United States v. French

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 10, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-5168
SHEILA DIANA FRENCH, (D.C. No. 03-CR-181-JHP)
(N. D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Defendant Sheila French pled guilty to one count of maintaining a place for the
purpose of manufacturing, distributing and using methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 240 months. French
now appeals her sentence, claiming the district court committed constitutional error by
relying on a number of judicially-found facts to mandatorily enhance her sentence under
the federal sentencing guidelines, and misapplied the federal sentencing guidelines in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
calculating the drug quantity attributable to her offense. We exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and reverse and remand with instructions to the district
court to vacate French’s sentence and resentence her.
I.
On August 27, 2003, Sergeant Harold Adair, a member of the Tulsa Police
Department (TPD), received information about an eleven-month-old infant being treated
for second-degree burns at Hillcrest Hospital in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Adair drove to
the hospital, viewed the infant, and observed what he believed to be “splash burns” on the
infant’s face, head, shoulders and back. According to Adair, a splash burn occurs when a
hot liquid splashes on a person’s skin. Adair had previously seen splash burns in
methamphetamine laboratory accidents.
Adair spoke with the infant’s mother, Lacey Kuhne. Kuhne indicated that her
husband, Kenneth Tinsley, had been performing some work at a trailer owned by Sheila
French, and that Kuhne and her infant had been inside the trailer visiting. Kuhne further
indicated that the infant was sitting on the kitchen floor playing with some magnets on the
refrigerator when something on the kitchen stove exploded. A person came into the
kitchen, grabbed the item on the stove, and attempted to swing it over to the sink. In
doing so, the person spilled some type of burning liquid onto the infant. According to
Kuhne, there was a discussion among the adults present at the trailer whether they should
take the infant to the hospital for treatment, with some, including French, expressing
concern that hospital employees would recognize the infant’s injuries as chemical burns.
-2-
Adair was familiar with the trailer described by Kuhne. He had received
information approximately one month earlier that someone was cooking
methamphetamine inside the trailer, and he had actually flown over the trailer in a
helicopter in an attempt to observe activities at the trailer. In addition, Adair was aware
from a previous investigation that French, the owner of the trailer, had purchased iodine
crystals, a chemical commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine, on three separate
occasions in September 2002.
Adair and another TPD officer traveled to French’s trailer to investigate further the
circumstances leading to the infant’s burns. When they approached the front door of the
trailer, they noticed a “real strong smell, sweet chemical solvent smell . . . .” ROA, Vol.
III at 21. After repeatedly knocking on the front door for approximately two minutes, a
person inside asked who was there. Adair responded that it was the police. A woman,
later identified as French, opened the front door and stepped out onto the front porch. As
she did so, smoke came out of the trailer and the chemical smell greatly increased. Upon
questioning, French said she had heard about the infant being burned, but had not been
present at the trailer when the accident occurred. French also stated “her understanding
was that [the accident] occurred at a burn pile to the west and south of her trailer.” Id. at
22. At Adair’s request, French escorted the officers to the area of the burn pile.
According to Adair, there was no indication that gasoline or other liquid had sprayed out
from the burn pile, and it was obvious that the infant’s burns had not occurred there.
Adair and French returned to the front porch of the trailer, where he explained to
-3-
her his belief that the infant had been burned inside the trailer in the kitchen area. Adair
advised French that she had two choices: either to voluntarily consent to Adair and the
other officer entering the trailer and looking for evidence relating to the burn incident, or
to deny them consent which would require them to obtain a search warrant. French
agreed to allow the officers to enter the trailer and search for evidence.
Inside the trailer, Adair observed burn marks on the carpet in front of the
refrigerator. In the rest of the kitchen area, Adair observed various items, such as vision
glassware, that he associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Adair and the
other officer seized the following items from inside the trailer, all of which subsequently
tested positive for methamphetamine: (1) a coffee grinder in the kitchen area that had a
white powdery substance in it; (2) two glass jars in the kitchen refrigerator’s freezer
section that contained frozen liquid; (3) a container of liquid in the shop/work area; (4) a
container of liquid in a small refrigerator on the back porch area; and (5) a plate with
some loose methamphetamine on it, found in the master bedroom. In addition, Adair and
the other officer found iodine crystals in the master bedroom along with approximately
one to one-and-a-half ounces of phosphorous acid flakes. Based upon all of these items,
Adair concluded that there was an ongoing methamphetamine laboratory operation inside
of the trailer.
On December 11, 2003, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment
against French and five other individuals (Jason Read, Brandon Jones, Jessica Gutierrez,
Gregory Smith, and Ryan Cole). Count One of the indictment charged all six defendants
-4-
with conspiring, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, to knowingly and intentionally
manufacture and distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture of substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine. Count Two of the indictment charged French
with maintaining a place in Osage County, Oklahoma, for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing and using methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) and (b).
Count Three of the indictment charged three of French’s co-defendants (Jones, Gutierrez
and Read) with attempting to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
On June 21, 2004, French pled guilty to Count Two of the indictment. The written
plea agreement entered into by French stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
I, SHEILA DIANE FRENCH, admit that on certain dates between
November, 2001 and December, 2003, the exact dates unknown, within the
Northern District of Oklahoma, I would and did knowingly allow my home
to be used as a place where methamphetamine was manufactured,
distributed or ingested. Methamphetamine was distributed or ingested to or
by me to, from or with Jason Read, Ryan Cole, Brandon Jones, Rebecca
Gutierrez and others at my residence in Osage County, Oklahoma. From
time to time, chemicals were purchased by me with the help of Ryan Cole,
Brandon Jones or Rebecca Gutierrez for Jason Read, which chemicals could
be used for the manufacture of methamphetamine and were delivered at my
residence in Osage County. Coffee filters or pans containing the residue of
methamphetamine that had previously been manufactured were scraped or
washed so that the methamphetamine residue could be used to ingest at my
residence in Osage County. This statement of facts is an accurate summary
of my knowledge of, and involvement in, the crime I am charged with in the
Indictment filed against me in this cause. However, I SHEILA DIANE
FRENCH, assert that the above statement of facts does not reflect the entire
breadth and knowledge that I have concerning the entire scope of my
activities.
Supp. ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 147 at 6.
-5-
On August 27, 2004, the probation office issued its presentence investigation
report (PSR). The PSR concluded that French was “responsible for 1,007 grams of a
mixture containing methamphetamine and 71.2 grams of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine,”
and thus was subject to a base offense level of 32 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8. ROA,
Vol. II, PSR at 9-10. The PSR proposed three upward adjustments to the base offense
level: (1) a six-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C) because the offense
involved the manufacture of methamphetamine and created a substantial risk of harm to
the life of a minor; (2) a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because
French possessed a loaded shotgun hidden under her bedroom mattress; and (3) a two-
level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice (due to French
allegedly threatening to burn down the house of Elsa Marlin if she told authorities how
the infant was burned at French’s trailer). After applying a three-level downward
adjustment or acceptance of responsibility, the PSR arrived at an adjusted offense level of
39. Combined with French’s criminal history category of III, the PSR recommended a
guideline range of 324 to 405 months. However, because the statutory maximum for the
offense of conviction was 240 months, the PSR recommended imposing a sentence of 240
months.
French objected to various portions of the PSR, including its drug quantity
calculations and its conclusion that she obstructed justice by threatening witness Elsa
Marlin. French also filed a sentencing memorandum asserting that, in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the district
-6-
court was precluded from imposing any enhancements based upon facts outside of her
guilty plea. In her sentencing memorandum, French asserted that the district court should
arrive at an adjusted offense level of 9 (derived from imposing a base offense level of 12
and subtracting 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility), and a guideline range of 8 to 14
months.
The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on October 1 and 7, 2004.
During the hearing, the government presented three witnesses: Adair, co-defendant
Rebecca Gutierrez, and Elsa Marlin. French also testified on her own behalf. At the
conclusion of the evidence, the district court made the following factual findings relevant
to French’s objections to the PSR:
• The district court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that French allowed
Jason Read, her son, to manufacture methamphetamine in her residence and
further had knowledge that he operated a methamphetamine laboratory in
the well house located behind her house. ROA, Vol. IV at 257-58.
• The district court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that French “would
demand some of the finished product [from Jason Read] when the process
was completed.” Id. at 258.
• The district court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that French did not
want the infant to be taken to the hospital for treatment of its burns because
of her concern that state authorities would be notified. Id.
• The district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that French
threatened to burn down Elsa Marlin’s house if she (Marlin) told the police
the truth about how the infant was burned. Id. at 259.
• The district court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the amount of
drugs attributable to [French] in paragraphs 19 and 24 of the [PSR] [wa]s an
extremely conservative amount in light of the drug activities occurring at
[her] residence.” Id. at 259. “The only amounts used in this calculation
-7-
were the drugs seized out of the residence on August 27, 2003. This
calculation does not contain any drug amounts for activities occurring on
other dates such as the amounts of methamphetamine [French] admitted to
selling in the many manufacturing activities occurring at [her] residence,
including [French] personally scraping pans which had been used to cook
methamphetamine or the ingestion of methamphetamine on numerous
occasions by [French] and others are her residence.” Id. at 260.
As for the PSR’s proposed enhancement based on French’s possession of a loaded
shotgun, the district court “reluctantly sustain[ed] [French]’s objection” “based upon the
government’s statement . . . that [it] believe[d] it was clearly improbable that the loaded
shotgun was connected to the drug activities . . . .” Id. at 262. In turn, the district court
applied an adjusted offense level of 37 which, together with French’s criminal history
category of III, produced a guideline range of 262 to 327 months. Ultimately, the district
court sentenced French to 240 months’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum for her
crime of conviction.
II.
Booker error
French contends on appeal that the district court violated her Sixth Amendment
rights, as outlined in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), by relying on
judicially-found facts to mandatorily enhance her sentence under the federal sentencing
guidelines. In Booker, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Blakely to the federal
sentencing guidelines, holding that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
-8-
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 543 U.S. at 244. To remedy the
constitutional infirmity of the federal sentencing guidelines, the Court in Booker
invalidated their mandatory nature, requiring a district court to consult them in an
advisory fashion. Id. at 245-46.
In United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc), we
identified two types of errors that could arise out of a district court’s pre-Booker
sentencing of a criminal defendant. First, a constitutional Booker error occurred if a
district court “re[lied] upon judge-found facts . . . to enhance a defendant’s sentence
mandatorily.” Id. at 731. Second, a non-constitutional Booker error occurred if a district
court “appl[ied] the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, . . . even though the resulting
sentence was calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the defendant, found by
the jury, or based upon the fact of a prior conviction.” Id. at 731-32.
Here, although the district court purported to apply the correct, “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard with respect to all but one of the sentencing enhancements
(i.e., the obstruction of justice enhancement, which it applied based upon findings made
using a preponderance of the evidence standard), the district court itself made the
pertinent factual findings. Thus, it did not comply with Booker’s requirement that a jury
make such findings. See United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 2006)
(noting that Booker “specif[ied] the appropriate decision maker (the jury) and the burden
of persuasion (beyond a reasonable doubt)”). Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court committed constitutional Booker error in sentencing French.
-9-
Because French adequately preserved the error below by timely objecting on the
basis of Blakely, we review her sentence for harmless error. United States v. Corchado,
427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 2005). In doing so, the question is whether the district
court’s error was harmless under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
United States v. Lang, 405 F.3d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 2005). Rule 52(a) states: “Any
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.” The government bears the burden of demonstrating the error was harmless
and, because the error was of constitutional dimension, must do so beyond a reasonable
doubt. Lang, 405 F.3d at 1065.
In United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005), we noted there
are at least two ways that a defendant’s substantial rights may be affected in cases of
constitutional Booker error. First, a defendant’s substantial rights may be affected if “a
jury applying a reasonable doubt standard would not have found the same material facts
that a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Second, a defendant’s
substantial rights may also be affected if there is “a reasonable probability that, under the
specific facts of his case as analyzed under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
the district court judge would reasonably impose a sentence outside the Guidelines
range.” Id. (footnote omitted).
After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that French’s substantial
rights were, indeed, affected by the district court’s constitutional Booker error. As noted,
the district court, at sentencing, made a number of factual findings which in turn resulted
-10-
in various enhancements to French’s offense level under the federal sentencing
guidelines. Notably, the district court expressly stated that all but one of those findings
were made utilizing the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The sole exception was
the district court’s finding that French had threatened to burn down the home of Elsa
Marlin if Marlin told authorities the truth about how the infant was burned. In making
this finding, the district court expressly noted that it was relying on a preponderance of
the evidence standard. By doing so, the district court implicitly acknowledged that the
evidence before it was not sufficient to satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
In turn, a review of the sentencing hearing transcript indicates that this factual issue
hinged almost exclusively on whether the district court believed Elsa Marlin, who
testified that she was threatened by French, or whether the court believed French, who
denied threatening Marlin. Although the district court resolved this credibility
determination in favor of Marlin’s testimony, it presumably did not believe the issue to be
so one-sided that it could make its finding under a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
(as it did with all of its other factual findings), and a review of the sentencing hearing
transcripts confirms that conclusion. These transcripts provide a basis for concluding that
both Marlin and French were less than credible for multiple reasons, including their
history of drug use and criminal histories.
Had the district court not imposed the two-level enhancement for obstruction of
justice, French would have been subject to an adjusted offense level of 35 which,
combined with her criminal history category of III, would have resulted in a guideline
-11-
range of 210 to 262 months, well below the 262 to 327 month range calculated by the
district court, and also below the statutory maximum sentence of 240 months actually
imposed by the district court. Thus, we conclude that the constitutional Booker error
committed by the district court was not harmless, and that French is therefore entitled to
be resentenced.
Drug quantity findings
French also contends the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines in
calculating her base offense level. More specifically, French complains that the district
court erroneously held her responsible for waste water or other liquid byproducts found in
four containers seized from her trailer. We review de novo whether the district court
properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. McVay, 447 F.3d 1348,
1353 (10th Cir. 2006).
During the search of French’s trailer, the police seized, among other things, four
containers of colored liquid that were confirmed by subsequent laboratory testing to
contain methamphetamine. In calculating French’s base offense level, the PSR took the
total weight of the liquid estimated to be in these containers, i.e., 35.5 ounces, and treated
it as a mixture containing methamphetamine. ROA, Vol. II, PSR at 8. The PSR in turn
converted this total amount into 2,726 kilograms of marijuana, and imposed a base
offense level of 32. Id. at 10. French objected to these calculations, arguing, in pertinent
part, that it was improper to use the total weight of the liquid found in the containers to
calculate her base offense level. More specifically, French argued (a) no scientific
-12-
measurements were conducted to determine the actual amount of methamphetamine
contained in the liquid, and (b) the liquid was not marketable as found, “but instead
required the removal of the water to make the methamphetamine distributable.” Aplt.
App. at 17. In short, French argued that the majority of the liquid was waste water that
should be excluded from the drug quantity calculations pursuant to the commentary to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
At the sentencing hearing, the government presented two pieces of evidence
relevant to this issue. First, the government submitted a laboratory report confirming that
methamphetamine was “identified” in the liquid found in the containers. Aplt. App. at 28
(lab report). Second, the government presented the testimony of co-defendant Rebecca
Gutierrez. Gutierrez testified, in pertinent part, that the containers found in the freezer in
French’s kitchen contained what she termed “freezer dope.” ROA, Vol. III at 69.
According to Gutierrez, “freezer dope” was a waste product of methamphetamine
manufacturing (i.e., primarily acetone) and, if itself “cooked down,” would produce
approximately a gram or so of usable methamphetamine. Id. At the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing, the district court overruled French’s objections and adopted the drug
quantity calculations set forth in the PSR. In doing so, however, the district court did not
specifically address French’s argument that the bulk of the liquid was unusable.
The propriety of the district court’s drug quantity calculations hinge on the
interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, i.e., the Guidelines’ Drug Quantity Table. Note (A) to
the Drug Quantity Table states, in pertinent part:
-13-
Unless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance set forth in
the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of the controlled substance.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, note (A) (2003) (emphasis added). In turn, Application Note 1 states:
“Mixture or substance” as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in
21 U.S.C. § 841, except as expressly provided. Mixture or substance does
not include materials that must be separated from the controlled substance
before the controlled substance can be used. Examples of such materials
include the fiberglass in a cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a
cocaine/beeswax statue, and waste water from an illicit laboratory used to
manufacture a controlled substance. If such material cannot readily be
separated from the mixture or substance that appropriately is counted in the
Drug Quantity Table, the court may use any reasonable method to
approximate the weight of the mixture or substance to be counted.
Id. cmt. n. 1 (2003) (emphasis added).
As noted by French, the uncontroverted evidence presented at the sentencing
hearing indicated that the methamphetamine contained in at least some, if not all, of the
liquid seized from French’s trailer was not in a usable form. Rather, according to
Rebecca Gutierrez’s unchallenged testimony, that liquid would first have had to have
been “cooked down” in order to produce a usable form of methamphetamine. Further,
again according to Gutierrez’s unchallenged testimony, the liquid, when cooked down,
would not have produced a substantial amount of methamphetamine (i.e., approximately a
gram or so per container). Thus, under the express language of Application Note 1, it was
improper for the district court to have relied upon the entire weight of the liquid in
calculating the drug quantity attributable to French. See United States v. Combs, 379
F.3d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 2004) (“it is well established that methamphetamine waste water
-14-
is irrelevant to sentencing”); United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.
1998) (discussing why, pursuant to Application Note 1 to § 2D1.1, waste water should be
excluded for purposes of determining base offense level); see also United States v. Treft,
447 F.3d 421, 423 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging, but finding it unnecessary to
apply, Application Note 1 to § 2D1.1).
The district court’s error in this regard was far from harmless. By taking into
account the entire weight of the liquid, the district court found that French was
responsible for 1,007 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine. ROA, Vol. II,
PSR at 10. Had the district court instead relied on the uncontroverted testimony of
Rebecca Gutierrez (i.e., that at least two of the containers, if cooked down, would each
only have produced approximately one gram of usable methamphetamine), it would have
found French responsible for a substantially lower quantity of methamphetamine, and in
turn presumably imposed a lower base offense level.1 Thus, this error also justifies a
remand for resentencing.
Structural error
In her final issue, French argues that the district court’s mandatory application of
the Sentencing Guidelines constitutes structural error. We, and more recently the
1
To be sure, the district court could have made additional findings regarding the
amount of methamphetamine that had been produced at French’s trailer over time. Such
a finding would likely have resulted in a substantial amount of methamphetamine, and in
turn a high base offense level. However, the district court declined to make any specific
findings in this regard, and instead relied solely on the substances seized during the
search of French’s trailer.
-15-
Supreme Court, have rejected this very argument. See Washington v. Recuenco, 126
S. Ct. 2546, 2553 (2006) (holding, in case arising from Washington state, that Blakely
error did not constitute structural error); United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 668 (10th
Cir. 2005) (holding that constitutional Booker error is not structural in nature); Gonzalez-
Huerta, 403 F.3d at 734 (holding that non-constitutional Booker error is not structural).
We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court with instructions to vacate
French’s sentence and resentence her. In doing so, we in no way express an opinion
regarding what the ultimate sentence should or should not be.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
-16-