United States v. Chacon-Orozco

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 1, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-2236
v. (D. New Mexico)
MARTIN CHACON-OROZCO, (D.C. No. 2:08-CR-01688-WJ-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 2009, Martin Chacon-Orozco pleaded guilty without a plea
agreement to unlawful entry by a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1326(a) and (b). The United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment, the top of the advisory
guidelines range of 77 to 96 months. On appeal he raises two unpreserved
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
challenges to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, and also challenges
its substantive reasonableness. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1990 Mr. Chacon-Orozco pleaded guilty to kidnapping, conspiracy to
commit kidnapping, and robbery, and was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment.
He had initially been charged with homicide and felony kidnapping. In 1996,
while incarcerated, he was twice convicted of the crime of possession of a deadly
weapon by a prisoner, and sentenced to an additional nine years’ imprisonment,
six months of which was suspended. On February 5, 2007, after serving nearly 17
years in prison, he was deported to Mexico.
Two United States Border Patrol agents encountered Mr. Chacon-Orozco
walking in an area south of Deming, New Mexico, on June 18, 2008. When
questioned, he admitted that he had illegally entered the United States from
Mexico the previous evening. He was arrested on a charge of unlawful entry by a
deported alien.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Mr. Chacon-Orozco challenges the procedural reasonableness of his
sentence, arguing that it was improper for the district court to consider at
sentencing (1) that he waited until three days before the scheduled start of trial to
plead guilty to the illegal-reentry charge and (2) that in 1990 he originally was
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charged with homicide. Because he failed to object below to the court’s
consideration of these matters, we review his procedural-reasonableness challenge
for plain error only. See United States v. Caraway, 534 F.3d 1290, 1298 (10th
Cir. 2008). “Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3)
affects the [defendant’s] substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The defendant has the burden of establishing all four
elements of plain error. See United States v. Gonzalez, 558 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th
Cir. 2009).
Mr. Chacon-Orozco’s arguments fail at the first step. The district court
committed no procedural error. Mr. Chacon-Orozco received a two-level
decrease in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. But he was not entitled
to a further one-level decrease because he delayed too long in accepting
responsibility. By waiting until the eve of trial to offer his plea, he put the
government to the burden of substantial trial preparation. Under the guidelines
his offense level could be reduced by an additional point only if he had “timely
notif[ied] authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting
the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the
court to allocate their resources efficiently.” USSG § 3E1.1(b).
Nor did the district court err in considering the 1988 homicide charge. The
court referred to that charge in observing that the victim of the 1988 kidnapping
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had died. The inference drawn by the court was a reasonable one. In any event,
the court’s observation did not affect Mr. Chacon-Orozco’s offense level. The
16-level enhancement to his offense level under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) was
based on his prior kidnapping conviction. See USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii)
(“‘Crime of violence’ means any of the following offenses under federal, state, or
local law: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault . . . .”).
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Mr. Chacon-Orozco also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. He argues that the 16-level enhancement he received under USSG
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) is overly punitive, that the guidelines double-counted his
prior kidnapping conviction because the conviction caused both a 16-level
enhancement to his offense level and a three-point addition in determining his
criminal-history category, and that the length of his sentence acts as a
disincentive for rehabilitation. He points out that his guidelines offense level was
comparable to that for such offenses as robbery with serious bodily injury and sex
trafficking of children.
We review the substantive reasonableness of Mr. Chacon-Orozco’s
sentence for abuse of discretion, giving substantial deference to the district
court’s determination. See United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir.
2009). “A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v.
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Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1277 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A sentence imposed within a properly calculated guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable, see id., although the defendant may rebut the
presumption “by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed
against the other factors delineated in § 3553(a),” id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Mr. Chacon-Orozco has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.
He acknowledges that the challenged double counting is permitted by the
guidelines. See United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir.
2007) (this court has “routinely upheld as reasonable the use of prior convictions
to calculate both the criminal history category and a sentence enhancement where,
as here, the Guidelines authorize it”). More importantly, his criminal history
reveals his dangerousness and contempt for the law. This country does not
welcome people with records like his, and severe punishment is appropriate for
his uninvited entry. We do not address Mr. Chacon-Orozco’s contention that his
sentence discourages rehabilitation. We do not understand it, and he does not
develop it. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e
routinely have declined to consider arguments that . . . are inadequately
presented[] in an appellant’s opening brief.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment below.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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