United States v. Foy

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 25, 2016
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-4100
(D.C. No. 1:07-CR-00057-DB-1)
STEPHEN FOY, D. Utah
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
Appearing pro se, defendant-appellant Stephen Foy appeals from the
district court’s denial of the motion he filed pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
On May 16, 2007, Foy was charged in a federal indictment with one count
of producing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The same
month, the state of Utah charged him with sexually abusing his two minor
daughters. 1 On December 2, 2008, Foy was charged in a superseding information
with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Foy pleaded guilty to that charge and entered into a written plea agreement with
the government. The agreement expressly stated that the government intended to
recommend a ten-year term of imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised
release. Although the government had previously informed the district court that
the parties were seeking a “global resolution” of the federal and state charges, the
plea agreement did not mention the state charges or contain any agreement as to
whether the federal sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with any
state sentence.
At the change-of-plea hearing, Foy acknowledged he had reviewed the
written plea agreement with his attorney and that he understood it. Foy signed
the plea agreement in the presence of the court and his attorney acknowledged it
was the entire agreement between Foy and the government. During the hearing,
1
The alleged victims in the federal offense were the same two minors.
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the federal prosecutor informed the district court that state charges were still
pending but the parties had “worked this out globally with both the state and our
system.” There was, however, no discussion as to whether Foy’s federal sentence
would run consecutively or concurrently with any state sentence.
Foy was sentenced on May 13, 2009. At the sentencing hearing, defense
counsel informed the district court that there were “some other companion cases,
not only in the federal system but in the state system also” and he was not the
attorney of record in the state cases. He also informed the court that Foy had not
opposed the government’s recommended sentence of ten years’ imprisonment as
“part of a global settlement.” During the sentencing hearing, neither party
referred to concurrent or consecutive sentences as being part of their agreement,
nor did any party ask the court to order the federal sentence run consecutively or
concurrently with any anticipated state sentence. The district court imposed a
ten-year term of incarceration to be followed by a life term of supervised release.
The court did not indicate whether the federal sentence would run consecutively
or concurrently with any state sentence.
Two years after Foy was sentenced, the government filed a motion
requesting that the district court “clarify whether it intended Mr. Foy’s sentence
to receive federal credit for the time he has served under his state sentence.” The
district court did not rule on this motion. In 2015, Foy filed a pro se motion
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 seeking clarification of the federal judgment or, in
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the alternative, correction of his sentence. In the motion, Foy informed the
district court he had been sentenced in the state case approximately one month
after his federal sentencing. He also informed the court that the state judge had
ordered the state sentence to run concurrently with the federal sentence. Foy was
released from state incarceration into federal custody on May 3, 2012. Relying
on Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Foy asked the district
court to “correct” the “oversight” in his federal sentence and clarify that it should
run concurrently with the state sentence. Foy also asked the court to issue an
order crediting him with the time he served in state custody.
In response to Foy’s motion, the district court issued an Amended
Judgment, expressly stating that the federal sentence would run consecutively to
the state sentence. The Amended Judgment, in effect, was a denial of Foy’s
motion. Foy filed this timely appeal.
This court has never specifically determined the standard of review
applicable to Rule 36 motions. See United States v. Gutierrez, 401 F. App’x. 378,
380 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished disposition). We have previously applied
either the abuse-of-discretion standard or reviewed the matter for clear error. See
id. It is unnecessary to resolve the issue in this appeal because the district court
did not commit reversible error under any standard of review.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment
imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms
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are to run concurrently.” For purposes of this statute, sentences imposed in
separate federal and state proceedings are treated as being imposed at different
times. See United States v. Eccleston, 521 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2008)
(assuming § 3584(a) applies when one of the multiple sentences is a state
sentence); see also Newman v. Cozza-Rhodes, 526 F. App’x 818, 822 (10th Cir.
2013) (unpublished disposition) (citing Eccleston for proposition that “[w]hen a
federal sentence is silent on the matter, a statutory presumption is triggered;
multiple sentences imposed at different times—even as between state and federal
sentences—run consecutively”); Heddings v. Garcia, 491 F. App’x 896, 899 (10th
Cir. 2012) (unpublished disposition) (same). Because the original judgment did
not affirmatively order that Foy’s federal and state sentences run concurrently, the
federal sentence is consecutive to his state sentence under the terms of § 3584(a).
It is irrelevant that the state sentence had not yet been imposed at the time Foy
was sentenced by the district court. United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57, 59
(10th Cir. 1995) (holding § 3584(a) does not prohibit “a district court from
ordering that a federal sentence be served consecutively to a state sentence that
has not yet been imposed”). Further, the record does not provide support for
Foy’s assertion there was a binding agreement that the federal sentence would run
concurrently with his state sentence. Although the parties referenced a “global
agreement,” the terms of any such agreement are not discernable from the record.
There is no language in the written plea agreement discussing whether the two
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sentences should run concurrently or consecutively and there was no discussion of
the issue at the change of plea hearing or the sentencing hearing. Accordingly,
the request in Foy’s Rule 36 motion that the district court “correct” his sentence
to run concurrent to his state sentence, was actually a request that the court
modify his sentence. A district court is authorized by Rule 36 only to correct,
“[c]lerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an
error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. The
district court did not err by denying Foy’s motion because it had no authority
under Rule 36 to substantively modify a sentence. United States v. Blackwell, 81
F.3d 945, 949 (10th Cir. 1996).
Foy also argues that because his federal sentence should have been ordered
to run concurrently with his state sentence, the district court should credit him
with the time he served in state custody. This argument is essentially a repeat of
Foy’s assertion the district court erred by not ordering concurrent sentences.
Because we have already concluded Foy’s federal sentence was to run consecutive
to his state sentence, this argument fails. Foy argues, however, that the federal
court could not “change” the state court’s judgment that the state sentence should
run concurrent to the federal sentence. This argument also fails. Even when a
“state sentence provides for concurrent service of the federal and state sentences,
the state court’s decision cannot alter the federal-court sentence.” Eccleston, 521
F.3d at 1254. Thus, the state court’s judgment does not affect our determination
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that the sentence imposed by the district court was to run consecutive to Foy’s
state sentence and Foy is not entitled to the relief he seeks.
The district court’s denial of Foy’s Rule 36 motion is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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