United States v. Ocon-Estrada

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 26, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 06-2326
v. (D.C. No. CR-06-1244 BB)
(D .N.M .)
PED RO OCO N -ESTR AD A ,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant-Appellant Pedro Ocon-Estrada entered a guilty plea to one
charge of illegal reentry of an alien after deportation for a conviction of an
aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). As a result, the
district court sentenced him to thirty months’ imprisonment and two years’
supervised release. M r. Ocon-Esrada appeals, arguing that the thirty-month
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
sentence is unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
M r. Ocon-Estrada was arrested by a federal agent on M arch 22, 2006 and
was charged with being illegally present in the United States subsequent to
deportation for an aggravated felony conviction. He pleaded guilty to that charge
shortly thereafter.
Prior to M r. Ocon-Estrada’s sentencing hearing, a Presentence Investigation
Report (PSR ) was prepared. The PSR revealed that, on M ay 31, 1994, M r. Ocon-
Estrada was convicted of burglary of a habitation in Texas state court, which
resulted in a suspended ten-year prison sentence. On April 13, 1995, however,
his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
Consequently, the PSR calculated M r. Ocon-Estrada’s base offense-level as eight
and recommended a sixteen-level enhancement because his prior burglary
conviction qualified as an enumerated “crime of violence.” See U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) & cmt. n.1(B)(iii). The PSR also recommended a three-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense-level of
twenty-one. In addition, M r. Ocon-Estrada had three criminal history points,
placing him in a criminal history category of II. A base offense-level of twenty-
one combined with a criminal history category of II resulted in a Guideline range
of forty-one to fifty-one months’ imprisonment, which the Probation Office
believed to be reasonable.
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At the district court, M r. Ocon-Estrada claimed that his date of birth was
January 28, 1977 and thus he was only seventeen years old when he was
convicted of burglary in Texas. Prior to his current offense, M r. Ocon-Estrada
had been arrested on three occasions and had given his date of birth as June 3,
1976 each time. Nonetheless, the PSR adopted the 1977 date of birth and noted
his juvenile status at the time of his Texas burglary conviction.
At the sentencing hearing, M r. Ocon-Estrada argued that the forty-one to
fifty-one month Guideline range was unreasonable because he had been convicted
of the crime of violence eleven years prior and had committed that crime when he
was a minor. He also argued that the burglary for which he was convicted in
Texas was not in fact a crime of violence. For these reasons, he requested a
sentence of ten months’ imprisonment. The district court, however, concluded
that his burglary conviction was indeed a crime of violence and thus a sixteen
level enhancement to his base offense-level was appropriate. But, it agreed with
M r. Ocon-Estrada that his juvenile status was a relevant sentencing factor and, as
a result, it found that a downward variance from the advisory Guideline range was
appropriate. II Aplt. App. (Statement of Reasons) at 3. As a result, it sentenced
him to thirty months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release.
On appeal, M r. Ocon-Estrada maintains that, despite the fact it is eleven
months less than the minimum advisory Guideline range, the district court’s
sentence is unreasonable because it still includes a sixteen-level enhancement for
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an offense he committed as a juvenile over eleven years ago. He claims that the
sentence does not adequately compensate for the fact that he was a minor at the
time of the prior offense. Additionally, he asks us to reverse his sentence because
the district court failed to adequately explain why it sentenced him to thirty
months’ imprisonment rather than the ten months he requested.
W hen reviewing a challenged sentence, we engage in a two-step analysis.
First, we determine whether the district court correctly calculated the Guideline
sentence, “reviewing its legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
clear error.” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). Second, we consider whether the ultimate sentence is reasonable in light
of the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Jarillo-Luna, 478
F.3d 1226, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 2007).
The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines sentence. M r. Ocon-
Estrada first appears to argue that the district court improperly applied the
Guidelines because his prior Texas conviction for burglary does not constitute a
crime of violence supporting a sixteen-level enhancement to his base offense
level. This argument is unconvincing given that the definition of a “crime of
violence” found in the comments to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 specifically lists “burglary
of a dwelling” as a crime of violence. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii); see
also United States v. Guadardo, 40 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
burglary of a dwelling in Texas constitutes a crime of violence). M oreover, M r.
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Ocon-Estrada’s alleged status as a minor does not alter the characterization of his
prior offense as a crime of violence.
M r. Ocon-Estrada’s reliance on our unpublished decision in United States
v. Ortuno-Caballero, 187 F. App’x 814 (10th Cir. 2006), is unavailing. In that
case, we explained:
Because defendant has not been convicted of any of the crimes
specifically enumerated in the first portion of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)’s “crime
of violence” definition, the only way he could be subjected to the 16-
level enhancement thereunder is if his prior Colorado state conviction
for attempted first degree criminal trespass of a dwelling “had as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another.”
Id. at 817 (alteration omitted). Here, burglary of a dwelling is specifically listed
as a crime of violence within U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). That listing,
standing alone, renders Ortuno-Caballero inapposite.
M r. Ocon-Estrada further contends that the district court erred in enhancing
his offense-level based on his prior conviction because U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)
prohibits taking a juvenile conviction into account if the defendant was released
from confinement for that offense more than five years prior to the offense for
which he is currently being sentenced. In so arguing, he conflates the rules
regarding the calculation of a criminal history category with those regarding the
calculation of an offense-level. Section 4A1.2, entitled “Definitions and
Instructions for Computing Criminal History,” provides instructions for
calculating a defendant’s criminal history points; it has nothing to do with the
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calculation of an offense-level and places no limitation on the enhancement of a
defendant’s offense-level for prior crimes of violence.
Finally, M r. Ocon-Estrada argues that the district court misapplied the
Guidelines because the sixteen-level enhancement was for a crime that occurred
more than eleven years prior to his illegal reentry. This argument similarly fails
because U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 does not require that a prior conviction for a crime of
violence be within a certain period of time from a reentry in order to support an
enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(viii). Thus, the district court
did not err in concluding that M r. Ocon-Estrada’s prior conviction constituted a
crime of violence and necessitated a sixteen-level enhancement.
Turning to the reasonableness of the sentence, M r. Ocon-Estrada avers that
the thirty-month sentence is unreasonable because it still includes an enhancement
for a crime committed while a minor, and he claims the district court did not give
adequate reasons for only reducing his sentence by eleven months (from the
bottom of the Guideline range) rather than by the thirty-one months he requested.
Both arguments, however, are without merit. The district court properly
considered the fact that M r. Ocon-Estrada was a juvenile when he committed the
prior offense and, due to that fact, the court imposed a sentence eleven months
below the minimum advisory Guideline sentence in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)’s sentencing factors. III Aplt. App. at 9-10. M ore specifically, the
district court stated the following:
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The Court has reviewed the factual findings and has considered the
sentencing guideline applications. The Court has also considered the
factors set forth in 18 United States Code, Section 3553. The Court
finds the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant indicate that the guidelines do not
adequately account for his juvenile status at the time of the offense.
Therefore, although the Court has considered the seriousness of the
offense and the seriousness of this offense in terms of reentering the
country, and to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct in the
future by this defendant and protect the public as necessary, the C ourt
will depart downw ard three levels, and that will make this an offense
level of 18, rather than 21, as indicated in the presentence report.
Together with a criminal history category of 2 results in a guideline
imprisonment range of 30 to 37 months. . . . Therefore, . . . Pedro Ocon-
Estrada, will be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to
serve a term of 30 months.
Id.Thus, for the purposes of deterrence and protecting the public and in
consideration of the seriousness of the offense (all factors listed in § 3553(a)), the
district court determined that thirty months was an appropriate sentence. In doing
so, the court exercised its discretion under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220(2005), to impose a sentence lower than that suggested by the properly calculated
Guideline range because M r. Ocon-Estrada was a minor when he committed the
offense underlying his prior conviction. The reasons given for arriving at the
thirty-month sentence were sufficient. See Jarillo-Luna, 478 F.3d at 1230. As a
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result, the district court imposed a procedurally and substantively reasonable
sentence.
A FFIR ME D.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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