. Martinez, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986).
Thus, even if the district court should have considered the police department a
defendant, the error would not have mattered. As a defendant, the police
department would have been entitled to dismissal for failure to state a valid claim.
3
III. The Colorado State Patrol Dispatch
The claims against the Colorado State Patrol Dispatch were summarily
dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The dismissal was proper. The Patrol Dispatch is an arm of the state; as a
result, the entity enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Sturdevant v.
Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Colorado State
Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education enjoys Eleventh
Amendment immunity as an arm of the state). With immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Colorado State Patrol Dispatch was entitled to dismissal.
Mr. Benton complains that the Patrol Dispatch had not invoked the Eleventh
Amendment. Pl.’s Opening Br. at 19-20. But, as discussed above, this issue can
be raised sua sponte.
IV. The Claims
A. Race Discrimination
In the amended complaint, Mr. Benton alleges race discrimination. There
are two potential sources for a race-discrimination claim: Title VII and the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
1. Title VII
We know that Mr. Benton intended to invoke Title VII, for he referred to
this statute in the heading of the amended complaint. But he does not say who he
is suing for the race discrimination.
4
We can fairly assume that Mr. Benton intended to sue the Town of South
Fork for the race discrimination because:
! Title VII authorizes suit against an employer, and
! the town served as Mr. Benton’s employer.
See Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993). 1
But Mr. Benton had already sued the town under Title VII—and the claim
was dismissed with prejudice. Final Judgment, Benton v. Town of South Fork,
Case No. 12-cv-336-CMA-KMT (D. Colo. 2013), ECF 110. This dismissal was
affirmed on appeal. Benton v. Town of South Fork, 553 F. App’x 772 (10th Cir.
2014) (unpublished).
With affirmance of the dismissal with prejudice, Mr. Benton cannot refile
the same action. That, after all, is what the designation “with prejudice” means.
See Styskal v. Weld Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 365 F.3d 855, 859 (10th Cir.
2004).
Mr. Benton argues on appeal that the court lacked jurisdiction in the prior
action because he had not yet received a right-to-sue letter by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
The district court had jurisdiction in the prior suit. In challenging
jurisdiction over that suit, Mr. Benton states that the EEOC issued a right-to-sue
1
In the amended complaint, Mr. Benton alleges that “Defendant is an
employer within the meaning of Title VII.” Third Am. Compl. at 2. But there are
twelve defendants named in the amended complaint. Id. at 1-2.
5
letter on July 1, 2013, and that by then, the prior action had already been
dismissed. See Final Judgment, Benton v. Town of South Fork, Case No. 12-cv-
336-CMA-KMT (D. Colo. 2013), ECF 110. But, he had filed the EEOC claim on
July 18, 2011. 2 Once 180 days expired without a response, the district court
acquired jurisdiction. See EEOC v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 347 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2003). Thus, the district court had jurisdiction in the prior suit even though
the EEOC had not yet issued a right-to-sue letter.
But the town was not the only defendant on the Title VII claim. Mr. Benton
also sued eight fellow employees of the town: Randy Herrera, James Chavez,
Sharon Fairchild, Todd Wright, Larry Heersink, Bill Mathews, Grover Hawthorn,
and Pam Stewart. None of these individuals functioned as the actual employer, for
that role was carried out by the town. See Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899,
901 (10th Cir. 1996). As a result, the district court properly dismissed the Title
VII claims against the eight town employees.
Mr. Benton also argues that the eight employees are being sued (in part) in
their official capacities. This argument has two shortcomings. First, there is
nothing in the amended complaint to suggest official-capacity claims. Second,
any official-capacity claims would have served as the equivalent of a claim against
2
He filed the claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, not the EEOC.
But, the Colorado Civil Rights Division and the EEOC have a worksharing
agreement. Under that agreement, the Colorado Civil Rights Division would have
transmitted the document to the EEOC for filing. See Rodriguez v. Wet Ink, LLC,
603 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 2013).
6
their mutual employer: the Town of South Fork. See Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d
1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009) (“To the extent [the plaintiff] brings a claim against
Beggs in his official capacity, it is the same as bringing a suit against the
county.”). And, as noted above, virtually identical claims against the town had
already been dismissed with prejudice. Thus, Mr. Benton cannot renew these
claims under the guise that he is asserting new official-capacity claims against the
eight town employees.
2. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act
The federal district court did not address a claim under the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act. The omission was understandable, for Mr. Benton never
mentioned this statute. But, we must liberally construe the amended complaint in
light of Mr. Benton’s pro se status. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972) (per curiam). And race discrimination is prohibited by the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (as well as by Title VII). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-
402(1)(a).
A race-discrimination claim under the Colorado law was plainly
insufficient. Under the Colorado law, Mr. Benton had to plead facts suggesting
circumstances that would have allowed a reasonable inference of race
discrimination. See George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1198
(Colo. 1997). But, Mr. Benton does not identify his race or suggest any facts that
7
would allow a reasonable inference of race discrimination. Thus, a race-
discrimination claim under the Colorado law was facially insufficient.
B. Age Discrimination
Mr. Benton has also alleged age discrimination. There are two potential
sources for a claim involving age discrimination: the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
In the earlier suit, Mr. Benton invoked the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act in the suit against the Town of South Fork. The claim was
dismissed with prejudice, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Final
Judgment, Benton v. Town of South Fork, Case No. 12-cv-336-CMA-KMT (D.
Colo. 2013), ECF 110; Benton v. Town of South Fork, 553 F. App’x 772, 778-83
(10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). With affirmance of the dismissal with prejudice,
Mr. Benton could not refile the same claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Thus, in the present action, the claim against the Town of South
Fork was properly dismissed.
As noted above, eight other town employees are being sued. But, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act can only be asserted against the employer,
which consisted of the town rather than the fellow employees. See Butler v.
Prairie Village, Kansas, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that
individual supervisors cannot incur liability under the Americans with Disabilities
8
Act, relying in part on cases interpreting the “employer” requirement in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
2. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act
The federal district court addressed the claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, but not the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. As discussed
above in the context of the race-discrimination claim, omission of the Colorado
claim was understandable because the Colorado law was never mentioned in the
amended complaint. But, we must liberally construe the pro se complaint to
encompass the state law claim, as well as the federal claim. See George v. Ute
Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Colo. App. 1997) (“[T]he federal
counterpart to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act is the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967.”).
Though the district court did not address the state-law claim, it was facially
invalid. A prima facie case would require circumstances allowing a reasonable
inference of age discrimination. See id. at 1198. No such allegations appear in the
amended complaint. Mr. Benton does not say how old he is or mention anything
that would suggest adverse treatment based on his age.
In the amended complaint, he states only that he was told that a man his age
should be looking for a different career. Third Am. Compl. at 3, 9. But, Mr.
Benton does not say:
! whether this reference suggests youth or old age, or
9
! how this comment related to his termination.
This single allegation is not enough to state a claim on which relief can be granted
under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. See Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d
1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999), abrogated in part on other grounds, Eisenhour v.
Weber Cnty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 2014). Thus, the district court’s
omission of the claim does not warrant reversal. Though the state-law cause of
action should have been discussed, it would not have survived any meaningful
scrutiny for failure to state a valid claim.
C. Retaliation
Mr. Benton alleges that the defendants retaliated against him because he had
been sued by an arrestee. In the prior suit, the arrestee alleged that his civil rights
had been violated by Mr. Benton (as a police officer for the town).
This allegation does not suggest a constitutional violation against Mr.
Benton. A constitutional violation could take place, for example, if Mr. Benton
had engaged in protected activity and suffered retaliation as a result. See, e.g.,
Cillo v. City of Greenwood Village, 739 F.3d 451, 460-61 (10th Cir. 2013). But,
Mr. Benton does not allege that he engaged in any activity protected by the
constitution. He arrested someone, and that person claimed that his civil rights
had been violated by Mr. Benton. In turn, Mr. Benton denies any wrongdoing and
alleges that he was terminated because of criticism growing out of the suit. Third
10
Am. Compl. at 3-4. If this allegation is interpreted as a retaliation claim, it would
be missing an essential element: retaliation for a protected activity.
The filing of lawsuits constitutes protected speech. See Van Deelen v.
Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 2007). But here the lawsuit was filed
against Mr. Benton, not by him. This scenario would not be actionable as
retaliation for protected speech by Mr. Benton. As a result, the claim was properly
dismissed.
D. Legal Malpractice
When Mr. Benton was sued, the town provided for a defense through its
insurer. The insurer provided two attorneys at different times: John Cross and
Sarah Cook. Mr. Benton complains about the quality of their work.
Our task is to identify the pertinent legal theory. The district court
characterized the legal theory as one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then dismissed the
claim because the attorneys were not state actors. This characterization is
questionable. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel, but Mr. Benton was not a criminal defendant. He was a
civil defendant. And civil defendants ordinarily have no constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th
Cir. 2006); Cullins v. Crouse, 348 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1965). 3
3
The only exception involves immigration cases. See Nelson, 446 F.3d at
1120.
11
If Mr. Benton had intended to assert a constitutional claim based on the
attorneys’ handling of the civil suit, dismissal would have been necessary. But we
have little reason to characterize the claim this way. Mr. Benton did not suggest a
constitutional claim, and a constitutional theory would not fit the allegation.
Mr. Benton’s allegation more easily fits a cause of action for legal
malpractice. But the district court did not expressly acknowledge the existence of
a cause of action for legal malpractice. Though the omission was understandable,
we conclude that the legal malpractice claim should have been discussed. 4
Accordingly, we remand for consideration of state-law claims against Mr. Cross
and Ms. Cook for legal malpractice.
E. Defamation
Mr. Benton alleges defamation by Mr. Herrera, Mr. Chavez, Ms. Fairchild,
and Mr. Wright. 5 Third Am. Compl. at 3, 7, 29, 31-32.
The district court did not discuss a defamation claim under state law. The
omission was understandable in light of the length of the amended complaint and
4
Instead, the court stated that if Mr. Benton had intended a legal malpractice
claim, he should have filed in state court because of the absence of diversity
jurisdiction. Order of Dismissal at 13, Benton v. Town of South Fork, Case No.
12-cv-336-BNB (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2014), ECF 15.
5
Mr. Benton asserted similar claims against Mr. Herrera and Mr. Chavez in
the earlier suit. Third Am. Compl. at 29, Benton v. Town of South Fork, Case No.
12-cv-336-BNB (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2012), ECF 9. But these claims were
dismissed without prejudice. Order Adopting & Affirming February 12, 2013
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge at 13-14, Benton v. Town of
South Fork, Case No. 12-cv-336-CMA-KMT (D. Colo. 2013), ECF 109.
12
the failure to identify the causes of action. But as discussed above, federal courts
must liberally construe the amended complaint because Mr. Benton wrote the
document pro se. Liberally construed, the amended complaint includes a
defamation claim. 6
We believe that the district court should consider this claim in the first
instance. As a result, we remand for consideration of state-law claims for
defamation against Mr. Herrera, Mr. Chavez, Ms. Fairchild, and Mr. Wright.
F. Equal Pay Act
In his appellate brief, Mr. Benton asserts claims under the Equal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). This statute prohibits discriminatory pay based on gender.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1363-
64 (10th Cir. 1997). There is nothing in the amended complaint that would
suggest less pay to Mr. Benton based on the fact that he was a male. As a result,
we decline to reverse based on the existence of a claim under the Equal Pay Act.
G. Failure to Release Records
In the amended complaint, Mr. Benton complains about an inability to
obtain his records from some of the defendants. Third Am. Compl. at 3, 27-28.
6
The district court apparently realized that Mr. Benton might have intended
to assert a state-law claim of defamation. See Order of Dismissal at 8, Benton v.
Town of South Fork, 1:3-cv-02668-LTB (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2014), ECF 15 (noting
an allegation of libel and slander, adding that “[i]t is not clear whether Plaintiff
asserts these claims pursuant to state law only”).
13
Mr. Benton does not identify a cause of action; but because he is pro se, we
liberally construe the amended complaint to discern a relevant legal theory.
The only conceivable theory involves a violation of the Colorado Open
Records Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-206. This theory was not acknowledged by
the district court. But the omission was not prejudicial, for no private right of
action exists under the Colorado Open Records Act. McDonald v. Miller, 945 F.
Supp. 2d 1201, 1205 (D. Colo. 2013). As a result, we cannot fault the district
court for failing to consider a meritless claim under the Act.
V. The Remaining Claims
Two state-law claims survive: defamation and legal malpractice. The
federal district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over any state-law claims
because diversity was lacking. But the court had the discretion to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
If the district court had recognized the state-law claims of defamation and
malpractice, we might have assumed that the district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. See Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1275
(10th Cir. 2007) (assuming that the district court declined supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims), vacated on other grounds, 555 U.S. 1210
(2009); Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1155 n.6
(10th Cir. 2001) (assuming that the district court declined supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims). But the district court did not expressly
14
acknowledge the state-law claims of defamation and legal malpractice. We cannot
assume that the court made a conscious decision on how to rule on claims that
were not expressly acknowledged. See Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180
F.3d 409, 419 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that when a state-law claim had not been
discussed, the district court should have said if its failure to discuss the claim
simply reflected a choice to decline supplemental jurisdiction). As a result, we
must remand for the district court to address the state-law claims of defamation
and legal malpractice.
VI. Disposition
We affirm the dismissal on the federal claims involving race discrimination,
age discrimination, and retaliation. We note that the district court did not address
the claims involving the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act and the Colorado Open
Records Act. These claims are facially deficient; thus, the district court’s failure
to consider these claims was not prejudicial. And, we reject Mr. Benton’s new
theory involving the Equal Pay Act. Nonetheless, we must remand for the district
court to address the state-law claims involving defamation and legal malpractice.
Remaining Defendants
The defendants remaining on the defamation claim are Mr. Herrera, Mr.
Chavez, Ms. Fairchild, and Mr. Wright. The defendants remaining on the legal
malpractice claim are Mr. Cross and Ms. Cook.
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In Forma Pauperis
Mr. Benton lacks enough money to pay the filing fee. Thus, we grant leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
16