United States v. Medina

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 17, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-8080
v.
(D.C. No. 03-CR-159-D)
(D . W yo.)
O SCAR ME DIN A ,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Oscar M edina appeals his sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed
following his guilty pleas for W itness Tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(3), W itness Retaliation in violation of 18 U .S.C. § 1512(b)(2), and Use
of Fire to Commit a Felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1). He argues that
the district court violated his right to due process by accepting these pleas without
first holding a competency hearing. He also claims that, because his public
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
defender failed to file a motion for a competency hearing, he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. M edina’s counsel moves for
leave to withdraw in a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967). Because M edina has not presented facts that “establish that a reasonable
judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to his competence at the time of trial,”
M cGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 954 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc), and because
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not normally considered on direct
appeal, we AFFIRM M edina’s sentence, DISM ISS the appeal, and GRANT
counsel’s motion to w ithdraw .
On Halloween night, 2001, M edina set fire to the home of Rolando Davila,
Jr. The arson was in claimed retaliation against D avila for his cooperation with
law enforcement officials which led to the arrest of M edina’s close friend,
Francisco Valasquez. From this single incident, M edina was charged with the
Use of a Destructive Device During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in addition to the crimes to which he pled guilty.
After initially entering a plea of not guilty, M edina decided to change his
plea following the first day of the government’s case in chief. On June 2, 2005 he
signed a written plea agreement in which the government dismissed the 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) charge and he pled guilty to the remaining counts against him, agreeing
to a sentence recommendation of 25 years’ imprisonment. At the change of plea
hearing held later that day, M edina, through his lawyer, informed the court that he
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was having a “mental breakdown” and asked to speak to a psychologist or a
psychiatrist. The court noted that M edina was facing an exceedingly difficult
decision and found his reaction to be a “healthy, normal response to the
circumstances in which he finds himself.” The court informed him that he was
free to reconsider, and after a brief discussion with his lawyer, M edina chose to
go forw ard with the plea agreement.
M edina was then placed under oath and the court conducted the required
plea colloquy. During the colloquy, the court asked M edina whether he was
under the care of a psychiatrist or had ever been treated for mental illness.
M edina responded that he was on medication for the treatment of bipolar disorder.
At each stage of the court’s thorough questioning, M edina indicated that he
understood the consequences of his actions. He then provided the court a factual
basis sufficient to support a finding of guilt on the three charges. Following this
colloquy, the court found M edina “fully competent and capable of entering an
informed plea.”
At the sentencing hearing, held August 11, 2005, M edina once again
equivocated, claiming that he did not understand the plea agreement, and that he
did not have the mental capacity to enter into the agreement because of prior head
injuries. Unconvinced, the district court declared “I don’t believe at all that
you’re mentally incompetent, sir. I think that’s just a lot of hooey.” H owever,
after pausing to carefully review the record, the district court determined that
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M edina had not formally entered his plea at the change of plea hearing. M edina
again consulted with his lawyer and decided to proceed with his guilty plea, but
sought and obtained two modifications to the plea agreement from the
government. First, the government would leave open the possibility for a
reduction in sentence in exchange for future substantial cooperation. Second,
M edina would not waive his right to appeal. After formally entering his plea, the
court sentenced M edina to the recommended 25 years. He now appeals.
If an attorney conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous, counsel may so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel must submit a brief to
both the appellate court and the client pointing to anything in the record that
would potentially present an appealable issue. The client may then choose to
offer any argument to the court. If, upon completely examining the record, the
court determines that the appeal is in fact frivolous, it may grant the request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id. In the present case, acting pursuant to
Anders, counsel provided M edina with a copy of the appellate brief and M edina
has not filed a pro se brief raising any argument.
Counsel’s Anders brief raises two potentially appealable issues. First, the
brief asserts a procedural competency claim. See M cGregor, 248 F.3d at 952 (“A
procedural competency claim is based upon a trial court’s alleged failure to hold a
competency hearing . . . .”). In order to prevail on such claim, a defendant must
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“establish that a reasonable judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to his
competence at the time of trial.” Id. at 954. W hen a competency hearing was not
held, our review of a district court’s competency determination “is not limited by
the clearly erroneous standard.” U nited States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833 (10th
Cir. 1986). A criminal defendant is competent if he possesses “sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding – and . . . a rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
Nothing in the record indicates that M edina was unable to consult with his
lawyer or understand the proceedings against him. To the contrary, his distress
and vacillation indicate that he fully comprehended the gravity of his guilty plea.
Even in the final stages of the sentencing hearing, despite his protests of
incompetence, M edina and his lawyer were able to bargain for additional
concessions in the plea agreement. These are not the actions of a person who
lacks understanding of the proceedings against him. Given the record before us,
we conclude that a reasonable judge would not have had a bona fide doubt as to
M edina’s competence.
The second potentially appealable issue is M edina’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. In this circuit, except in rare circumstances, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims must be presented in collateral proceedings. United
States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). M edina’s
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claim is brought on direct appeal, making it “presumptively dismissible, and
virtually all [such claims] will be dismissed.” Id. This rule allows a district court
to develop the factual record necessary for effective review. See M assaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505-06 (2003). The present claim does not fall into
the narrow category of cases that require no further development and are therefore
suitable for review on direct appeal. Cf. United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 728
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding the record sufficient to review an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim on direct appeal where defense counsel averred to mistakenly
omitting a jury instruction on a lesser included offense). Accordingly, if M edina
intends to pursue this claim further he must raise it in a collateral proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
B ecause w e are not presented with any meritorious grounds for appeal, we
GR ANT counsel’s request to withdraw, AFFIRM the sentence, and DISM ISS
the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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