Union Insurance Company v. Mendoza

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
December 13, 2010
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNION INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Counter-
Defendant-Appellee,
v. No. 09-3159
(D.C. No. 6:08-CV-01096-MLB)
KARLA MENDOZA, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Counter-
Claimant-Appellant.
__________
COMPLEX INSURANCE CLAIMS
LITIGATION ASSOCIATION,
Amicus Curiae.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Karla Mendoza appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Union Insurance Company (Union), in which it ruled that the accidental
disbursement of anhydrous ammonia was excluded from coverage by Union’s
pollution exclusion clause. We have jurisdiction over this diversity case under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Denial of Coverage. The facts are uncontroverted. In July 2006,
Ms. Mendoza was injured by a spray of anhydrous ammonia fertilizer released on
farm land in Kansas owned by Irsik G&B Farms, Inc. (Irsik Farms). Union
provided a Farm owners-Ranch owners insurance policy to Irsik Farms from
September 2005 to September 2006. Ms. Mendoza filed a personal injury lawsuit
against Irsik Farms and its employee, Bradley Irsik, alleging that they caused her
bodily injury by exposing her to a mist of anhydrous ammonia fertilizer on
July 14, 2006. Anhydrous ammonia fertilizer places nitrogen into the soil, and is
commonly used as a fertilizer. Relying on a pollution exclusion provision in its
insurance policy, Union denied coverage for the Mendoza lawsuit. Ms. Mendoza
obtained a consent judgment from Irsik Farms for one million dollars, in
exchange for a covenant not to execute upon the judgment against them. Union
filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
seeking a declaratory judgment that the liability policy did not cover the
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Mendoza judgment. Irsik Farms was voluntarily dismissed from the declaratory
action.
B. Underlying Claim. On the day Ms. Mendoza was injured, an Irsik
Farm’s employee was applying anhydrous ammonia fertilizer on an Irsik Farm’s
field next to where Ms. Mendoza was working on road construction. The
employee asked Bradley Irsik for help because the fertilizer was not coming out
evenly. The fertilizer was stored in a tank on the back of a tractor; it was applied
to the soil by flowing through piping from the tank to several holes on shanks on
the tractor’s plow and then into the soil. Bradley Irsik raised the plow out of the
soil to see if the lines were plugged, and looked at the plow to see if vapors were
coming out of the tubes. He then held the hydraulic switch down for about three
seconds, releasing the anhydrous ammonia into the air. At the time, Ms. Mendoza
was loading a road sign on the nearby road when a mist of the anhydrous
ammonia fertilizer engulfed her. She testified that she could not breathe; her
eyes, lungs and throat were burning; and she required medical attention.
C. Policy Language. Union’s policy of insurance to Irsik Farms includes
coverage for personal injury liability. The personal liability coverage contains an
exclusion, however, for personal injury caused by a pollutant. In an endorsement
entitled “Farmer’s Comprehensive Personal Liability Insurance,” the liability
coverage states:
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If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for
damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an
“occurrence” to which this coverage applies, we will:
a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which
the
“Insured” is legally liable; and
b. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice.
We may make any investigation and settle any claim or
suit
that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend
any
claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages
resulting from the “occurrence” equals our limit of
liability.
Aplt. App., Vol. I, at 68.
The “Exclusions” clause in the Personal Liability endorsement states in
relevant part:
Personal Liability and . . . Medical Payments to Others do not apply
to bodily injury or property damage:
****
j. (1) arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of
pollutants:
(a) at or from any premises, site or location which is or
was at any time owned or occupied by, or rented or
loaned to you, or any “Insured”.
****
(d) at or from any premises, site or location on which
you, or any “Insured” or any contractors or
subcontractors working directly or indirectly on
your’s or any “Insured’s” behalf are performing
operations:
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(i) If the pollutants are brought on or to the
premises, site or location in connection with
such operations by you, or any “Insured”. . . .
****
(2)
****
Pollutants mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed.
(This exclusion does not apply to property damage caused by
accidental drift of vapors, fumes, or toxic chemicals as a result of
spraying operations.)
Id. at 69-71.
D. District Court Ruling. The district court granted Union’s motion for
summary judgment, ruling Irsik Farm’s accidental disbursement of anhydrous
ammonia was excluded from coverage by the pollution exclusion. It ruled that
the language of the pollution exclusion clause and its definition of a pollutant are
not ambiguous, and that anhydrous ammonia, while useful as a fertilizer in
farming operation, is a pollutant. Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 345, 347. It concluded
that “a pollutant under the insurance policy is any irritating or contaminating
substance, which may be a solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal substance.” Aplt.
App., Vol. II, at 342. Citing to dictionary definitions, it concluded that an
“irritant is a source of irritation, especially physical irritation,” and that
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“[t]o contaminate means to make impure or unclean by contact or mixture.” Id. at
342-43 (internal quotations omitted). Ms. Mendoza now appeals that ruling.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Mendoza contends that the anhydrous ammonia was being used, as it
commonly is, as a fertilizer, and that under these circumstances, it is not a
pollutant. She contends that the definition of a pollutant in the pollution
exclusion clause is so overly-broad as to be ambiguous because any substance
could conceivably meet the definition of a pollutant under the exclusion. She
notes that the definition of a pollutant does not define the terms irritant or
contaminant and read literally, these terms are virtually boundless, because there
is no substance or chemical in existence that does not irritate or contaminate some
person or property. She contends the terms “irritant” and “contaminant,” do not
have a plain, ordinary meaning. She further argues that, particularly in a farm
owner’s insurance policy, a reasonably prudent insured farmer would not
understand the exclusion clause’s definition of a pollutant to cover a commonly
used farm fertilizer. Thus, she argues that coverage exists because the exclusion
must be interpreted narrowly and in a light most favorable to the insured.
In response, Union contends that anhydrous ammonia is a pollutant under
the terms of its pollution exclusion clause, and thus is excluded from coverage.
Union presented evidence that anhydrous ammonia has known hazardous effects,
including respiratory tract, skin and eye burns, and contains one or more
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components listed as a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act. It asserts
that Ms. Mendoza’s injuries of burning in her eyes, throat, lungs and skin further
establish that anhydrous ammonia fertilizer is an irritant. Thus, Union argues the
anhydrous ammonia is clearly an irritant and contaminant and, thus, falls within
the policy’s definition of a pollutant.
Our duty in a diversity case is to “apply state law in accordance with the
then controlling decision of the highest state court.” Juarez v. United Farm
Tools, Inc., 798 F.2d 1341, 1342 (10th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Under Kansas law, an insurer bears the burden of proving
that coverage is excluded. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams ex rel. Williams,
804 P.2d 1374, 1383 (Kan. 1991). When interpreting insurance contracts, and
exclusion clauses in particular, Kansas applies the following rules of
construction:
Because the insurer prepares its own contracts, it has a duty to
make the meaning clear. If the insurer intends to restrict or limit
coverage under the policy, it must use clear and unambiguous
language; otherwise, the policy will be liberally construed in favor of
the insured. If an insurance policy’s language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken in its plain, ordinary, and popular
sense. In such case, there is no need for judicial interpretation or the
application of rules of liberal construction. The court shall not make
another contract for the parties and must enforce the contract as
made.
However, where the terms of an insurance policy are
ambiguous or uncertain, conflicting, or susceptible of more than one
construction, the construction most favorable to the insured must
prevail.
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To be ambiguous, a contract must contain provisions or
language of doubtful or conflicting meaning, as gleaned from a
natural and reasonable interpretation of its language. Ambiguity in a
written contract does not appear until the application of pertinent
rules of interpretation to the face of the instrument leaves it
genuinely uncertain which one of two or more meanings is the proper
meaning. Whether a written instrument is ambiguous is a question of
law to be decided by the courts. Courts should not strain to create an
ambiguity where, in common sense, there is not one. The test in
determining whether an insurance contract is ambiguous is not what
the insurer intends the language to mean, but what a reasonably
prudent insured would understand the language to mean.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkens, 179 P.3d 1104, 1109-10 (Kan. 2008)
(internal quotation marks and bracketed material omitted).
Different courts interpreting this same definition of a pollutant in liability
exclusion clauses have reached different conclusions as to the term’s meaning and
as to whether the term is ambiguous under Kansas law. Compare Regent Ins. Co.
v. Holmes, 835 F. Supp. 579, 581-82 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that the definition
of pollutants in this exclusion clause was ambiguous because it did not define the
terms irritant or contaminant), and Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg,
794 F. Supp. 353, 355 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that this pollution exclusion clause
was so broad and imprecise as to be ambiguous), with Atl. Ave. Assocs. v. Cent.
Solutions, Inc., 24 P.3d 188, 191-92 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an
identical exclusion clause was not ambiguous), and Crescent Oil Co. v. Federated
Mut. Ins. Co., 888 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that no
ambiguity arose from the pollution exclusion clause language itself).
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Based on these conflicting decisions, we requested the Kansas Supreme
Court to exercise its discretion to accept the certified question of whether the
definition of a pollutant in a standard pollution exclusion clause in a liability
insurance contract is ambiguous under Kansas law. We recognized that the
Kansas Court of Appeals had twice held the term to be unambiguous, in Atlantic
Avenue and Crescent Oil, but we noted that those decisions could be interpreted
as being limited to the presented facts. See also Grynberg v. Total, S.A., 538 F.3d
1336, 1354 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “we are not bound by decisions of state
intermediate appellate courts when we apply state law in a diversity case.”).
The Kansas Supreme Court initially accepted certification. It subsequently
dismissed the case, however, stating that, in light of a recent Kansas federal
district court decision, Gerdes v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 713 F.
Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Kan. 2010), it would be improper to accept certification
because there is controlling Kansas precedent. The dismissal order stated that
Gerdes “acknowledged the precedential value of Crescent Oil [ ] and Atlantic
Avenue [ ] beyond the facts of those cases,” and thus, these decisions represented
the state’s controlling precedent. Order to Dismiss, Union Ins. Co. v. Mendoza,
No. 104,087 (Kan. Oct. 8, 2010) (unpublished order).
In Gerdes, the district court held that under Kansas law, as articulated in
Atlantic Avenue and Crescent Oil, the definition of a pollutant in a pollution
exclusion clause as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant,
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including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste” is not
so overly broad as to be ambiguous and is not subject to conflicting
interpretations. 713 F. Supp. 2d at 1300-01. In Crescent Oil, gasoline leaked
from an underground storage tank at a gasoline station. The insured’s policy had
a pollution exclusion clause with the same definition of pollutants as in Irsik
Farm’s policy with Union. The Kansas court in Crescent Oil recognized that
“[c]ases in some jurisdictions may have limited the scope of the definition of
pollutant under the exclusion in a number of ways,” but that it was not
constrained to do so. 888 P.2d at 872-73. It declined to hold that the pollution
exclusion applied only to active industrial pollution, as the insured had
contended, and ruled that the policy definition of pollutants did not permit
“multiple conflicting interpretations.” Id. at 873. The Kansas Court of Appeals
in Atlantic Avenue followed Crescent Oil, holding that the exclusion clause was
not so overly broad as to render the entire exclusion ambiguous, 24 P.3d at 191,
and that liquid cement cleaner is a pollutant when it leaks out of a drum, causing
damage. Id. at 191-92.
Based on Gerdes, and the Kansas Supreme Court’s characterization of
Gerdes in its order of dismissal, we conclude that the district court correctly held
that, under Kansas law, the definition of a pollutant as “any solid, liquid, gaseous
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids,
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alkalis, chemicals and waste” is not ambiguous, and must, therefore, be enforced
according to its terms.
By its terms, the pollution exclusion clause here includes “any irritating or
contaminating substance, which may be a solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
substance.” Aplt. App., Vol. I, at 71. Union presented undisputed evidence that
anhydrous ammonia is an irritant. As noted by the district court, the Material
Safety Data Sheet for the anhydrous ammonia used by Irsik Farms stated that
exposure to the anhydrous ammonia was a major health hazard that could cause
respiratory tract burns, skin burns and eye burns, as well as nausea, vomiting and
nerve damage, and contains one or more components listed as a hazardous air
pollutant under the Clean Air Act. See Aplee. Br., Attach. 1, at 1-2, 7; Aplt.
App., Vol. II, at 345-46 (Memorandum and Order). Accordingly, we conclude the
district court correctly ruled that the release of anhydrous ammonia is a pollutant
under the pollution exclusion clause in Irsik Farm’s liability insurance policy with
Union, and, therefore, that Union is not liable for bodily injuries arising out of
Ms. Mendoza’s exposure to it.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary
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judgment in favor of Union.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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