Davis v. Ortiz

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 18, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JOE BROOKS DAVIS,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-1129
v. District of Colorado
JOE ORTIZ, Executive Director, (D.C. No. 06-CV-02398-ZLW )
Colorado Department of Corrections
and JOHN SUTHERS, Attorney
General of the State of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and M cCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Joe Brooks Davis, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district court’s order
denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). Because we conclude that M r. Davis has failed to make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request for
a COA, and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Background
In 1992 M r. Davis entered an Alford plea to one count of theft. See North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). He was sentenced to eight years in prison
and is currently incarcerated at the Trinidad Correctional Facility in Trinidad,
Colorado. According to his habeas petition, M r. Davis has filed four
postconviction motions in state court. He filed the first post conviction motion in
state court in M ay 1994; it was pending until July of 1994. He filed the second
postconviction motion in July 1997; it was pending until November 1999. He
filed the third postconviction motion in November 1998; it was pending until
April 2000. And in December 2003 he filed his fourth postconviction motion; it
was pending until September 2006. In November 2006, M r. Davis filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado. The district court denied the application on the ground
that the one year statute of limitation period had expired. M r. Davis now seeks a
COA allowing him to appeal from the district court’s order.
Discussion
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may be appealed
only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
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could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Where, as here, the district court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds,
a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
We deny M r. Davis’s request for a COA because the one year statute of
limitations for an application for a writ of habeas corpus has expired, and no
reasonable jurist could find otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Mr.
Davis was convicted before AEDPA was enacted, the statute of limitations began
to run for purposes of this application on April 24, 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
During that year, no motions for postconviction relief were pending.
M r. Davis argues that the period from April 1996 to June 1997 should be
tolled because he was incarcerated in Arizona and did not have access to Colorado
statutory materials. We need not determine whether this satisfies the “reasonable
diligence” standard for equitable tolling, however, because even if we were to toll
the statute of limitations for the first year, M r. Davis has failed to demonstrate
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that any properly filed postconviction motion was pending between April of 2000
and December of 2003.
M r. Davis argues that the entire period from July 1997 to September 2006
should be tolled because in his July 1997 postconviction motion he raised twelve
claims for relief, but his attorney chose only to pursue one of the claims. Mr.
Davis argues that we should treat the other eleven claims as “pending” until they
were addressed following his December 2003 postconviction motion, even though
they had not been presented to any court for decision during that time. We find this
suggestion wholly unpersuasive.
M r. Davis cites Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 2000), for
the proposition that the statute of limitations is “tolled during the period in which
the petitioner could have sought an appeal under state law” whether or not he
actually did. Id. This does not help his case, however, because Gibson addresses
the time for taking an appeal, not the time for filing a motion for post conviction
relief. We agree with the district court that the statute of limitations was not tolled
during this period because no properly filed postconviction motion was pending.
Conclusion
We therefore DENY M r. Davis’s request for a COA and DISM ISS this
appeal. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also DENIED.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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