Hamilton v. Chabries

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 11, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TO N Y A LEX A N D ER HA M ILTON,
Petitioner - A ppellant, No. 06-4145
v. (D. Utah)
M IKE CHABRIES, Executive (D.C. No. 2:03-CV -757-TS)
Director, Department of Corrections of
the State of Utah,
Respondent - Appellee.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before HA RTZ, EBEL, and T YM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Tony Alexander Hamilton was convicted in Utah state court on charges of
criminal trespass, attempted aggravated murder, aggravated assault, killing of a
police dog, and interfering with an arresting officer. He sought relief in the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
United States District Court for the District of Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and
the district court denied the application.
M r. Hamilton now requests a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal
the district court's denial of his application for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)
(requiring COA to appeal denial of § 2254 application). He asserts before us
claims alleging violations of (1) the Due Process Clause, (2) the Fourth
Amendment, (3) the Fifth A mendment, and (4) the Establishment Clause. He also
argues that (5) his warrantless arrest was unlawful; (6) law-enforcement
authorities conspired to take him by force; (7) the trial judge w as biased; (8) there
remained factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the arrest, including the
possibility that the police dog was killed for euthanasia purposes;
(9) he should not have been convicted of criminal trespass because he owned the
property; (10) the state was equitably estopped from charging him with criminal
trespass; (11) a faulty jury instruction denied him his defense of self-defense; (12)
insufficient evidence supported his convictions; and (13) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to a jury instruction on
self-defense, did not question witnesses regarding an allegedly fraudulent tax
deed, and neglected to put on evidence regarding the police officer's training.
W e deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
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I. B ACKGR OU N D
M r. Hamilton's religious group, the Fraternity of Preparation (Fraternity),
purchased Vance Springs, a tract of property in Beaver County, Utah, where
members of the Fraternity resided. Because the Fraternity refused to pay property
taxes, the county sold the tract in a tax sale, and title to the land was quieted in a
series of default judgments. M r. Hamilton continued to squat on the land, being
forcibly removed and convicted of criminal trespass on one occasion. Upon
release from his imprisonment on that conviction, however, he returned to Vance
Springs. On September 9, 1999, sheriff's deputies came to Vance Springs once
again to evict M r. Hamilton. W hile resisting arrest, he shot a deputy, assaulted
another deputy, and killed a police dog. His convictions for those acts are the
subject of this case.
Before the Utah Supreme Court, M r. Hamilton challenged his conviction on
several grounds: (1) that the criminal-trespass conviction should have been
dismissed because as a matter of law he was lawfully present on his own property
(the tax sale having been invalid); (2) that the State should have been equitably
estopped from prosecuting him for trespass because the State had acknowledged
that the statute cited in the tax deed was incorrect; (3) that insufficient evidence
supported his criminal-trespass conviction; (4) that insufficient evidence
supported the trial court's decision to submit to the jury the charges of aggravated
murder, aggravated assault, killing the police dog, and interfering with an
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arresting officer; and (5) that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding
self-defense and justification. See State v. Hamilton, 70 P.3d 111, 114, 117-24
(Utah 2003).
In his § 2254 application M r. Hamilton reasserted those claims, and added
several that he had not pursued in state court: (1) that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel; (2) that he was arrested without a w arrant; (3) that a
conspiracy existed to take him by force; (4) that the state trial judge was biased;
and (5) that factual disputes remained regarding the details of the arrest.
II. STANDA RD O F REVIEW
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard
requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant must
show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either
“debatable or wrong.” Id. If the application was denied on procedural grounds,
the applicant faces a double hurdle. Not only must the applicant make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, but he must also show
“that jurists of reason would find it debatable . . . whether the district court was
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correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. “W here a plain procedural bar is present and
the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist
could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or
that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further .” Id.
The A ntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
provides that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, a
federal court will grant habeas relief only when the applicant establishes that the
state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), (2).
Under the “contrary to” clause, we grant relief only if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court
on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than the [Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, relief is provided
only if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Thus we may not issue a
habeas writ simply because we conclude in our independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable.
Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks,
brackets, and citations omitted). Therefore, for those of M r. Hamilton's claims
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that were adjudicated on the merits in state court, “AEDPA 's deferential treatment
of state court decisions must be incorporated into our consideration of [his]
request for COA.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir .2004).
III. D ISC USSIO N
W e need not address the claims first raised by M r. Hamilton in his
application for a COA— alleged violations of due process, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, and the Establishment Clause. See Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302,
1307 (10th Cir. 2005) (claims raised for the first time on appeal are deemed to be
waived).
The district court disposed of four of M r. Hamilton's claims— that the arrest
was unlawful, that a conspiracy against him existed, that the state trial judge was
biased, and that there were factual disputes surrounding the circumstances of the
arrest— on procedural grounds. The court held that these claims were not
exhausted in state court and would now be procedurally barred were they
remanded to that court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1)(c) (2006) (“A
person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that . . . could
have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal . . . .”). Accordingly, he could
pursue those claims in federal court only by showing cause and prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Thom as v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1221
(10th Cir. 2000). Because he made no attempt in district court to make such a
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showing, the district court properly denied relief. No reasonable jurist could
disagree with the decision of the district court on these matters.
The district court also ruled that one of the claims presented by
M r. H amilton to the Utah Supreme Court was procedurally barred. The Utah
Supreme Court had held that because M r. Hamilton had failed to appear in the
state-court quiet-title actions related to Vance Springs, he could not challenge
title to the property in his criminal case. See Hamilton, 70 P.3d at 119. The
district court noted that M r. Hamilton had failed even to argue that grounds
existed to overcome this procedural ground for denial relied upon by the Utah
Court. See Thomas, 218 F.3d at 1221 (“This court may not consider issues raised
in a habeas petition that have been defaulted in state court on an independent and
adequate procedural ground unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and
prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted)). The district court's ruling was correct, and could not be
debated by reasonable jurists.
The district court did not address M r. Hamilton's claim based on equitable
estoppel, but we can readily determine that he is not entitled to relief on that
ground. The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue on the merits, and its
analysis is eminently reasonable. See Hamilton, 70 P.3d at 119-20. In any event,
the issue is not one of federal constitutional law, so we cannot grant a COA on
that ground. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Thornburg v. M ullin, 422 F.3d 1113,
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1128-29 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Federal habeas review . . . is limited to violations of
constitutional rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court resolved M r. Hamilton’s other claims on the merits. It
ruled that (1) the challenged jury instruction was correct; (2) the Utah Supreme
Court did not incorrectly apply federal law in determining that the verdicts were
supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) his counsel provided effective
assistance. The district court's rulings could not be debated by reasonable jurists.
IV . C ON CLU SIO N
W e DENY M r. Hamilton’s application for a COA and DISM ISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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