Hunter v. Jones

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 13, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
RODNEY HUNTER,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 10-6046
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
JUSTIN JONES, Director, (D.C. No. 5:09-CV-00567-F)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Rodney Renee Hunter, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks
a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of his application under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 for habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (requiring COA to
appeal denial of application). Because no reasonable jurist could debate whether
Mr. Hunter’s application ought to have been granted, we deny his request for a
COA.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Hunter was convicted by a jury in Oklahoma state court of distribution
of a controlled substance (Xanax) after two or more prior felony convictions. He
was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.
Christopher Rush, a convenience-store employee, was the principal witness
at Mr. Hunter’s trial. He testified that when Mr. Hunter was in the store, he asked
Mr. Hunter for some Xanax. Mr. Hunter left to obtain the drug, but when a police
officer entered the store, Rush called Mr. Hunter to tell him not to return until the
officer left. About 30 minutes after his first conversation with Mr. Hunter, Rush
went out to the store parking lot to meet him at Mr. Hunter’s vehicle. Mr. Hunter
gave Rush a package with four Xanax pills. Rush later pleaded guilty to
possession of a controlled substance.
The officer corroborated much of Rush’s account. He testified that he had
just left the convenience store after buying a snack when a police-department
dispatcher who happened to be in the store approached him at his car. She told
him that she had overheard Rush say to someone on the phone, “[H]e’s about to
leave, when he leaves you can come up here.” Br. of Aplee. at 2, Hunter v. State,
No. F-2008-700 (Okla. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2008). Deciding to investigate, the
officer pulled into an alley from which he could observe the store through
binoculars. He saw Mr. Hunter arrive in his vehicle, Rush approach the vehicle,
and Mr. Hunter apparently hand something to Rush. After the transaction, the
officer questioned Rush about what Mr. Hunter had handed him. Rush gave the
officer a cigarette pack containing Xanax pills.
Michael Lynn Williams also testified for the state. He said that in an
unrelated transaction Mr. Hunter had sold him methamphetamine. The
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methamphetamine sale took place after Mr. Hunter gave Xanax to Rush, but
Mr. Hunter was convicted and sentenced for distribution of methamphetamine
before he was tried on the Xanax transaction.
Mr. Hunter appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (OCCA), arguing four main claims: (1) that he was denied his right to a
fair trial by the introduction of evidence of his methamphetamine crime; (2) that
there were various prejudicial errors in the sentencing phase of his trial; (3) that
his trial counsel’s failure to object to these sentencing-phase errors constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) that he received an excessive sentence.
The OCCA held that William’s testimony about the methamphetamine sale was
inadmissible. Because of this error and various errors in the sentencing phase, the
OCCA reduced Mr. Hunter’s sentence from 20 years’ imprisonment to six years’
imprisonment, the minimum possible sentence for distribution of a controlled
substance after two or more prior felony convictions.
On May 29, 2009, Mr. Hunter filed his § 2254 application in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. It asserted a single
ground for relief: that the state’s introduction of evidence of his prior crime
violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. He claimed that he was entitled to
habeas relief because the OCCA failed to reverse his conviction. In response, the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation stated:
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The OCCA’s implicit finding that the evidence was sufficient to
support [Mr. Hunter’s] conviction is neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. The introduction of
the other crimes evidence did not determine the outcome of the jury’s
finding of guilt in light of the strength of the other evidence, and the
OCCA modified [Mr. Hunter’s] sentence to the minimum sentence.
[Mr. Hunter] was not, therefore, denied the fundamental fairness that
is the essence of due process.
R., Vol. 1 at 9 (footnote omitted). The district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation and denied relief.
Mr. Hunter now seeks a COA from this court. He asserts four challenges:
(1) that he was denied a fair trial by the introduction of evidence of a past crime;
(2) that numerous sentencing-stage errors deprived him of a fair sentencing
determination; (3) that his counsel’s failure to object to misconduct at the
sentencing stage constituted ineffective assistance; and (4) that he received an
excessive sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard
requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant must
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show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either
“debatable or wrong.” Id.We summarily dispose of three of Mr. Hunter’s claims: (1) that
sentencing-stage errors deprived him of a fair sentencing determination, (2) that
his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the sentencing stage, and (3)
that his sentence was excessive. Because he failed to raise these issues in his §
2254 application to the district court, we decline to address them. See Rhine v.
Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e will generally not consider
issues raised on appeal that were not first presented to the district court.”). In any
event, the OCCA resentenced Mr. Hunter to the minimum permissible term for his
offense, so ultimately no errors at sentencing could have prejudiced him.
Mr. Hunter’s remaining claim is that the admission of evidence of his
methamphetamine offense rendered his trial unfair. The OCCA did not express a
view on whether the error denied Mr. Hunter a fair trial; once it found error, all it
did was reduce the sentence. We therefore have no state-court decision to defer
to under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Even on de novo review, however, the issue is not difficult. The improper
admission of evidence does not render a trial fundamentally unfair if there is
otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt. See Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999,
1025 (10th Cir. 2006) (improper closing argument did not deny defendant a fair
trial in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt); United States v. Caballero, 277
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F.3d 1235, 1244–45 (10th Cir. 2002) (improper reference to defendant’s prior
conviction not ground for mistrial when there was other overwhelming evidence
of guilt). In light of the other overwhelming evidence of Mr. Hunter’s guilt
presented at his trial, no reasonable jurist could say that he was denied a fair trial.
Moreover, Mr. Hunter has presented no authority that the introduction of the
methamphetamine evidence was improper under the federal constitution, even if it
violated a state rule of evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We GRANT Mr. Hunter’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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