Tyler v. Tsurumi (America), Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 7, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DAN TYLER,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
No. 10-8039
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00228-ABJ)
(D. Wyo.)
TSURUMI (AMERICA), INC.,
Defendant–Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Dan Tyler sued Tsurumi (America), Inc., his former employer, alleging four
causes of action under Wyoming law. The district court granted Tsurumi’s Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.
I
In his complaint, Tyler alleged that he had worked for Tsurumi in Chicago,
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Illinois, but quit his job in 2001 to move back to Salt Lake City, Utah. Tsurumi called
Tyler during his move and offered him a new position testing and developing the pumps
Tsurumi makes. According to the complaint, “Tyler and Tsurumi entered into an oral
contract for . . . Tyler to become a permanent employee.” The complaint further alleges
that “[b]ecause . . . Tyler was a permanent employee of Tsurumi, he could only be
terminated for cause.” In addition, the oral contract allowed Tyler to live and work
wherever he chose. As a result of this promise, Tyler moved to central Wyoming and
built a testing facility and workshop.
Tyler claims that the quality of Tsurumi’s pumps steadily deteriorated over several
years. He alleges that when he told Tsurumi about his concerns, Tsurumi demanded he
move back to Chicago knowing that he was unwilling to relocate, flowing from a “desire
to silence his criticism.” Tyler refused to move and Tsurumi terminated his employment.
Tyler filed suit in federal district court, alleging four Wyoming state-law claims:
(1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; and (4) “breach of public policy.” Tsurumi’s motion to dismiss all
claims was granted by the district court. Tyler appeals.
II
“This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), applying the same legal standard applicable in the district
court.” Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted).
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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted). But
because dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “is a harsh remedy, . . . a well-pleaded complaint
may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable,
and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567
F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
A
In Wyoming, termination of an employee does not generally constitute a breach of
contract because state law imposes a presumption that employment for an indefinite
period is at-will, meaning that the employer (or employee) can terminate the employment
relationship without cause or notice. Bear v. Volunteers of Am., Wyo., Inc., 964 P.2d
1245, 1250 (Wyo. 1998). An employee seeking to overcome that presumption must
show the existence of an express or implied-in-fact agreement to the contrary. Id. The
dispositive test is “whether there has been an objective manifestation of assent to an
employment contract containing a job security provision.” Id. (citations omitted).
Tyler’s complaint does not allege his oral contract contained job security
provisions. Instead Tyler pleads that he was hired as a “permanent employee.” It
conclusively follows, he asserts, that because he “was a permanent employee of Tsurumi,
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he could only be terminated for cause.” But “on a motion to dismiss, courts are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation omitted). Tyler does not allege
any facts suggesting that Tsurumi promised he would be terminated only for cause.
Rather, Tyler alleges that the “for cause” limitation results from his status as a permanent
employee. This conclusion is unsupportable under Wyoming law. “[A] claim by an
employee that the employer promised ‘permanent’ employment does not alter the
at[-]will presumption without additional consideration supplied by the employee or
explicit language in the contract of employment stating that termination may only be for
cause.” Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Comm., 868 P.2d 211, 218 (Wyo. 1994).
Because Tyler does not offer anything more than the allegation of “permanent”
employment, his breach-of-contract claim fails as a matter of law.
B
“Promissory estoppel provides relief for an injury arising from actions or
declarations which have been acted on in good faith,” and which, if retracted, would
result in an inequity. Worley v. Wyo. Bottling Co., 1 P.3d 615, 623 (Wyo. 2000)
(quotation omitted). Wyoming courts permit promissory estoppel recovery in an
employment context if a plaintiff shows: (1) “the existence of a clear and definite
agreement”; (2) “the party urging the doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable
reliance on the agreement”; and (3) “the equities support the enforcement of the
agreement.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Not unlike the contract claim, in application of the stated criteria the complaint
fails to state a viable claim of promissory estoppel. The complaint alleges that Tyler was
promised “permanent employee” status. Without more, under Wyoming law, such status
is terminable at will. As an at-will employee, Tyler could not reasonably rely on
continued employment with Tsurumi.
C
“Wyoming law recognizes a limited tort claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in employment contracts.” Worley, 1 P.3d at 624. But “[a]lthough
a duty of good faith and fair dealing is created by law in all [employment] cases, it is only
in rare and exceptional cases that the duty is of such a nature as to give rise to tort
liability.” Id. Only when “a special relationship of trust and reliance exists between the
employer and the employee seeking recovery” may the employee recover in tort. Id.
Often, a “special relationship” may be found “in a long-term employment relationship,
coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the employee.”
Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 105 P.3d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 2005). Wyoming courts also
find a “special relationship” when there is “separate consideration, common law,
statutory rights, or the existence of rights accruing with longevity of service.” Id.(quotation omitted).
Although Tyler’s complaint invokes the magic words “special relationship,” it
does not allege facts demonstrating anything extraordinary about his employment. He
lists his duties and asserts that Tsurumi benefited from his work. Yet if that constituted a
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“special relationship” under Wyoming law, all employees who did any work would have
a cause of action. He does mention his longevity of service. But he does not explain how
Tsurumi was seeking to “avoid employer responsibilities” by discharging him. Cf.
Hoflund,105 P.3d at 1087. Accordingly, we take the district court’s view of the matter in
concluding that dismissal is required.
D
In Wyoming, “a limited exception to the at-will employment doctrine” provides
that “an employee may not be terminated for a reason that violates public policy.”
McLean v. Hyland Enters., Inc., 34 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Wyo. 2001). To successfully plead
a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, an employee must establish:
“(1) [t]he discharge violated a well established public policy; and (2) there is no other
remedy available to protect the interests of the discharged employee or society.”
McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt. LLC, 211 P.3d 503, 507 (Wyo. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
According to Tyler’s complaint, his suit implicates the public policy “that a
producer of goods and its employees must protect the interests of its products [sic]
consumers.” While not particularly illogical, this is nonetheless not a well established
public policy under Wyoming law. See McGarvey, 211 P.3d at 508 (rejecting a
discharge in violation of public policy claim arising from speech critical of employer).
The district court correctly dismissed Tyler’s claim.
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III
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in its judgment, and
accordingly AFFIRM.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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