United States v. Hahn

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 14, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 04-2344 & 05-2033
(D.C. Nos. CIV-04-44-JP/ACT
M A RCUS H A H N , & CR -00-82-JP)
(D . N.M .)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before B ROR B Y and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and KANE, ** District Judge.
M arcus Hahn appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for
sentencing relief. He also challenges the transfer to this court of various post-
dismissal motions. W e affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
B ACKGROUND
W hile executing a search warrant on Hahn’s residence, police found
firearms and marijuana plants. Following a jury trial, Hahn was convicted on
four counts: manufacturing marijuana; maintaining a place to manufacture,
distribute and use marijuana; possessing a firearm in furtherance of
manufacturing marijuana; and possessing a firearm in furtherance of maintaining
a place to manufacture, distribute and use marijuana. Hahn’s twenty-five year
consecutive sentence for the second firearm offense forms the basis of this appeal.
Hahn was sentenced under former 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000):
(A) . . . any person who, during and in relation to any . . . drug
trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance
of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such . . . crime . . .
(B) . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10
years [if the firearm is a semiautomatic assault w eapon] . . . .
(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, the person shall— (i) be sentenced to a term of
imprisonm ent of not less than 25 years.
(Emphasis added.) Hahn appealed to this court. He argued that his conviction for
possessing a firearm in furtherance of maintaining a place to manufacture
marijuana could not qualify as a second or subsequent conviction to his
conviction for possessing a firearm in furtherance of manufacturing marijuana.
He reasoned that, because the underlying drug crimes “were coterminous in space
and time,” Aplt. App. at 77, it would be “an absurdity to declare that the
possession of a gun in furtherance of the marijuana grow is one offense, and that
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the possession of the same (or even of a different) gun in furtherance of using
one’s residence to grow marijuana is a ‘second or subsequent’ offense,” id. at 78.
Hahn characterized the statute as ambiguous and sought application of the rule of
lenity. Id. at 81. In affirming, we cited prior precedent that “‘consecutive
sentences may be imposed for multiple 924(c) counts if the offenses underlying
each 924(c) count do not constitute a single offense for double jeopardy
purposes.’” United States v. Hahn, 38 F. App’x. 553, 555 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 461 (10th Cir. 1992)). W e
indicated that there was no double jeopardy problem because Hahn’s drug
convictions were for separate and distinct wrongs. Id. W e were not persuaded
that the time-space overlap between the drug offenses meant that there was only
one firearm offense. W e noted prior precedent that a second or subsequent
§ 924(c) conviction may arise from “a single criminal episode.” Hahn, 38 F.
App’x at 555 (citing United States v. Rom ero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1137 (10th Cir.
1997), and United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir. 1993)). Hahn
unsuccessfully sought rehearing en banc and certiorari.
In January 2004, Hahn moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that double jeopardy bars multiple
§ 924(c)(1) firearm convictions “based on multiple predicate offenses w hich are
factually inseparable in terms of time, space and underlying conduct,” Aplt. App.
at 17, and that § 924(c)(1) contains a number of ambiguities, requiring application
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of the rule of lenity. Hahn claimed that these arguments were not raised on
appeal and that they were not raised because his counsel was ineffective. The
district court dismissed the motion on M ay 12, 2004, finding Hahn’s arguments
procedurally barred and lacking in merit.
On M ay 20, 2004, Hahn moved for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e), disputing that his double jeopardy claim had been resolved on direct appeal
and re-arguing precedent from the Fifth Circuit. On June 7, Hahn moved to
amend his § 2255 motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to include evidence that the
state judge who authorized the search warrant in this case had been arrested for
drunk driving and possessing a controlled substance. On July 13, Hahn filed
another motion to amend, arguing that only the jury, and not the judge, had
authority to determine whether his conviction for possessing a firearm in
furtherance of maintaining a place to manufacture marijuana was a “second or
subsequent conviction” under § 924(c)(1)(C). The district court treated the
motions as successive attempts to secure § 2255 relief and transferred them to this
court.
Hahn appealed. W e issued a certificate of appealability to consider Hahn’s
§ 924(c)(1) issues.
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D ISCUSSION
“W e review the district court’s legal rulings on a § 2255 motion de novo
and its findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792,
796 (10th Cir. 2006).
I. The Rule of Lenity
“If a statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity indicates that courts should
interpret it in favor of the defendant.” United States v. M ichel, 446 F.3d 1122,
1135 (10th Cir. 2006). Lenity is only available, however, if “there is a grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of a provision.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
H ahn argues that “it is not clear that Congress intended to prescribe two
punishm ents for the unitary possession of a firearm in furtherance of two
predicate drug trafficking offenses that were spatially and temporally co-
extensive.” Aplt. Br. at 20. But Hahn made that same argument during his direct
appeal, and we rejected it, stating that § 924(c)(1)’s sentencing enhancement
applies “even if possession of a firearm occurs in connection with a single
criminal episode.” Hahn, 38 F. App’x at 555. A § 2255 motion generally cannot
be used, absent an intervening change in circuit law, to raise an argument that was
resolved on direct appeal. United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir.
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1989). 1 Hahn does not claim in his appellate brief any change in this circuit’s law
that would justify revisiting the ambiguity issue in this case.
II. Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits “(1) a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same
offense.” Warnick v. Booher, 425 F.3d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations
omitted). Hahn states, without any discussion or analysis, that “imposing two,
consecutive sentences” violates “his right to be free from being placed twice in
jeopardy for the same offense of carrying a firearm.” Aplt. Br. at 44. A litigant
who mentions a point in passing but fails to support it with pertinent authority
generally forfeits the point. United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1115 n.6
1
Hahn seeks to avoid the procedural bar by characterizing his present
ambiguity argument as a challenge to § 924(c)(1)(A ) and his former ambiguity
argument as a challenge to § 924(c)(1)(C). But no such distinction appeared in
his direct appeal brief. And while this court announced the general issue on
direct appeal as whether one of H ahn’s firearm convictions could be treated as a
“second or subsequent conviction,” Hahn, 38 F. App’x at 554 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(C)), the court’s analysis did not involve that language. Rather, the
court’s analysis focused on the “the underlying drug crimes,” id., unmistakably
referring to § 924(c)(1)(A ). M oreover, the Second Circuit case Hahn presently
describes as “succinctly explain[ing] the distinct basis for [the] 2255 motion,”
Aplt. Br. at 24, was the centerpiece of Hahn’s ambiguity argument on direct
appeal, Aplt. App. at 78-81 (citing United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199 (2d Cir.
2001)). As far as we can tell, H ahn’s ambiguity arguments are identical.
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(10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). M oreover, Hahn’s double jeopardy point is
procedurally barred, either because it w as resolved on direct appeal, see
Prichard, 875 F.2d at 791, or because Hahn failed to mention it in his direct
appeal brief, see United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 341 (10th Cir. 1996). Despite
Hahn’s failure to make a double jeopardy argument on direct appeal, this court
reached the issue in deciding whether § 924(c)(1) supported Hahn’s second
firearm sentence. See Hahn, 38 F. App’x at 555.
Hahn attempts to avoid only the Cox bar. Assuming that we may overlook
the Prichard bar on the basis that such a bar cannot be imposed without the
litigant presenting the issue that is decided on direct appeal, Hahn may avoid the
Cox procedural bar by showing cause and prejudice, as from ineffective assistance
of counsel, or by showing a fundamental miscarriage of justice if the claim is not
considered. Cox, 83 F.3d at 341. Hahn argues that his appellate counsel was
ineffective.
In order to prevail, Hahn must demonstrate that his counsel’s failure to
argue double jeopardy on direct appeal was deficient performance and prejudicial.
See M allicoat v. M ullin, 426 F.3d 1241, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2356 (2006). The omission of a meritless issue on appeal will not
constitute deficient performance. Cargle v. M ullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th
Cir. 2003) If Hahn’s counsel on direct appeal had asserted a double jeopardy
challenge, it would have failed under Sturmoski, 971 F.2d at 461, which upheld
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two convictions for possessing only one firearm in the course of (1) maintaining a
place to manufacture drugs and (2) attempting to manufacture drugs. In
Sturmoski, this court reasoned that because Congress intended multiple
convictions and punishments for the two underlying drug crimes, two consecutive
§ 924(c)(1) sentences could be imposed without subjecting the defendant to
double jeopardy, “even though the underlying offenses [arose] out of the same
criminal episode and even though the same gun [was] paired with each underlying
offense.” Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, Hahn did not receive ineffective
assistance of counsel and he cannot avoid the Cox procedural bar.
III. Evidentiary Hearing
Hahn argues that the district court abused its discretion by resolving his
§ 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. W e disagree. A hearing is not
required if, as in this case, “the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
IV. Second or Successive § 2255 Motions
Hahn contends that the district court abused its discretion in construing his
motion for reconsideration and motions to amend as second or successive § 2255
motions. W e disagree.
A post-judgment motion must be treated as second or successive— and
certified by an appellate panel— if it asserts or reasserts a substantive claim to set
aside the movant’s conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2648,
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2651 (2005) (deciding the extent to which a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion filed in
a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding should be considered a second or successive
habeas petition); United States v. Scott, 414 F.3d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 2005)
(extending Gonzalez to § 2255 motions). On the other hand, if the post-judgment
motion challenges the integrity of the § 2255 proceedings, then it is not second or
successive. See Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2648.
Hahn’s motion for reconsideration expressed disagreement with the district
court’s reasoning. Hahn’s motions to amend presented new grounds for relief.
W e conclude that all three motions qualified as second or successive and were
properly referred to this court. See United States v. Lam bros, 404 F.3d 1034,
1036-37 (8th Cir.) (concluding that a R ule 59(e) motion was subject to
precertification because it “sought ultimately to resurrect the denial of [the]
earlier § 2255 motion”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2953 (2005); United States v.
Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 503 (10th Cir. 2000) (approving district court’s
treatment of a supplemental § 2255 motion as second or successive, rather than as
an amendment, where the motion could not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c) because it raised new claims). The “bar against successive § 2255
petitions” may not be avoided “by simply styling a petition under a different
name.” United States v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2002). 2
2
Hahn does not argue that any of the points raised in his motions to
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
W ade Brorby
Circuit Judge
2
(...continued)
reconsider or amend are certifiable as either: (1) newly discovered evidence
establishing innocence; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
to cases on collateral review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Nor could he, as the second
or successive proceedings in this court were dismissed for lack of prosecution.
United States v. Hahn, No. 04-2197 (10th Cir. M ar. 16, 2005) (dismissal order).
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