Thompson v. Kansas Department of Corrections

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 20, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ED G A R M ILTO N TH O MPSO N,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 07-3045
v. (D. Kansas)
K A N SA S D EPA RTM EN T O F (D.C. No.05-CV-3453-CM )
C ORREC TIO N S; JO H N CO O LING,
Chief Records Clerk, Lansing
Correctional Facility; DAV ID R.
M CKUNE, W arden, Lansing
Correctional Facility; W ILLIAM L.
CUM M INGS, Correctional M anager &
Secretary of Corrections Designee;
JEFFERY L. COW GER, Counsel of
Record, Kansas Department of
Corrections,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, T YM KOV IC H, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Edgar Thompson, proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
while a state prisoner in Kansas in 2005; he has since been released. His
complaint alleged that the defendant prison officials violated his constitutional
rights by (1) refusing to release him in 1999, a claimed parole date; (2) refusing
to release him again in late 2004, allegedly, the end of his sentence; and (3)
denying access to the courts. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
M r. Thompson pleaded guilty in 1992 to one count of aggravated indecent
liberties with a child and assault. He received a sentence of three to ten years’
imprisonment. He sought state post-conviction relief, which the Kansas courts
denied in 1996. In 1998, M r. Thompson filed a petition for federal habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied as untimely filed. W e
agreed and denied M r. Thompson a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2253. Thom pson v. Simmons, No. 98-3270, 1999 W L 339697, at *1
(10th Cir. M ay 28, 1999). W e also rejected M r. Thompson’s claims of actual
innocence. Id.In December 2004, M r. Thompson filed an action in federal court styled as
a declaratory judgment action seeking a re-computation of his sentence. The
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district court gave M r. Thompson two months to respond to the defendants’
motion to dismiss, during which time M r. Thompson failed to respond. The
district court dismissed that action concluding (1) it was an attempt to reopen
examination of his prior state and federal habeas determinations; and, in the
alternative, (2) M r. Thompson failed to respond. See Aples’ Ex. 3, Order, Case
No. 04-1379-JTM , filed M arch 1, 2005. M r. Thompson filed the instant action in
December 2005.
II. DISCUSSION
W e review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. United
States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1996). “[W ]e must
accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and construe all reasonable allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.A. Issue and Claim Preclusion
The district court determined that M r. Thompson’s release date claims were
barred by issue and claim preclusion. The district court found these claims were
identical to claims M r. Thompson brought in his prior federal habeas petition and
in the declaratory relief action. The district court also found that the prior action
was fully adjudicated on the merits, that M r. Thompson was a party in the prior
action, and that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
action.
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Res judicata is an affirmative defense that “encompasses two distinct
barriers to repeat litigation: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” Park Lake
Res. L.L.C . v. U SD A, 378 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004). Claim preclusion
applies if three elements exist: (1) a judgment on the merits in an earlier action,
(2) identity of parties in both suits, and (3) identity of the cause of action in both
suits. King v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 117 F.3d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1997).
“Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage, issue preclusion, ‘means simply that
when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any
future lawsuit.’” Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (quoting Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).
Before this court, M r. Thompson vehemently disagrees with the district
court’s characterizations of his complaint, and accuses the district court of
“tell[ing] [a] wrongful and malicious((LIE)) . . . in nearly every sentence and
paragraph . . . .” Aplt’s Br. part two, at 19, see also id. at 10, 13, 21. Despite
M r. Thompson’s exhortations, our review of the record comports with the district
court’s scrupulous analysis: identical parties previously fully and fairly litigated
legally identical issues in federal court. M r Thompson had ample opportunity to
litigate his claim; his failure to comply with procedural rules or cure procedural
defects did not deprive him of this opportunity. W e therefore hold that the
district court properly dismissed M r. Thompson’s claims as barred by res judicata.
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B. Denial of Access to the Courts
As to the denial of access to the courts claim, the district court considered
M r. Thompson’s lengthy submissions before dismissing it. Although his
argument is difficult to discern, M r. Thompson seems to contend that he was
denied access because the district court should not have found his claims estopped
because he w as unable to fully present them in previous proceedings. M r.
Thompson maintains that the previous dispositions should not be afforded
preclusive effect because he was deprived of his prison mail, and because his
appointed counsel was incompetent
The district court stated that M r. Thompson’s “claims are conclusory and
omit any allegation of specific hindrance.” Rec. doc. 29, at 5 (Dist. Ct. Order
filed Jan. 10, 2006). Even liberally construing his pleadings, as we must, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we agree. Although this court liberally
construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings and holds them to a less stringent standard
than required of those prepared by a lawyer, Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935,
938 (10th Cir. 1989), we will not assume the role of advocate for the pro se
litigant, nor need we accept conclusory allegations as true. Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Because he has not alleged facts showing he
was unable to pursue a specific legal claim due to lack of access to the courts or
to a prison law library or legal assistance, M r. Thompson fails to state a claim for
denial of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996).
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C . Other C laim s
In addition, throughout his brief on appeal, M r. Thompson raises a litany of
undecipherable claims, including the district court’s alleged partiality, its alleged
malicious deprivation of access to the courts, and the continued manifest injustice
M r. Thompson has endured at the hands of the state and federal courts. M r.
Thompson’s attacks on the judiciary are insufficient to state colorable claims for
relief against the prison officials he has named as defendants. Although he has
not sued the judges about whom he now complains, we note that adverse rulings
alone are rarely sufficient to demonstrate bias, Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 555 (1994), and that “immunity applies even when the judge is accused of
acting maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, (1967).
W e also caution M r. Thompson that his pro se status is not a bar to the imposition
of sanctions. Haworth v. Royal (In re Haworth), 347 F.3d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir.
2003).
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of the defendants’
m otion to dismiss. A ll pending motions are DENIED.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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