United States v. French

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 21, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-5091
SHEILA DIANA FRENCH, (D.C. No. 03-CR-181-006-JHP)
(N. D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Sheila Diana French (French) appeals her 240-month sentence for
maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing and using
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). The sentence appealed
was imposed after remand from the 240-month sentence initially imposed. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir.
R. 32.1.
I.
The underlying facts in this case are set forth in French’s direct appeal. See
United States v. French, 200 Fed. App’x 774 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).
French and co-defendants Jason Read, Brandon Jones, Jessica Gutierrez, Gregory
Smith, and Ryan Cole were indicted for conspiring to manufacture and distribute
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), 846. In a
separate count, only French was charged with maintaining a place for the purpose
of manufacturing, distributing and using methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). French pleaded guilty to this charge, and the government
dismissed the conspiracy charge against her pursuant to the terms of the plea
agreement.
During French’s initial sentencing in 2004, the district court determined
French was responsible for 1,007 grams of methamphetamine and 71.2 grams of
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, and was thus subject to a base offense level of 32
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). The district court calculated an adjusted
offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of III. The district court’s
calculations included: (1) a six-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(8)(C)
for creating a substantial risk of harm to a minor because an eleven-month old
infant received second-degree burns during the manufacture of methamphetamine;
(2) a two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice
because French threatened to burn down the house of Elsa Marlin if she told
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authorities how the infant was burned; and (3) a three-point downward adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility. Based on these determinations, the resulting
guideline range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment, which exceeded the
statutory maximum of 240 months for French’s offense of conviction. The district
court sentenced French to 240 months of imprisonment.
French appealed her sentence, and we reversed and remanded for
resentencing on two grounds: (1) the district court erred by relying on judicially
found facts to mandatorily enhance her sentence, in violation of the Supreme
Court’s holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (making the
guidelines advisory, rather than mandatory); and (2) the district court erred by
including the weight of waste water in its calculation of the total weight of
methamphetamine used for calculating the base offense level, contrary to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.1 (2003).
On remand, the district court again sentenced French to 240 months of
imprisonment. When resentencing French, the district court determined that she
was responsible for 1,320 grams of methamphetamine, and was subject to the same
base offense level of 32 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). It again arrived at an
adjusted offense level of 37 by imposing the same enhancements as it had
previously for endangering a minor, and obstruction of justice, and also granting a
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The guideline range, with a
criminal history category of III, was again 262 to 327 months, which was above the
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240 month statutory maximum.
On remand, French raised numerous objections to her revised presentence
investigation report (“PSR”), including an objection to the PSR’s new drug quantity
calculation of 1,320 grams of methamphetamine. French also disputed the revised
PSR’s factual findings that supported the enhancements for endangering the life of
a minor, and for obstructing justice. The district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on February 28 and March 2, 2007, where the government offered one
witness and French offered nine witnesses. The court also considered the evidence
previously presented at the 2004 sentencing, which included testimony from French
and three government witnesses.
II.
French raises seven arguments on appeal. We first address French’s
argument that her resentencing was unfair because the district court was
predisposed to reimpose its prior sentence. Next, we address the procedural
reasonableness of French’s sentence, including her arguments concerning the
district court’s reliance on the hearsay testimony of Agent Abowd and the
credibility of co-defendant Gutierrez’s testimony concerning drug quantities, as
well as the sentencing enhancements for endangering a minor and obstructing
justice. Finally, we address the substantive reasonableness of French’s sentence.
A. Predisposition
French argues that the district judge’s decision to impose the same sentence
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on remand indicates that the court prejudged the evidence and was predisposed to
impose the same sentence. French did not raise this “predisposition” error before
the district court. As a result, we may only review for plain error. United States v.
Burbage, 365 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2004). “Plain error occurs when there is
(1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4)
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1107 (10th Cir. 2001).
When resentencing after a Booker remand, nothing precludes a sentencing
court from imposing the same sentence, or even a greater sentence, than it did
initially. See United States v. Medley, 476 F.3d 835, 840 (10th Cir. 2007)
(affirming a longer term of imprisonment on resentencing after a Booker remand);
United States v. Huber, 462 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentence is not
invalid simply because the district court came to the same conclusions both pre-
and post-Booker.”). To arrive at a reasonable sentence after a Booker remand, a
sentencing court must individualize the sentence by consulting the factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and adequately explaining the sentence imposed. United
States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 803 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)).
French is correct that a district court violates its duty to engage in
individualized sentencing when it reflexively imposes the same sentence on
remand. Yet, in this case, there is no evidence that the district judge in this case
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took this approach. To the contrary, the district court’s actions during the
resentencing process represent a near model example of post-Booker sentencing.
The court held an evidentiary hearing to allow the government and French to
resolve disputed factual questions regarding specific enhancements. At the hearing,
the government presented one witness and French presented nine witnesses.
During sentencing, the court addressed each of French’s objections to the revised
PSR and provided a basis for its ruling on each objection. After allowing French
and her attorney to address the court, the court announced that it had considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors including “the nature and circumstance of the offense,
as well as the personal characteristics of the defendant and her criminal history,”
ROA, Vol. XI, at 12, provided its final guideline calculation, recognized the
advisory nature of the guidelines under Booker, identified the factual basis for the
sentencing enhancements, and imposed a sentence. On this record, we cannot
conclude that the court reimposed the same sentence without any individualized
consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Further, French’s resentencing is
distinguishable from the sentencing in United States v. Crowell, 60 F.3d 199 (5th
Cir. 1995), the only case cited by French in support of her predisposition argument.
See Crowell, 60 F.3d at 201 (where, prior to sentencing, the district court expressed
concern over the sentence allowable under the plea agreement, “which was too light
a sentence, in the district court’s opinion”). In the present case, we have no overt
statement from the district court to indicate its predisposition regarding the
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appropriate sentence.1
French argues the district court failed to decide each sentencing issue de
novo. French points to the fact that the court in some instances overruled her
objections to the revised PSR by summarily referring to the prior rulings it made
when French was initially sentenced. See, e.g., ROA, Vol. XI, at 7 (“[T]he court
previously found by a preponderance of the evidence that the [PSR] was accurate
and a two-level increase was applicable. The court previously found by a
preponderance of the evidence that [French] threatened to burn Elsa Marlin’s house
if she, Marlin, told the police the truth about how the child was burned on August
26, 2003. Therefore, the court overrules these objections.”) Although the court
clearly referred to its prior rulings on these fact issues, it was permitted to do so.
See United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[D]e novo
resentencing permits the receipt of any relevant evidence the court could have
heard at the first sentencing hearing.”) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
That the district court reached the same conclusions after hearing more evidence
does not indicate the court’s initial rulings were erroneous.
Additionally, the district court did not restrict the evidence or argument that
1
French argues that the district court’s decision to reduce her attorney fees is
overt evidence of predisposition. As the order reducing attorney fees is currently
pending in a separate appeal, No. 07-5147, we express no opinion as to the
propriety of that decision. However, even if the district court erred in reducing the
attorney fees, under a plain error standard of review, that alone would be
insufficient evidence of predisposition.
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French could present at resentencing. In fact, French took ample advantage of this
opportunity and presented nine witnesses. The court also acknowledged the receipt
of new evidence, at one point noting that “[n]o new evidence has been presented to
the court that would warrant a change to this previous finding.” ROA, Vol. XI, at
4. The court’s rulings reflect that it considered French’s arguments and evidence in
reaching its ultimate conclusions. French has not shown plain error.
B. Procedural Sentencing Errors
French argues that the district court committed several procedural errors in
the imposition of her sentence. “In reviewing the district court’s application of the
Sentencing Guidelines, this court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal
determinations de novo.” United States v. Redcap, 505 F.3d 1321, 1322 (10th Cir.
2007).
1. Hearsay Evidence
French argues that the district court improperly considered hearsay evidence
provided by Agent Abowd because the out-of-court statements to which he referred
were made by drug dealers with numerous criminal convictions, and were thus
unreliable. However, we have previously held that district courts may consider
reliable hearsay testimony when sentencing. United States v. Bustamonte, 454 F.3d
1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). French argues that the district court gave no reasoned
explanation for admitting and considering Agent Abowd’s hearsay testimony.
However, the district court noted at sentencing that the statements corroborated one
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another and were supported by the fact that French attempted “to cover up what
really happened at her residences.” ROA, Vol. XI, at 5. The district court’s ruling
that the hearsay statements were sufficiently reliable is supported by the record,
and, thus, the district court properly considered these statements at sentencing.
2. Witness Credibility and Drug Quantity Calculations
The base offense level for the unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting,
trafficking or possession of illegal narcotics is based on the quantity of drugs for
which a defendant is responsible. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. When narcotics are not
seized, the district court may estimate the drug quantity for sentencing, “so long as
the information relied upon has some basis of support in the facts of the particular
case and bears sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Verdin-Garcia,
516 F.3d 884, 896 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted); see U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1 cmt. 12 (“Where there is no drug seizure . . . the court shall approximate
the quantity of the controlled substance.”).
The district court adopted the drug quantity findings in the revised PSR at
resentencing. The revised PSR estimates
. . . that Jason Read manufactured methamphetamine at the
defendant’s residence approximately one hundred times. Fifty percent
of the time, these cooks would produce at least 28 grams of
methamphetamine (1,400 grams). The remaining cooks produced at
least five grams of methamphetamine (250 grams). The defendant
knowingly and intentionally offered this residence for, and was aware
that, Read was manufacturing methamphetamine at her residence
eighty percent of the time or on eighty occasions, and therefore is
responsible for 1,320 grams of a mixture and substance containing a
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detectable amount of methamphetamine.
ROA, Vol. III, 2007 PSR, at 8 ¶ 18.2
In adopting the drug quantity suggested by the revised PSR, the district court
based its finding on the 2004 sentencing testimony of co-defendant Jessica
Gutierrez. ROA, Vol. XI, at 7. Gutierrez testified that Jason Read manufactured
methamphetamine 100 times at French’s residence, that on 50-75% of those
occasions Read manufactured at least 28 to 30 grams of methamphetamine, and that
the other times Read produced between 5 and 10 grams at a time. ROA, Vol. VI, at
53-54. Gutierrez indicated that French became angry with Read for manufacturing
methamphetamine about 20 times, but did not object on other occasions. Id. at 96.
She also indicated that French would purchase and provide pseudoephedrine to be
used in producing methamphetamine. Id. at 55.
French objected to the revised PSR’s calculation, arguing that Gutierrez was
not a credible witness and that the district court failed to offer a reasoned
explanation for crediting Gutierrez’s testimony. In particular, French argues that
Gutierrez was facing prison time and therefore had an incentive to lie to obtain a
lesser sentence for herself. French also cites Gutierrez’s drug use as a reason for
not crediting her testimony.
2
French argues for the first time in her reply brief that the district court
should have used the estimate provided by Brandon Jones of six or seven cooks,
rather than the one hundred cooks estimated by Jessica Gutierrez. Arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief on appeal are deemed waived. See Stump v.
Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000).
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While French’s arguments regarding Gutierrez’s credibility are noted, this
court has made clear that “the district court’s determination of a witness’s
credibility at a sentencing hearing is virtually unreviewable on appeal,” and will
only constitute grounds for reversal where testimony is “unbelievable on its face,
i.e., testimony as to facts that the witness physically could not have possibly
observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” United
States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotations and brackets omitted). Gutierrez’s testimony relates to events she could
have heard, and it appears credible on its face. We have no basis for concluding
the district court erred in considering her testimony when determining drug
quantity.
3. Enhancement for Endangering a Minor
The district court applied a six-level enhancement to French’s base offense
level for committing an offense that “(i) involved the manufacture of . . .
methamphetamine; and (ii) created a substantial risk of harm to the life of a
minor[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(8)(C). The district court adopted the following
facts from the revised PSR:
On August 26, 2003, a child between the age of one and two years was
burned in a flash fire related to methamphetamine manufacture at
French’s residence . . . . French, Read, and Gutierrez were outside of
the residence when the child was burned. French had been boiling
some used coffee filters in acetone in an attempt to recover a
minuscule amount of methamphetamine which might be present in the
filters. When the contents of the pan and the kitchen stove flared into
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an open fire, Brandon Jones, Read’s friend and co-conspirator, was
standing nearby and tried to put the burning pan in the kitchen sink.
Some of the burning liquid sloshed out of the pan and landed on the
child. French argued against taking the child to the hospital because
authorities would recognize the child’s wounds as chemical burns.
ROA, Vol. III, 2007 PSR, at 7 ¶ 14; see ROA, Vol. XI, at 6 (finding this account of
events to be “accurate”).
French argues that the district court’s factual finding that she did not want
the child to be taken to the hospital was clearly erroneous.3 We disagree.
Gutierrez testified that French was concerned the authorities would recognize a
chemical burn and conduct a follow-up investigation. ROA, Vol. VI, at 63. Elsa
Marlin testified that French was concerned about being “busted” if the child was
taken to the hospital. ROA, Vol. VI, at 107-08. This corroborating testimony
provided an adequate factual basis to support the court’s finding.
French again argues that the district court made clearly erroneous witness
credibility determinations. She argues that Gutierrez and Marlin were not credible,
while the testimony of her sister and a co-worker, neither of whom were at the
residence on the day the child was burned, should have been given more
3
French actually argues that the enhancement for endangering a child should
not apply to French if it did not apply to Brandon Jones, who was also present
when the child was burned. See Aplt. Br. at 53 (“On this record, the court cannot
adopt Jones’ plea agreement and hold the burning of the child was unforeseeable to
him but find the enhancement for injury to a minor child applied to [French].”).
However, the district court based its decision to apply the enhancement on French’s
insistence that the baby not be taken to the hospital for treatment of the burns, and
not on whether the manufacture of methamphetamine foreseeably could cause
injury to a minor. ROA, Vol. XI, at 6.
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consideration by the district court. The testimony of Gutierrez and Marlin is
credible on its face, and we will not disturb the district court’s credibility
determinations. See Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d at 1018.
4. Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice
The district court imposed a two-level enhancement against French because
it found she
(A) . . . willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede the administration of justice during the course of the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the
defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a
closely related offense[.]
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court found at French’s initial sentencing that
French threatened to burn down Elsa Marlin’s house if she told the police the truth
about how her child was burned. The district court reaffirmed this finding on
remand. ROA, Vol. XI, at 8.
French contends that the district court erred in imposing this enhancement
for two reasons. First, she claims that this court should use a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard in imposing this enhancement. This argument is foreclosed by this
court’s decision in United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 683-85 (10th Cir.
2005), which made clear that post-Booker sentencing courts may make factual
findings by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as they do not apply the
guidelines in a mandatory fashion. Second, she argues that the district court was
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unreasonable in applying the enhancement based on Marlin’s testimony because she
was not a credible witness. We disagree. The district court had the opportunity to
hear Marlin’s testimony and to assess her credibility. French has not shown her
testimony to be unbelievable on its face. See Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d at 1018.
C. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence
Finally, French appeals the substantive reasonableness of her sentence.
French was sentenced within the guidelines, 4 so this court applies a deferential
standard of presumptive reasonableness to the sentence on appeal. United States v.
Angel-Guzman, 506 F.3d 1007, 1014 (10th Cir. 2007). French may rebut the
presumption of reasonableness on appeal by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when viewed in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Id.As her primary argument, French cites 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) to argue that
there is an unwarranted disparity between her sentence of 240 months of
imprisonment and the sentences of her co-defendants Gutierrez, Jones, and Cole.
We have said, however, that “[o]rdinarily, the disparity between co-defendants’
sentences is not grounds for relief.” United States v. Shaw, 471 F.3d 1136, 1140
4
French was sentenced to 240 months of imprisonment, the statutory
maximum sentence for the crime of conviction. French’s term of imprisonment is
the guideline sentence, even though it is below the calculated guideline range of
262 to 327 months of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1 (“Where the statutorily
authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline
range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline
sentence.”).
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(10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “While similar offenders engaged in similar
conduct should be sentenced equivalently, . . . disparate sentences are allowed
where the disparity is explicable by the facts on the record.” United States v.
Goddard, 929 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted).
French’s calculated guideline range included enhancements for creating a
substantial risk of harm to a minor, and for obstruction of justice. These
enhancements were not found to apply to her co-defendants. Without those
enhancements, her offense level would have been 29, and, with a criminal history
category of III, her guideline range would have been 108-135 months of
imprisonment. This hypothetical guideline range would have been comparable to
the sentences of co-defendant Jones (125 months); Cole (130 months); and
Gutierrez (79 months).
French raises two final points to support her argument that her 240-month
sentence is substantively unreasonable. First, she contends that her sentence is far
greater than it would have been if based solely on drug quantities she specifically
admitted to using or distributing at her initial sentencing hearing. This argument is
essentially a repetition of her claim that the district court’s drug quantity
calculation was erroneous, a claim which we again reject. To the extent French
argues that our current sentencing system “does nothing to further the goals of the
Sixth Amendment,” Aplt. Br. at 57, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
otherwise. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S. Ct. 856, 863-
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68 (2007) (summarizing cases). Second, French claims the district court erred in
failing to consider her unique individual characteristics as required under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1). Specifically, she notes that she has been continuously employed for
over thirty years, which she claims is unusual for a person convicted of a narcotics
offense. She also emphasizes that, since her incarceration, no disciplinary action
has been taken against her. While French’s employment history and unblemished
prison record are to her credit, these considerations fail to overcome the
presumption of reasonableness which applies on appeal to sentences within the
applicable guideline range.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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