United States v. Navarro-Flores

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT April 28, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 10-8042
v. (D. Wyoming)
ALFREDO NAVARRO-FLORES, also (D.C. No. 2:09-CR-00135-WFD-4)
known as Miguel,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
I. Introduction
Appellant Alfredo Navarro-Flores challenges the sentence imposed upon him for
violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Navarro-Flores, a citizen of Mexico, argues his
case should be remanded to the district court for further disposition because he was never
informed of his right to consult with the Mexican consulate under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (the “Vienna Convention”), art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
596 U.N.T.S. 261. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742,
we AFFIRM.
II. Background
Navarro-Flores was arrested in 2009 for his involvement in a conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine. He was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846;
distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); and
two counts of knowing use of a communication facility to facilitate a drug offense in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Navarro-Flores ultimately entered into a plea agreement
with the government.
Pursuant to this agreement, Navarro-Flores agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy
and distribution counts in the superseding indictment in exchange for the government’s
dismissal of the remaining counts. Additional provisions of this plea agreement required
Navarro-Flores to “provide truthful, complete and accurate information regarding his
criminal activity and the criminal activity of others.” The plea agreement also required
the government to consider recommending a downward departure from the
guideline-recommended sentencing range (pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5K1.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); or Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)) if satisfied that Navarro-Flores
had “fully, completely, and truthfully cooperated.” After satisfying itself that the plea
agreement had been translated and explained prior to Navarro-Flores’s signature, and that
Navarro-Flores understood and appreciated the consequences of the agreement, the district
-2-
court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence report.
The presentence report calculated Navarro-Flores’s base offense level to be
thirty-four. A three level adjustment was given for acceptance of responsibility, resulting
in a total offense level of thirty-one. In combination with his Category I criminal history,
Navarro-Flores’s guideline sentence was calculated to be between 120 and 135 months
imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the government explained it would not
recommend a downward departure from the guideline sentence because Navarro-Flores
had failed to provide complete and truthful cooperation with the government’s
investigation as required by the plea agreement. Specifically, it appears Navarro-Flores
refused to provide the identity of a co-conspirator with whom he had demonstrably
traveled on several occasions. Based on this information, the district court concluded
Navarro-Flores would also be ineligible for the safety valve provided by U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2(a)(5) (authorizing sentencing “without regard to any statutory
minimum sentence” if “defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense”). Ultimately, the
district court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range, 120 months’
imprisonment. Navarro-Flores raised no objection to the sentence imposed.
Before announcing the terms of Navarro-Flores’s sentence, the district court made
the following remarks:
Also, note, sir, that I’ve been advised by [the probation officer] that there is
no indication that this defendant was advised, counsel, of his rights to consult
with the Mexican consulate [under the Vienna Convention]. . . . We have a
statutory obligation, because the statute is the treaty, to honor our obligations
-3-
to foreign nationals who are incarcerated in this country, and we did not keep
it with respect to Mr. Navarro.
Mexico does not require mandatory notification when its citizens are
incarcerated in this country, but this defendant has the right to be advised
that, if he chooses, he can consult with consular authorities. . . .
If you wish, we can notify your consular officials in Denver. . . .
Do you want the Republic of Mexico’s consulate in Denver notified of your
incarceration here in the District of Wyoming?”
Navarro-Flores responded, “I don’t know.” There is no indication in the record that he
has since made the decision to contact his consulate. This appeal followed.
III. Discussion
Navarro-Flores contends the government’s failure to advise him of his rights under
the Vienna Convention prior to his sentencing hearing prejudiced his rights and requires
we remand his case for further proceedings. He suggests that, had he been advised of his
right to consular notification, he might have availed himself of such right, and that the
Mexican consulate might have convinced him of the need to be fully forthcoming in his
proffer, thereby qualifying him for safety valve consideration. Because Navarro-Flores
did not raise this issue below, we review for plain error. See United States v.
Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000). To succeed in his appeal, then,
Navarro-Flores must demonstrate “(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects substantial
rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2010).
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides, in relevant part:
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
-4-
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.
Vienna Convention, art. 36(b). Federal regulations, moreover, require that “[i]n every
case in which a foreign national is arrested the arresting officer shall inform the foreign
national that his consul will be advised of his arrest unless he does not wish such
notification to be given.” 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1).
The government concedes it failed to advise Navarro-Flores of his right to consular
notification. Nevertheless, as Navarro-Flores acknowledges, neither this court nor the
Supreme Court has resolved the question whether the Vienna Convention confers
individually enforceable rights upon a defendant. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548
U.S. 331, 342 (2006) (declining “to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention
grants individuals enforceable rights”); Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1024
n.11 (10th Cir. 2007) (expressing “serious doubts” the Vienna Convention grants
individually enforceable rights). The courts of appeal that have affirmatively passed upon
the issue, moreover, reach differing conclusions. Compare Cornejo v. County of San
Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding the Vienna Convention does not confer
“a privately enforceable right to be notified”); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d
377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001) (same), and United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir.
2001) (same), with Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We conclude that . .
-5-
. Article 36 [of the Vienna Convention] confers individual rights on detained nationals.”).
In light of this uncertainty, the error, if any, is not plain, and Navarro-Flores’s challenge
must therefore fail. See United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 669 (10th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that to be “plain,” an error must be “clear or obvious under current, well-settled
law.” (quotation omitted)).
Even assuming for sake of argument the Vienna Convention indeed creates
individually enforceable rights, Navarro-Flores has not shown how the government’s
failure to notify him of his right to consular contact affected a substantial right. Instead,
Navarro-Flores speculates that, if he had known of his right to consular contact at the time
of his arrest, he might have exercised it. He further supposes that, if he had spoken with
the Mexican consulate, the United States’ criminal justice system might have been better
explained to him, thereby convincing him of the need for complete disclosure to the
government. Finally, he hypothesizes his honesty would then have qualified him for
safety valve consideration and, perhaps, a lighter sentence.
Nothing in the record indicates Navarro-Flores did not, in fact, understand the
availability of reduced sentencing was contingent upon his honest and complete disclosure.
The plea agreement, read to him in Spanish, contains several references to the requirement
that Navarro-Flores “provide truthful, complete and accurate information,” and the
presentence report explicitly states the availability of safety valve consideration is
contingent upon his compliance with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2(a)(5).
Nor is it clear Navarro-Flores would have even exercised his right to consular contact had
-6-
he been advised of it. When ultimately informed of this right and asked whether he
wished to exercise it, Navarro-Flores in fact replied “I don’t know.” Finally, there is no
reason to believe the Mexican consulate, if contacted, would have succeeded in convincing
Navarro-Flores to be completely honest with the government. Navarro-Flores’s
demonstration of impact to his substantial rights thus rests entirely upon speculation.
Such speculation cannot satisfy the substantial rights prong of plain error review. Jones v.
United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394-95 (1999) (“Where the effect of an alleged error is so
uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected
his substantial rights.”). Consequently, Navarro-Flores’s challenge must be rejected not
only for failure to satisfy the second prong of the plain error standard, but the third as well.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Navarro-Flores’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
-7-