Cook v. Astrue

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 2, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JU D ITH E. C OO K ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-7113
(D.C. No. CIV-05-004-JHP-SPS)
M ICH AEL J. ASTRU E, (E.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, M U RPH Y and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Judith Cook appeals from an order of the district court affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income. She claims to have become disabled on July 31, 2002, due to physical
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and mental impairments. 1 After a hearing, however, an administrative law judge
(A LJ) concluded at step five of the five-step sequential evaluation process, see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)
(explaining the five-step process), that M s. Cook was not disabled because she
retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform work that exists in
significant numbers. The A ppeals Council denied review, and the district court
affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision is the final
agency decision. Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003). Our
review of the agency’s decision is limited to determining whether it is supported
by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
standards. M adrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2006). In
conducting this review, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our
judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & H um an Servs., 933
F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
M s. Cook argues on appeal that the ALJ: (1) failed to recognize all of her
impairments as severe; (2) failed to discuss why she did not meet a Listed
Impairment; (3) incorrectly assessed her RFC by failing to account for all of her
limitations; and (4) improperly evaluated her credibility.
1
W ithout explanation, M s. Cook asserts for the first time on appeal that she
became disabled on September 28, 2002. For purposes of this appeal, we retain
the originally alleged onset date of July 31, 2002.
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M s. Cook advanced the same contentions before the district court.
Adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court
rejected them. The magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ had considered all
evidence of M s. Cook’s alleged impairments; adequately discussed why M s. Cook
did not meet the criteria of a Listed Impairment, albeit in subsequent steps of its
analysis; accurately assessed M s. Cook’s RFC; and correctly noted that
M s. Cook’s claims of total disability were not consistent with the substantial
evidence in the record. See Aplt. App., Tab 7 at 351-66.
The magistrate judge thoroughly and accurately analyzed each of
M s. Cook’s claims using the same standard that governs our review, and we see
no reason to repeat that analysis here. Accordingly, having reviewed the parties’
briefs, the relevant legal authority, and the administrative record, we affirm the
district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons as those articulated in
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation dated September 28, 2006,
which the district court adopted in its order dated October 23, 2006.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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