Garcia v. State of Wyoming

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 8, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JACQUELINE M. GARCIA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-8019
(D. Wyoming)
STATE OF WYOMING, (D.C. No. 2:14-CV-00007-NDF)
Defendant - Appellee.
SIGIFREDO MOLINA VARELA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-8020
(D. Wyoming)
STATE OF WYOMING, (D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00288-NDF)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In these consolidated appeals, Mr. Sigifredo Molina-Varela and Ms.
Jacqueline Garcia, both federal prisoners proceeding pro se, appeal orders
dismissing and denying various motions and actions filed by them following their
federal convictions for drug violations. We affirm the dismissals and denials
entered by the district court, and we dismiss these appeals.
BACKGROUND
After receiving information that Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia were
distributing methamphetamine in the Gillette, Wyoming area, agents from the
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation commenced an investigation. That
investigation confirmed that Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia were distributing
methamphetamine and that they were using two firearms and their 1996 Chevrolet
Camaro to facilitate the distribution. As a result, both were charged with, and
subsequently convicted by the Wyoming federal district court for, one count of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A),
and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug felony, in
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Our court affirmed both convictions.
United States v. Molina Varela, No. 13-8067 (10th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014)
(unpublished); United States v. Garcia, No. 13-8066 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2014)
(unpublished).
Some three months after their federal convictions, the State of Wyoming
filed a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem in Wyoming state court against
the two firearms and the 1996 Chevrolet Camaro. Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms.
Garcia each filed a motion to stay those proceedings, which included a request
that the State be required to provide them with copies of various legal materials.
The state court denied these motions. Neither Mr. Molina-Varela nor Ms. Garcia
filed any further motion or pleading in state court. When they both failed to
defend against the State court forfeiture proceedings, the State requested a default
judgment. Accordingly, the State court entered a default judgment against the
property, forfeiting it to the State of Wyoming. Neither Mr. Molina-Varela nor
Ms. Garcia appealed that decision or pursued any other relief in State court.
Instead of pursuing State remedies, Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia filed
motions in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming seeking to
intervene in the proceedings before the State court. They called each of their
motions a “Motion for Stay/Injunction of Proceedings and to Compel Defendant
to Comply or Show Just Cause.” In those motions, Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms.
Garcia first described their denied requests to be provided with legal materials by
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the State. Second, they asserted that the State could not pursue forfeiture of the
1996 Chevrolet Camaro and the firearms in the State civil forfeiture proceeding
because they (Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia) were being criminally
prosecuted by the Federal government, not the State government. Finally, they
claimed that the forfeiture of the property would amount to an unconstitutionally
excessive fine. Relying on those arguments, the two asked the federal district
court to stay the State court proceedings and require the State to post a bond for
the value of the property at issue.
In response to those motions, the State asserted that the federal district
court could not exercise jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings initiated in
State court. The federal district court agreed, and denied the identical motions
filed by Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia. The two then moved the district
court to set aside its dismissal of their intervention requests, and the federal
district court denied those motions. These appeals followed, which we
consolidated for purposes of this appeal. Because Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms.
Garcia have filed identical briefs, and the district court’s orders in each case are
identical, we treat the two appeals as one.
DISCUSSION
As the State notes, we must first satisfy ourselves that we have jurisdiction
over these proceedings. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
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possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Sunshine
Haven Nursing Operations, LLC v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 742 F.3d
1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. Mosaic Potash
Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2012)). As indicated, the district
court determined that it lacked jurisdiction. We agree with that conclusion and
determine that we too lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
28 U.S.C. § 1355(a) specifically gives the federal district courts jurisdiction
over forfeiture proceedings that are commenced under “any Act of Congress . . .”
Id. Congress has authorized federal entities to file civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings against items used or intended to be used to violate the federal
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881; 18 U.S.C. § 983. In those cases, we
would have jurisdiction over an appeal from the federal district court’s final order
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. $252,300.00 in U.S. Currency, 484
F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2007).
That is not the case here, where no federal forfeiture proceedings were ever
initiated. Rather, the forfeiture proceedings at issue in this case were initiated in
Wyoming state court under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1049. The property involved
in this case (the firearms and the Camaro) was and is in the possession of
Wyoming authorities, and the State forfeiture proceedings were well under way
before Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia sought to intervene by way of filing an
action in federal district court. Because the State court exercised its jurisdiction
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over the property, it had the power to decide the case without any interference
from the federal district court. See United States v. One Parcel Property Located
at Lot 85, Cnty Ridge, 100 F.3d 740, 741 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the court
first asserting jurisdiction over the property has the power to decide the case
without interference from other courts, even though those courts may have had
jurisdiction over the property had they exercised that jurisdiction first.”). “This
first-in-time rule applies to in rem proceedings in both federal and state courts.”
Id. Thus, the federal district court lacked jurisdiction over the disputed property
at the time Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia sought relief from the district
court.
Furthermore, the federal district court was obligated to refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction in this case pursuant to the Younger abstention
doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013); Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1232
(10th Cir. 2007). Younger abstention prevents federal courts from intervening in
certain state proceedings involving “exceptional circumstances,” including certain
types of civil enforcement proceedings and civil proceedings involving orders
“uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 591 (quoting New Orleans Pub.
Serv. , Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)).
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The forfeiture proceedings in the Wyoming courts present the kind of civil
enforcement action that mandates abstention by the federal courts. See Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 591.
In order for property to be subject to forfeiture under Wyoming law, it must have
been used, or intended for use, in violation of the Wyoming Controlled
Substances Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1001, et. seq. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-
7-1049(a). Those Wyoming civil forfeiture provisions are in aid of and closely
related to Wyoming’s criminal statutes; this presents the very type of civil
enforcement proceeding where the Younger abstention doctrine prevents federal
court intervention in state court proceedings. We therefore agree that the district
court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant State of
Wyoming.
Although we have determined that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal,
and therefore do not reach its merits, we nonetheless briefly address the specific
arguments made by Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia. Thus, they first argue
that, because they were prosecuted under federal law, the State somehow
relinquished jurisdiction over all things related to their criminal prosecution,
including the firearms and vehicle subject to the State civil forfeiture
proceedings. This argument overlooks the point that state and federal
governments and governmental proceedings, including criminal prosecutions, are
distinct and separate, see Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1471 (2012),
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and that forfeiture proceedings are related to, but distinct from, criminal
prosecutions. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613-19 (1993).
Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia next claim that their access to the courts
was impeded by the defendant State. They claim that the United States Supreme
Court’s pronouncement in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) that “the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities
to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law” provides them with some remedy by the federal
district court. They seem to claim that the State of Wyoming impeded their
access to the courts by refusing to provide them with copies of Wyoming statutes
and cases and that this deprivation caused them to default in the State court civil
forfeiture proceedings. This argument fails for multiple reasons.
First, Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia were incarcerated in federal
prisons at the time they filed their motions in federal district court. The State of
Wyoming has no control over, or authority in, the law libraries or other relevant
facilities in federal prisons. Second, the particular action in this case (for the
civil in rem forfeiture of a car and firearms) is not necessarily the type of action
that can support an access to the courts claim. The Supreme Court has stated that
inmates may claim a right to assistance in the preparation of legal papers that
directly or collaterally attack their sentences and the conditions of their
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confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (“Bounds does not
guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines
capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall
claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in
order to attach their sentences, directly or indirectly, and in order to challenge the
conditions of their confinement.”). We have further noted that, “in all other types
of civil actions, states may not erect barriers that impede the right of access of
incarcerated persons.” Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir.
2010) (quoting Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2005)). Even if
a civil in rem action was the type of civil action for which a state may not erect
barriers, Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia do not demonstrate what “barriers”
the State placed in their path which actually impeded their access to courts.
Third, to the extent they claim they did not receive due process before they
were deprived of their property, they have not established that they did not
receive notice or an opportunity to be heard in the State in rem forfeiture
proceedings. The record shows that they simply failed to defend against the State
proceedings. And, if they wish to challenge the forfeiture proceedings, their
remedy lies in the State courts. Finally, they simply miss the mark in arguing that
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 requires the State to send them legal materials.
Mr. Molina-Varela and Ms. Garcia lastly argue that their “rights according
to the Eighth Amendment protecting an individual from excessive fines has [sic]
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been violated.” Appellants’ Op. Br. at i, 13. Here, they make a convoluted
argument that “the principles of proportionality . . . apply to the Appellee [State
of Wyoming] [since] the Federal sentencing court determined that Appellant did
not have the financial means with which to pay the penalties allowed by law for
his offense.” Id. at 14. They also argue that, since the federal authorities
prosecuted them, the State has no authority to seize anything, and the “forfeiture
action by the Appellee voids Appellant’s plea agreement” with federal authorities.
Id. at 16. As the State notes, the Excessive Fines Clause has never been
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states. See
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, ___ n.13, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035,
n.13 (2010). And they fail to develop any articulate argument concerning their
plea agreements.
In short, Mr. Molina-Varela’s and Ms. Garcia’s arguments would fail, even
assuming we had jurisdiction to address them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s determination
that it lacked jurisdiction to address the appellants’ motions. We DISMISS these
appeals. Appellants’ motions for leave to appeal without prepayment of fees is
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GRANTED and they are reminded of their obligation to continue making partial
payments until the filing fees are paid in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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