Baker v. Target Corporation

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 13, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARCELLUS H. BAKER, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 10-3128
(D.C. No. 6:09-CV-01214-MLB-KMH)
v. (D. Kansas)
TARGET CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10 th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Marcellus H. Baker, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his
claim against his former employer, Target Corporation, for failure to state a
claim. We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Baker was formerly employed by Target as a Bike Specialist. He
alleges that Target discriminated against him from April 1, 2009, until June 16,
2009. Further, he claims that on April 22, 2009, he was wrongly accused of
failing to perform his work duties.
On June 1 and June 19, 2009, Mr. Baker filed complaints with the Kansas
Human Rights Commission (“KHRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). In his complaints, he checked every box alleging
discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, retaliation, age,
and disability. While Mr. Baker claims the EEOC intake worker checked all the
boxes, he provides no evidence of that. On June 13, the EEOC found no
violations and issued Mr. Baker a right to sue notice.
On July 9, Mr. Baker filed his pro se complaint against Target, alleging
discrimination based on race, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability and
retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e - 2(a)(1) & 2000e-3(a), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621- 634. Mr. Baker also alleged that Target had failed to
accommodate his disability.
While noting Mr. Baker’s pro se status, the district court nonetheless
dismissed his complaint:
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The court agrees with [Target] that all but one sentence in
plaintiff’s factual allegations are conclusory statements. Plaintiff
provides no statement of fact that support[s] his claim[s] for
discrimination based on race, gender, national origin, religion, age,
or disability. Nor has plaintiff provided any statement of fact as to
how [Target] allegedly harassed him. . . . Therefore, plaintiff’s Title
VII, ADEA, and ADA discrimination claims are dismissed under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Memorandum & Order at 4. While acknowledging that Mr. Baker provided
“slightly more factual support for his retaliation claim, the court still finds that
the allegations are insufficient to support such a claim.” Id. The court further
found that Mr. Baker failed to exhaust his claim about failure to accommodate,
and it was subject to dismissal as well.
In sum, the court granted Target’s motion to dismiss. We have carefully
reviewed the record and, while we acknowledge the leeway allowed pro se
plaintiffs, we agree that the district court properly dismissed Mr. Baker’s action.
We also deny all pending motions.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order dismissing
this action.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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